Residential Property Tax Abatement;Testing a Model of Neighborhood Impact by Swetkis, Doreen
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
ETD Archive
2009
Residential Property Tax Abatement;Testing a
Model of Neighborhood Impact
Doreen Swetkis
Cleveland State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive
Part of the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in ETD Archive by an
authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Swetkis, Doreen, "Residential Property Tax Abatement;Testing a Model of Neighborhood Impact" (2009). ETD Archive. 286.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive/286
  
 
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX ABATEMENT:   
TESTING A MODEL OF NEIGHBORHOOD IMPACT 
 
 
 
DOREEN SWETKIS 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor of Liberal Studies 
 
Bowling Green State University 
 
May, 1991 
 
 
 
 
Master of Education 
 
Cleveland State University 
 
December, 1998 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN URBAN STUDIES AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
 
at the 
 
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
December, 2009 
  
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by Doreen Swetkis 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation has been approved for the Department of URBAN STUDIES 
  
and the College of Graduate Studies by 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________ 
Dissertation Chairperson, Professor Mark S. Rosentraub, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Department of Urban Studies, Date 
 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
Professor William M. Bowen, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Department of Urban Studies, Date 
 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
Professor Julia Beckett, J.D., Ph.D. 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Department of Public Administration and Urban Studies,  
The University of Akron, Date 
  
 
DEDICATION 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my wonderful husband Marc, whose steadfast support 
was paramount to my success,  
and to my daughter Fay, who can now call me “Dr. Mommy”. 
  
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I wish to thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Mark S. Rosentraub, for providing consistent 
and sage advice throughout this entire process, and saving my academic life.  I would like 
to gratefully acknowledge Dr. William M. Bowen.  Words can not fully express the deep 
respect, admiration and gratitude I feel for having had the pleasure of learning from him 
throughout my time in the program.  I wish to thank Dr. Julia Beckett, whose comments 
and perspective were instrumental in the formulation of this final document.   
I want to acknowledge what an honor it had been to work with the faculty, staff and 
students of the Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, especially Dr. Roberta 
Steinbacher.  Such a supportive environment has been instrumental to my success.  
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the Albert A. and Maxine Goodman Levin Advisory 
Fund for providing financial assistance for this dissertation. 
 
 vi
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX ABATEMENT:   
TESTING A MODEL OF NEIGHBORHOOD IMPACT 
DOREEN SWETKIS 
ABSTRACT 
Using a quasi-experimental research design, this study examines the relationship 
between residential property tax abatement for new construction, and urban 
neighborhoods in four Ohio cities.  Neighborhoods were defined as census tract.  The 
purpose of this research is to determine if there is a statistically significant relationship at 
p < .05 between residential property tax abatement programs for new construction and 
several different measures of neighborhood outcomes.  The neighborhood outcome 
measures can be grouped under the broad concepts of increased private investment, blight 
removal, decreased criminal activity, and property tax equity.  Subsequent questions 
investigated are the direction of these relationships and the existence of a threshold level 
at which point relationships become significant.  The utilization of a comparable 
comparison group addresses the counterfactual scenario.  Independence of samples tests 
and multivariate cubic regression are employed to answer the research questions. 
Results indicate that there are no discernable effects between residential property tax 
abatement and the indicators of neighborhood change as defined in the study.  Second, 
there appears to be no threshold at which the number of tax abated residential units 
becomes significantly associated with the indicators of neighborhood change.  Third, 
there were no significant differences on the indicators of neighborhood change between 
subject and comparison groups.  In essence, there are no effects from residential tax 
abatement policy seen at the neighborhood level. 
 vii
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Evaluation of programs needs to take into account program objectives other than just 
economic development, for example, do they actually help solve social problems. 
~ B. Guy Peters, 1999, pp. 60-61. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study and statement of the problem 
If the frequent and enduring use of tax incentive programs in Ohio cities is any 
indication, then one could conclude elected officials perceive such policies as effective or 
at the minimum, necessary evils used to compete with other communities and states.  
Empowered by state government, local jurisdictions in Ohio can (and often do) grant tax 
incentives to attract new or retain current homeowners and businesses.  The effectiveness 
of such incentives for residential development has been debated in newspapers (e.g., 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 2007; The Plain Dealer, 2007; Toledo Blade, 2008; Dayton 
Daily News, 2009), on community blogs (e.g., Green City Blue Lake; 
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blog.cleveland.com) and in government chambers, as well as in the academic literature 
(e.g., Simons & Sharkey, 1997; Dalehite, Mikesell, & Zorn, 2005).   
Tax incentives are often rationalized in terms of achieving broad public policy 
objectives such as increased investment (e.g., City of Toledo Department of 
Development, 2008; Columbus City Bulletin, 2005; City of Dayton, 2003), elimination of 
blight (e.g., Cleveland City Record, 1999) decrease in criminal activity (e.g., Toledo 
Ordinance No. 170-04, 2004), and promotion of neighborhood stability (e.g., City of 
Columbus Department of Development, 2006; City of Cleveland, 1990).  Evaluating such 
programs to determine if goals and objectives are being met is often overlooked.  This 
study will examine the relationship between one such policy incentive, residential 
property tax abatement programs for new construction (herein referred to as “RPTA”), 
and urban neighborhoods in four Ohio cities.  The purpose of this research is to determine 
if there is a statistically significant relationship between RPTA and several different 
measures of neighborhood outcomes:  (1) home purchase mortgage loan applications,   
(2) home purchase mortgage application approval rates, (3) the median amount of home 
purchase loans originated, (5) number of businesses in a neighborhood, (6) type and 
number of crimes and (7) vertical equity in property taxation.  This evaluation is modeled 
after Galster, Hayes, Boxall and Johnson’s (2005) work that focused on developing a set 
of robust, parsimonious indicators of neighborhood change, and the work of Galster, 
Hayes and Johnson (2004) and their examination of the impact of place-based public 
programs in changing the trajectories of neighborhoods indicators.   
The four cities in this study, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Toledo, provide 
an interesting group to examine, as each has tailored RPTA programs to fit local 
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objectives.  The local character associated with each city’s RPTA program allows for 
intra-state comparisons of the broader Ohio policy and evokes an additional set of 
important questions regarding RPTA policy implementation including the effects of 
abatement levels, the concentration of abated properties, and the duration of abatements 
on each indicator of success.  Simons and Sharkey (1997) conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis on several RPTA projects in Cleveland and concluded that the duration of 
abatement (fifteen years) may be too long, resulting in a deficit for the city if extended 
beyond ten years.  Conversely Bier, Mikelbank, Horn, Post and Rosentraub (2007) 
concluded in their study of Cleveland’s RPTA program that increasing the duration from 
ten to fifteen years resulted in a spike in residential construction and an increase in the 
city’s tax revenues.  This study influenced the recent political decision made by 
Cleveland City Council, which was to renew the current RPTA program at 15 years, 100 
percent for new construction (Cleveland City Council, 2007). 
The data in Table 1 describe the four cities.  The estimated change of certain 
socio-demographic characteristics is useful in providing a context for a study on RPTA.  
The data were taken from the actual count for the 2000 U.S. Census and the estimated 
figures derived from the 2005-2007 American Community Survey (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 2008).  The following estimates are illustrative of possible trends occurring in 
these cities.  Additionally, the City of Columbus is unique in that it has increased its 
population through annexation of several surrounding areas.  Dayton is unique in that the 
percentage of owner-occupied homes is projected to decrease, while increasing in the 
other cities.  This trend may reflect that Dayton is a community hit particularly hard by 
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the foreclosure crisis, which may also have resulted in the median housing values being 
grossly over-estimated.  
 
Table 1 
Estimated Percent Changes in Socio-Demographic Characteristics from 2000 to 2005-07 
  
 
City 
 
Population 
 
White 
 
Black 
 
Owner-
occupied 
units 
 
Median value 
owner-occupied 
units 
 
Housing units 
built 00-07 as 
percent of total 
housing units 
 
 
Cleveland 
 
-15.3 
 
-19.7 
 
-12.3 
 
+6.3 
 
+18.9 
 
2.7 
 
 
Columbus 
 
+1.7 
 
-1.7 
 
+8.9 
 
+14.6 
 
+26.2 
 
10.5 
 
 
Dayton 
 
-11.7 
 
-12.7 
 
-9.7 
 
-4.1 
 
+20.1 
 
3.1 
 
 
Toledo 
 
-7.8 
 
-11.6 
 
-0.8 
 
+0.7 
 
+30.2 
 
2.5 
 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population & Housing; 2005-2007 American Community 
Survey 
 
1.2  The Political Debate 
In examining RPTA, the essential question for cities considering the program is 
whether policy implementation changes housing investment patterns within specific 
geographic areas.  From the city’s perspective, the overall goal of the policy is to increase 
housing supply through increased private development, and increase demand for housing 
by attracting non-residents from outside the city.  It has been argued that RPTA makes 
new housing construction affordable and provides “new product jumpers” an incentive to 
put urban neighborhoods on their list of housing options (D. S. Sharkey, personal 
communication, November 17, 2006).   
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Popular arguments supporting the use of RPTA hinge on a counter-factual 
scenario:  if there were no abatements, there would be significantly less demand for 
housing in urban neighborhoods (e.g., Bier, et al., 2007).  It has been argued (e.g., 
Rosentraub, 2003) that RPTA can be offset by the increased revenue from other taxes a 
city can collect from its new residents who, presumably, earn a higher-than-average 
income.  For example, the City of Cleveland operating budget for 2007 lists income taxes 
as 55.3 percent of general fund revenues, sales, fines and other taxes as 14 percent, and 
property taxes as constituting 10.5 percent (City of Cleveland, 2008).  Bier et al., (2007) 
found a modest increase in income tax gain for Cleveland of $509,044 per year.  
Proponents also argue that, not only is the city receiving greater property tax revenues 
from land taxes, but the formerly under-utilized land is now occupied by owners who 
earn (on average) higher incomes, and who could possibly contribute to a city’s revenue 
base through payment of other taxes.  There are also costs to cities to maintain abandoned 
properties or vacant land such as maintenance (lawn mowing) and public safety.  Other 
possible positive benefits of RPTA are that it helps remove blight (the original goal of tax 
abatement policy in Ohio), spurs more local economic activity (the current goal of the 
policy), and positively impacts nearby non-abated property values (Bier, et al., 2007).  
Further, framing RPTA as an effective economic development policy over the long term 
allows proponents to argue that the abatements will eventually expire resulting in 
substantial and new property taxes filling city coffers.  Finally, while it can be argued that 
RPTA creates a gap at the neighborhood level between the original lower-income 
households and the new generally higher-income households in abated homes, conversely 
it can be argued that, on a regional level RPTA may help improve the mix of income 
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groups in a city and reduce the disparity in median income levels between central city 
and suburban households.  
Opponents of RPTA describe such policy incentives as nothing more than 
“bribes” for potential homeowners to choose one community over another, resulting in 
foregone property tax revenues for the community offering the incentive.  Abatements 
have been described as “involuntary subsidies” (Dardia, 1998) given by overlapping 
jurisdictions (e.g., school districts, counties) who have little or no control over RPTA 
policies.  Hoxby argues that tax burdens are not an indicator of competitiveness, but 
rather an attempt to compensate for an unobserved difference in more fundamental 
characteristics (as cited in Bradbury & Kodrzycki, 1997).   
Opponents can also argue that RPTA may result in tax inequity because properties 
of similar values are not being equally taxed, placing a heavier burden on poorer and 
more immobile city homeowners.  In essence the owners of non-abated property may be 
paying higher taxes to maintain public service provisions in order to compensate for 
those not paying the property tax.  The counter argument is that non-abated homes 
increase in value due to the improved demand for property as more people are attracted to 
a city by incentives such as RPTA.  Opponents further argue that the abated taxes are 
merely capitalized into the sales prices (or rent) of homes; therefore, purchasers end up 
paying an amount equal to the abated taxes to the home seller or developer (Bartimole, 
2007).  For aging, declining areas in a region tax abatements offered by one community 
may in effect force neighboring communities to offer similar or better tax incentives, 
resulting in a negative-sum game as these jurisdictions draw from the same limited 
regional pool of “desirable” (middle class, higher earning) residents.   
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Across the longer term these residents may eventually leave the community for 
one that has a more desirable package of public goods and services, regardless of the tax 
incentive, because of homeowners’ changing preferences.   If the out-migration of 
desirable homeowners results in filtering, the desirable homeowners will be replaced with 
a less wealthy group of homeowners.  Thus, the reliance on alternative taxes to enhance a 
city’s revenues may no longer support the alternative-to-property-taxes argument made 
by some proponents of RPTA.  Another major argument against RPTA programs is that 
they cripple urban city school districts.  The current funding structure of public school 
districts in Ohio is such that districts rely heavily on property tax revenues, which is not 
the case in other states1.  Finally, a legal argument against RPTA could be made in that, 
although the policy appears prima facie neutral, it has a disparate impact on minorities 
who are significantly less likely to be able to afford new homes, even if those homes are 
tax abated.   
 
1.3  Statement of the Research Question 
Adapting the work of Galster, Walker, Hayes and Johnson (2004) and Galster, 
Hayes and Johnson (2005), a fundamental research question regarding the effectiveness 
of public policy at the neighborhood level is addressed.  The main research question is 
whether there is a statistical relationship between residential property tax abatement 
(RPTA) and changes in urban neighborhoods as measured on a set of indicators. 
                                                 
1 However, changes in the current school funding structure (rather than a moratorium on RPTA programs) 
may be the preferred solution to the plight of urban schools in Ohio.  Since 1997, the State of Ohio has 
been under an order from the Ohio Supreme Court to create a more equitable public school district funding 
structure, including a decrease in the reliance on property tax revenues.  See Case No. 1999-0570, DeRolph 
v. State, and subsequent court action for more details.  The complex relationship between school district 
funding and property tax allocation is beyond the scope of this study.  
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Subsequent questions are investigated, namely, if there are such relationships, in what 
direction are these associations?  Is there a certain number of new RPTA homes needed 
in a neighborhood before significant relationships are revealed?  Finally, if there were no 
RPTA in neighborhoods would the relationships remain the same, maintain a significant 
level of association, and/or be in the same direction?   
 
1.4  Objectives & Significance 
An objective of this study is to uncover significant relationships between RPTA and 
stated policy outcomes such as increased private investment, removal of blight, and 
reduction in crime.  Although equitable distribution of property tax burden is not an 
outcome stated in the legislature, it is a popular argument made against the effectiveness 
of RPTA and therefore worthy of investigation. 
This study makes a new and important contribution to the literature in its evaluation 
of RPTA policy (and, by extension, other local economic development policies involving 
incentives) in several ways.  First, this study expands upon the established work of other 
experts in the field of urban studies, thus building on our collective knowledge of policy 
evaluation at the neighborhood level.  This is accomplished by testing the usefulness of a 
published model used to measure the impact of another public policy at the neighborhood 
level.  Second, this study includes a measure for equity in its evaluation of a public 
policy.  Including measures for private and public activities, as well as a measure for 
equity appears to be somewhat unique in that policy evaluations generally pick one type 
of indicator only. Third, previous studies of RPTA have been mostly descriptive in the 
analysis (e.g., Bier, et al., 2007; Dalehite, et al., 2005) and/or are from a purely economic 
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perspective (e.g., Simons & Sharkey, 1997). This study is a causally-probative (Shadish, 
Cook, and Campbell, 2002) analysis in order to uncover the impact of RPTA on certain 
neighborhood characteristics, which serve as proxies for more complex dimensions of 
neighborhood activity (Galster, et al., 2005). Bier, et al. (2007) comment that the ideal 
research design would be to compare a set of outcomes between subject cities with RPTA 
and cities without such a program.  They argued that appropriate statistical controls and 
methodological limitations required reliance on an in-depth case study approach.  This 
study takes a different tact and, rather than attempting a city-to-city comparison, it 
compares a set of outcomes between neighborhoods with tax-abated homes and those 
without such homes in an attempt to measure impact at the community level versus the 
more common approach of examining outcomes at the parcel level.  Finally, the analysis 
uses data that are collected annually, thus providing a more accurate reflection of current 
activity in urban neighborhoods. 
The administration of the same public policy (and its effects) can vary widely 
across jurisdictions.  In the case of RPTA, states grant different authority to local 
governments regarding their ability to offer abatements.  Some states grant localities the 
authority to abate all property taxes—county and school—on new investments in their 
jurisdiction.  Other states allow each overlapping government to grant abatements of only 
its own taxes on new investments (Beck, 1993).  The study sample is drawn from the 
population of Ohio municipalities because the abatement policy is a state-derived policy 
and operates at the state level.  The study can be replicated to examine the impact of 
RPTA policy in other areas or to examine other public policies.   
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1.5  Definition of Terms 
Constructs such as “effective” and “equity” need to be clearly defined in order for 
an empirical analysis incorporating such constructs to have any useful meaning.  The 
following section provides definitions for terms and constructs used in this analysis.  
Please note that the definitions provided are not necessarily the only way in which one 
could frame these constructs.   
 
1.5.1  Residential Property Tax Abatement 
Residential property tax abatement (RPTA) is defined as an exemption from 
taxation for real property granted by municipal, township, or county governments as an 
incentive for development (Ohio Department of Taxation, 2006), specifically under the 
Ohio Community Reinvestment Area program.  The International Association of 
Assessing Officers (IAAO) define abatement as  
(1) an official reduction or elimination of one's assessed valuation after 
completion of the original assessment; (2) An official reduction or elimination of 
one's tax liability after completion of the assessment roll. (2004, p. 25) 
 
Carter and Hildreth define real property as land and improvements (as cited in Rabin, 
1992), assessed at 35 percent in Ohio (Ohio Department of Taxation, 2006).  The 
abatement offered under RPTA in Ohio’s large cities, however, do not include the land, 
but apply only to the improvements (in this case, new residential construction). The 
particulars of local RPTA policy vary for new construction in Ohio.  Table 2 provides a 
summary of the RPTA policy parameters current for the four cities in this study.  Each 
city may have designated Community Reinvestment Areas prior to the date listed, and 
may have scattered properties receiving tax abatement prior to the date as well.  The date 
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listed in Table 2 identifies when the respective city standardized and codified its RPTA 
program.  As reflected in Table 1, Columbus is unique among Ohio cities because of its 
ability to annex outlining areas resulting in population changes different to the other 
cities in the study.  Similarly, Table 2 shows that Columbus officials did not see the need 
for offering residential tax incentives until 2001, when apparently some of the oldest 
areas of the city were showing substantial levels of disinvestment.  Further, Columbus 
and Dayton confine their respective RPTA programs to small geographic areas. 
 
Table 2 
Comparison of Residential Tax Abatement Program Characteristics by City for One-
Three Family New Construction 
 
  
Cleveland 
 
 
Columbus 
 
Dayton 
 
Toledo 
 
Beginning Date of 
Neighborhood 
Program 
 
 
1991 
 
2001 
 
1993 
 
1981 
 
Rate (% of 
Improved Value) 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
(graduated 
for 2 CRAs) 
 
 
100% 
 
Duration 
 
15 years 
 
15 years 
 
9-10 years 
 
15 years 
 
 
Clawbacks/penalties 
for non-compliance 
 
Rescind 
abatement w/o 
reinstatement 
 
Rescind 
abatement 
 
Rescind 
abatement 
 
 
None 
 
Community 
Reinvestment Area 
 
Whole City 
 
Neighborhood 
Investment 
Districts 
 
Specific  
CRAs, 
w/emphasis 
on historic 
districts 
 
 
CRAs 
comprising 
majority of 
city 
 
 
It can be argued that exemption rather than abatement is the appropriate term to 
use in drafting such policies because the locality is choosing not to collect taxes on the 
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increased value of the property, the value of which was non-existent prior to the 
exemption.  In essence, one cannot abate (i.e., put an end to) something one never had in 
the first place.  Since Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) defines abatement as “the act of 
lessening or moderating; diminution in amount or degree”, this definition is appropriately 
applied in this instance because governments collect taxes on real property, regardless of 
the value of the property.  RPTA is merely a diminution in the amount of what otherwise 
would be collected.   Further, if the results from this study support a counter-factual 
scenario i.e., that these neighborhoods would have followed the same trajectories if there 
had been no residential tax abatement policy implemented, then the respective taxing 
jurisdictions would experience a loss of property tax revenues because of RPTA.  
 
1.5.2  Effective 
When describing public policy as effective, one way to measure it is to determine 
whether the goals were reached and stated objectives met.  The stated goal of CRA policy 
in Ohio is: 
To promote the revitalization of areas where investment has been 
discouraged…The law is used for historic preservation, residential rehabilitation, 
industrial remodeling and expansion, and new commercial, residential and 
industrial construction. (Ohio Department of Taxation, 1998, p. 6) 
 
RPTA will be described as effective policy if there is a significant increase in 
investment, a decrease in crime, and no significant differences in the distribution of the 
property tax burden in neighborhoods with RPTA versus city neighborhoods without the 
program.  One could make a determination that RPTA was effective if the above 
legislative goal has been met, in essence, if there was a significant increase in private 
sector investment.  However, this dissertation expands beyond that economic objective to 
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include measurements addressing blight removal, public safety and tax equity, concepts 
that are mentioned as objectives in some of the local ordinances regarding RPTA.  If 
there are no significantly different relationships between the indicators of neighborhood 
change for the subject and comparison neighborhoods, then the effectiveness of RPTA as 
an economic or community development tool is brought into question.  
 
1.5.3  Equity 
Notions of redistribution and equality are often components in definitions of 
equity as it relates to public policy.  These notions are value-laden terms that can be 
interpreted differently by different people (Been, 1992).  For example, some ways to 
frame a discussion of redistribution can be in terms of wealth, income, tax burden, 
administrative cost, or public goods and services.  Krumholz and Clavel define social 
equity as, “The conscious attempt [by public officials] to devise redistributive policies in 
favor of the least powerful and to enhance the avenues of participation” (1994, p. 1).  
Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson frames the concept not as a political one but as the need 
for equitable representation in the way our American society and economy are structured 
(Zaun, 2007).  While public choice models of local expenditures do not explicitly include 
redistribution, such approaches may be considered equitable if one assumes that the 
federal government fulfills a redistributive role (Blair & Kumar, 1997; Helms, 1985; 
others).  In essence, distribution (of tax burden, public services, income) is a public 
policy issue more so than an economic market outcome because it is a question of values 
(Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989).  Similarly, equality can be framed as equal access to the 
allocation of public resources, equal distribution of public goods and services, or equal 
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application of the procedural processes of government administration, or all of the above.  
Equality can be viewed as a passive approach to fairness; if everyone in a jurisdiction is 
offered the same opportunity to access public resources, then the system could be viewed 
as fair.     
In this study, equity refers to vertical equity in property taxation, which occurs 
“when the assessment ratio—the ratio of assessed value to market value—is uniform 
across property value ranges”, (Cornia & Slade, 2005, p. 19).  The International 
Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) defines equity in assessment as, “the degree to 
which assessments bear a consistent relationship to market value…(2) In popular usage, a 
synonym for tax fairness” (2004, p. 26).  
Systematic vertical inequity occurs when lower-value properties are consistently 
assessed at a greater portion of their market value, creating what may be referred to as an 
“arbitrary and capricious” tax system, with those least able to afford it paying a greater 
proportion of their income for property taxes.  One hypothesis for the existence of such 
inequity is that, in order to offset the loss in revenues from the higher-valued tax-abated 
homes, the lower-valued non-abated homes in the neighborhood may be systematically 
assessed at a greater proportion of their market value (e.g., Bartimole, 2007).  This study 
examines vertical tax equity to uncover the presence of any unfair property tax burden in 
neighborhoods with tax-abated homes relative to those without abatement.  If median 
assessment-to-sales ratios between the subject and comparison neighborhoods are 
significantly different from each other, then there exists the possibility of systematic 
vertical inequity across the combined neighborhoods (Birch, Sunderman & Smith, 2004), 
and a need for further research to determine the extent of the inequity.   
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1.5.4  Neighborhood 
 Galster (2001) describes neighborhoods as bundles of spatially-based 
characteristics including those that are structural, infrastructural, demographic, socio-
economic, environmental, political, social-interactive and sentimental, where what is 
produced is consumed by the same actors, namely households, property owners, business 
people and local government. Where one neighborhood stops and another begins is where 
the bundle of attribute changes.  Galster (1986) discusses Suttles' four levels of 
neighborhood:  block face (where children are allowed to play w/o supervision; 
"defended neighborhood" (the smallest area possessing a corporate identity as defined by 
mutual opposition to another area); "community of limited liability" (administrative 
district in which individuals' social participation was selective and voluntary).  When 
people have been asked to draw their neighborhood, there is no common answer given, 
nor is one of the levels of neighborhood dominant: "Actual urban spaces thus may be 
arrayed within a matrix according to their scores on these dimensions, analogous to a 
social area analysis" (p. 258).  Sawicki & Flynn (1996) argue that examining indicators at 
the neighborhood level is the best way to check for success/failure of public policy at the 
local level because local economic development policies, such as RPTA, operate on a 
city subarea (CRAs).   
In the academic literature, there are several possibilities for defining 
neighborhoods for analysis such as predetermined radii around elementary schools, 
administrative boundaries as determined by government, housing submarkets (e.g., Bates, 
2006), and other interesting ways to conceive of them (e.g., “collective consumption 
units”, Ostrom, 2005, p. 2).  Sawicki and Flynn (1996) sum it up well when they write: 
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More recently, Galster (1986) showed that, depending on the context, even a 
single resident could describe different boundaries for a neighborhood according 
to the subject being explored.  User-defined areas, institutional definitions, etc. 
make it so that there is not one overarching definition.  (p. 167) 
 
A common approach in the literature (Chow & Coulton, 1998), and the one taken by 
Galster, et al. (2004; 2005), is to delineate neighborhoods by Census tract.  Some of the 
data sets used in this study are available at the tract level (e.g., HMDA), while the other 
data at parcel or address level will be assigned appropriate census tracts.   
This dissertation will examine the relationship of RPTA to urban neighborhoods. 
Census tracts will act as proxies for neighborhoods, and urban neighborhoods are defined 
as those Census tracts that fall within the political boundaries of the following Ohio 
cities:  Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Toledo.  While use of proxies is not the ideal 
choice, Gephart (in Brooks-Gunn, Duncan & Aber, 1997) comments,  
although administrative units, such as census tract and block groups, are imperfect 
proxies for the concept of local community, they generally possess more 
ecological integrity than cities or SMSAs, and they are more closely linked to the 
causal processes assumed to underlie the outcomes of interest. (p. 10)  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The literature review guiding this study included work from several different 
academic disciplines, as well as from government legislation.  This dissertation examines 
the relationships between RPTA legislation and changes in the urban neighborhoods of 
four Ohio cities.  The review begins with an analysis of the relevant state legislation 
(2.2), followed by a discussion of municipal policies and local legislation (2.3) pertaining 
to residential property tax abatement (RPTA) for the four cities included in this study.  
Since RPTA is a tax incentive policy, an analysis of relevant academic literature 
regarding the use and effectiveness of tax incentives (2.4) is necessary.  The final section 
includes a review of theoretical issues (2.5) that are relevant to this study also drawn from 
the academic literature and instrumental in the development of the conceptual model, and 
is organized under five themes.  It is argued that the implementation of RPTA can have 
serious implications for both inter-jurisdictional competition (2.5.1) and property tax 
equity (2.5.2), and that theories of neighborhood change (2.5.3), the theory of broken 
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windows (2.5.4), and the anti-urban—pro-rural dichotomy (2.5.5) have helped lay the 
theoretical grounding for the development of policies such as RPTA. 
 
2.2  State Legislative History 
In 1969, to help stem the flow of population and investment from the state’s urban 
areas, the Ohio’s General Assembly enacted sections 3735.65 and 3735.72 of the Ohio 
Revised Code (ORC), which created “rehabilitation areas” wherein remodeled and/or 
newly constructed homes were exempt from property taxes.  Rehabilitation areas 
originally were defined as,  
areas within a municipal corporation or unincorporated area of a county for which 
the legislative authority…has adopted a resolution…describing boundaries of the 
area and containing a statement of finding that the area…is one in which the 
conditions of slum housing, blight, or disrepair of housing is such that property 
values are depressed, new housing construction and repair and rehabilitation of 
existing housing are discouraged because of such depression of values, or because 
the incomes of residents generally in the area are such that taxes on property 
substantially affect the ability of residents or owners of housing for…repair or 
rehabilitation of housing. (§ 3735.65 (B)). 
 
The legislation limited RPTA to ten years and required that cities appoint a housing 
officer (§3735.66), a housing committee comprised of property owners in the 
rehabilitation area charged with making quarterly inspections of area properties 
(§3735.70), and a housing rehabilitation council comprised of political appointees whose 
duty it was to conduct annual property inspections in the designated areas (§3735.71). 
In 1977, the General Assembly created the Ohio Community Reinvestment Area 
(CRA) Program, which repealed the term “rehabilitation areas” and replaced it with 
“community reinvestment areas”.  This change was not merely one of semantics; by 
changing the terminology, the legislature loosened the requirements for an area to qualify 
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for tax abatement.  Specifically, the conditions of slum housing, blight, disrepair, 
depressed property values and income issues of residents were removed, leaving only 
two requirements for an area to qualify as a CRA:  the existence of structures with 
0historical significance, and the discouragement (meaning a dearth) of new housing 
construction and repair (§ 3735.65 (B)). The decision of what denotes “historical 
significance” was left to local governments with some constraints regarding age, 
architectural quality, rarity, and previous designation (§3735.65(D)).   
The 1977 CRA program set a maximum allowable tax abatement period of fifteen 
years for new construction (§3735.67 (C)).  In addition to the CRA program, Chapter 
1728 of the ORC contains a tax abatement program for “blighted areas” in “impacted” 
cities, but requires the establishment of community urban redevelopment corporations “to 
acquire, construct, operate, and maintain a [redevelopment] project” (§1728.01(B)).  It is 
more difficult to have areas qualify as “blighted” or for a municipal corporation to be an 
“impacted city” than it is to establish a CRA.  However, a specific examination of the 
relationship between community development corporations and RPTA is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
In 1990, another major change to the law was passed with the insertion of 
language requiring local legislative bodies or the housing officer to notify affected school 
districts of the proposed tax exemption.  Prior to this stipulation, local legislative 
authorities were not required to include affected school districts in decisions to grant tax 
abatements.  Local school districts can be adversely impacted by the loss of property tax 
revenues.  Municipalities can circumvent the need for approval by affected school 
districts waiving their rights to be notified of proposed RPTA offerings (see § 
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3735.67(C)).  In essence, the level of involvement by the school district depends on the 
political strength of the respective school board (M. Sutherland, personal communication, 
April 21, 2009).   
In 1992 the General Assembly added language that increased local government 
accountability in that it required an annual “status report” for each CRA to be submitted 
to the Ohio director of development (§ 3735.69 (B)).  The Ohio Department of 
Development (ODD) acts in an advisory capacity through reviews of proposed legislation 
(recommending broad parameters), recommendations on how to limit administrative 
dollars to administer the program, and recounts of what has occurred elsewhere around 
the state.  The ODD also has a regulatory role of investigating complaints, helping cities 
with compliance, and decertifying CRAs if necessary (M. Sutherland, personal 
communication, April 21, 2009). 
When Senate Bill 19 was enacted in 1994, a series of major changes passed 
through the Ohio General Assembly regarding CRAs and the corresponding tax 
abatement incentives, resulting in a different CRA program.  Most of these changes 
applied to commercial and industrial projects (such as adding a clawback provision under 
§3735.68) more so than to RPTA and does not impact this study. One significant change 
for RPTA was that, before 1994 it was stipulated in the Ohio Revised Code that real 
property must be exempted 100 percent.  Since 1994, more discretion is given to local 
legislative authorities in that real property is now exempted up to 100 percent.  However, 
less discretion was granted to local legislative authorities in that all CRA commercial or 
industrial projects created after 1994 must receive approval from the ODD director prior 
to granting a real property tax incentive (§3735.671).  In essence, these changes resulted 
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in two types of CRAs operating in the State:  those areas designated as such prior to 1994 
and those areas created after the 1994 revisions.   
Residential property tax abatement is designed to attract homeowners to purchase 
homes in the community offering RPTA.  The original objectives outlined in the 
authorizing legislation were to combat blight and encourage residential development 
where it has been declining.  It can be inferred, even if not explicitly stated, that another 
objective of the program was to attract desirable (i.e., from a higher socio-economic 
group) homebuyers to settle in specific geographic areas.  State legislators were operating 
under the assumption that Ohio’s urban neighborhoods no longer held any attraction; 
developers would no longer build in the city and homeowners would no longer buy 
without the use of incentives.  By offering RPTA, cities could become a formidable 
housing market competitor for the perceived limited pool of desirable residents.  To date, 
it appears that no published study has evaluated the impact of Ohio RPTA policy on 
urban neighborhoods.   
 
2.3 Municipal Development and Administration of RPTA 
Much of the language found in local legislation flows from Chapter 3735 of the 
ORC.  Local legislative bodies were granted some discretion by the General Assembly in 
order to tailor Ohio’s Community Reinvestment Program (CRA) program to the specific 
needs of their respective communities.  Some common program parameters derived from 
the ORC and implemented at the local level are the transference of the abatement to 
subsequent property owners and by owners paying property taxes on the value of the 
land. All that is required of a municipality if it wants to establish a CRA is that there must 
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be at least two structures in the proposed area, one of which is a residence, and to survey 
the proposed area for “evidence of disinvestment in the structures located 
there…basically, evidence that the structures have not been kept up”, (C. R. Manno, Ohio 
Department of Development, n.d.).   
Detailed decisions regarding the administration of an RPTA program can vary 
from locality to locality in terms of the number and size of CRAs, the rate and duration of 
abatements, penalties for non-compliance and sunset provisions (language that allows for 
the law to “expire” after a certain time if no further legislative action is taken), as well as 
requirements concerning historic preservation and green building.  Abatements have 
come to be viewed as legislative entitlements, so to allow a local RPTA ordinance to 
sunset or to decrease the current incentives can pose quite a political problem for local 
officials.   
Table 3 provides an overview of some projected economic characteristics of the 
cities included in this study (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).  Also included is a number 
representing the dissimilarity index for each city.  The role of racial segregation in 
housing can have a significant impact on declining urban areas as well as the current 
housing foreclosure crisis.  The dissimilarity index represents the percentage of white 
people that would need to move to another neighborhood in order to make blacks and 
whites evenly distributed across all neighborhoods (Censuscope.org, n.d). 
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Table 3 
2005 Estimates of Select Economic Characteristics of Four Cities in Study 
  
Cleveland 
 
Columbus 
 
Dayton 
 
Toledo 
 
 
Population 
 
312,237 
 
565,708 
 
115,219 
 
224,599
 
Percent of unemployed (civil labor force) 
 
16.3 
 
7.8 
 
13.3 
 
12.5 
 
Median household income (inflation-
adjusted to 2007 dollars) 
 
$27,007 
 
$42,031 
 
$28,381 
 
$34,839
Percent of households on food stamps in 
last 12 months 
23.2 11.2 18.8 16.9 
Percent of families below poverty level 25.2 14.6 24.3 18.0 
Index of Dissimilarity 79.4 61.0 78.3 67.0 
 
 
One interesting question to examine is how strong a political influence is wielded 
by residential property developers and how this influence may impact local RPTA 
legislation.  Table 4 provides a brief overview of some municipal spending trends for 
construction under neighborhood/community development initiatives.   To be sure, local 
developers have a vested interest in encouraging the adoption of programs and their 
enhancement.  In Cleveland, for example, local developers encouraged the city to 
maintain the program and when the mayor voiced concern with the program’s effects and 
the scale of the abatements, businesses leaders lobbied to have an evaluation performed 
and to have future decisions about the program based on the evaluation’s analysis and 
recommendations (Mikelbank, Rosentraub & Post, 2009).  While studies of the politics in 
the others cities were not found, it is reasonable to suggest that the outcomes and actions 
of developers in Cleveland mirrored the sentiments and positions of builders in other 
parts of the state.   
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Table 4 
Construction Costs as a Percentage of Total (Capital) Expenditures for 
Neighborhood/Community Development  
 
Budget 
Year 
 
Housing 
construction 
costs 
Cleveland 
 
Columbus capital 
budget, 
neighborhood 
services 
 
 
Capital 
improvement 
contracts 
Dayton 
 
Construction 
contracts 
Toledo 
 
2003 
 
22.1 
 
--- 
 
4.4 
 
45 
 
2004 
 
22.1 
 
--- 
 
56.0 
 
38 
 
2005 
 
23.0 
 
0 
 
3.6 
 
54 
 
2006 
 
23.2 
 
0 
 
--- 
 
58 
 
2007  
 
36.4 
 
0.17 
 
18.6 
 
0 
 
 
2.3.1  Cleveland 
 The first RPTA ordinance for Cleveland (Ord. No. 2831-86, 1987) established a 
Downtown CRA, the goal of which is paraphrased from the ORC:  Cleveland CRAs can 
be established where there are structures of historical significance and where construction 
and repair has been discouraged.  Cleveland City Council maintained language from the 
original state legislation regarding the removal of blight and preventing its reoccurrence.  
Abatements were granted for seven years for new residential units, “with the rate of 
exemption set at the increase in market value of the property” (§3).  In 1991 local 
legislation established all of Cleveland as a CRA, excluding the already established 
Downtown CRA, with a fifteen-year abatement at 100 percent for new construction or 
conversion of large residential developments of more than twenty-five one- and two-
family homes (Ord. No. 1776-A-90).  Residential projects constructing less than twenty-
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five single or two-family homes would receive 100 percent abatement for ten years.  In 
1994 there were changes made to the Downtown CRA that increased the duration to 
fifteen years, at 75 percent of market value (Ord. No. 1171-94).  In 1999, the geographic 
area of the Downtown CRA was expanded (Ord. No. 959-99) and the tax abatement on 
new one- and two-family residential construction, regardless of the size of the project, 
was increased to fifteen years in City neighborhoods (Ord. No. 960-99).   
In 2007, when Cleveland’s RPTA policy was scheduled to end, the policy was 
renewed again for the maximum allowable duration and rate for new construction (fifteen 
years at 100 percent).  What changed in renewing the program is that the former 
Downtown-area CRA is now considered a neighborhood, which in essence makes all of 
Cleveland one large CRA with the maximum rate and duration allowed for RPTA.   In 
addition, Cleveland City Council approved future requirements for new construction to 
meet Energy Star standards (Samsa, 2007; The City Record, 2007).   
 
2.3.2  Columbus 
CRAs have been codified in Columbus since 1978, but the current RPTA program 
began in 2001 in five specific areas.   The language in the local legislation refers to these 
areas as CRAs pursuant to Chapter 3765 of the ORC; however, the city refers to these 
areas as Neighborhood Investment Areas, or NIDs.  The stated goals of the RPTA 
program in Columbus are to stabilize these neighborhoods and upgrade housing units to 
increase investments in the city (City of Columbus, 2006).  According to the former 
RPTA program manager for the city, in order for an area to be considered for NID 
designation it must be losing population, have declining schools, vacant lots and/or 
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boarded up buildings, and there must be something upon which the city officials can 
“hang” success (A. Owens, personal communication, June 27, 2008).   For example, Area 
A (also known as the Linden neighborhood) had the highest reported crime rate in the 
city, with a reduction in crime following redevelopment of the area, which included a 
new government agency headquarters for the housing authority and a terminal for the 
transit authority, (A. Owens, personal communication, June 27, 2008). Columbus 
recently renewed CRA designation of the original five areas, and expanded its RPTA 
program to include six more areas (City of Columbus, 2009).    
In listing the benefits of tax abatement, Columbus identifies public sector entities 
as beneficiaries.  Language from both the 2006 and 2009 city development department 
website contains the language, “the schools will continue to receive the current, existing 
property taxes” (City of Columbus, 2006; 2009).  Columbus appears to be no different 
than the other cities in the study on this point; owners of newly constructed single-family 
homes do not make any additional payments to the school district other than the taxes 
paid on the land value.  Also similar to other cities, if the home has “uncured” code 
violations the abatement can be rescinded (R. Parise, personal communication, April 28, 
2009).   
 
2.3.3  Dayton 
Similar to Columbus, Dayton has the most targeted RPTA program of the four 
cities in this study.  Dayton suffers from some of the same urban problems as Cleveland 
(even though it is a much smaller city) including high foreclosure rates, a sharp decline in 
a number of manufacturing concerns leading to high unemployment levels, an aging 
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housing stock, and high level racial segregation (between parts of the city and between 
the city and the county.  “In recent history, little has affected The City more profoundly 
than the significant numbers of people and jobs that have moved to the suburbs” (City of 
Dayton, 2008, p. 7).  Unlike Cleveland, however, lawmakers did not establish the entire 
city as a CRA.  Dayton appears to be very careful about using RPTA as a redevelopment 
tool.  Not only are the city’s CRAs small, but also it has seven neighborhoods in which 
only renovations or new construction within the historic districts in those neighborhoods 
are eligible for tax abatement.  By controlling for each city, this study will attempt to 
uncover whether Dayton’s prudent use of the CRA program works better on certain 
outcomes than other more geographically comprehensive approaches.   
Dayton lawmakers give explicit voice to the impacted school districts, although 
the districts have not been granted additional powers beyond notification and comment 
(Ord. 28718-93, §44, 1993).  Dayton is also unique in that the local legislation states that 
the duration of RPTA is up to fifteen years for new construction but the specific time 
period varies by area.  For example, two historic districts (Wright-Dunbar and Madden 
Hills) follow a nine-year, graduated scale for the RPTA program, with a 100 percent 
exemption for the first five years decreasing by 20 percent in each of the remaining years.  
The city’s vision plan highlights one of the common goals of RPTA, which is to “provide 
incentives to community-based developers and the private market to build market-rate 
housing”, (Citiplan, n.d., p. 10).   
 
 
 
 28
2.3.4  Toledo 
 The City of Toledo, also paraphrasing from the ORC, has as the stated goal of its 
CRA program to promote investment in neighborhoods that have experienced decline 
resulting from disinvestment. Toledo Ordinance 170-04 declares that, 
there exist areas of the city that are underdeveloped, blighted, deteriorated or 
deteriorating, or inappropriately developed and that these areas have arisen from 
inadequate public and private investment and reinvestment in housing. (§1201.02, 
2004)   
 
Currently Toledo offers 100 percent abatement on improvements for fifteen years on 
single-family new construction, but city officials are contemplating lowering the 
parameters on new construction and increasing the rate and duration on rehabilitated 
properties (J. Morell, personal communication, August 7, 2008), probably in light of 
diminished demand for new housing construction.  Unlike the other cities in this study, 
Toledo does not emphasize residential development in its advertisement of its CRA 
program, but rather highlights the advantages for business and industry relocation to the 
city (City of Toledo, 2009).  Chapter 135.09 of Ordinance 653-02 (2002) established the 
Division of Real Estate within the Department of Economic and Community 
Development.  The City does have a Department of Neighborhoods with a housing 
division; however, it is the Division of Real Estate that is responsible for administering 
the RPTA program.  Toledo has nine distinct CRAs (see Figure A4 in Appendix), which 
account for a majority of the city’s geographic area.   
 Similar to the discussion of how Columbus city officials define success, Toledo’s 
leadership capitalized on the construction of new city school buildings by linking them 
with large RPTA developments of new single-family construction and calling it the New 
School/New Neighborhoods Initiative.  In addition, in 2005 city officials created a CRA 
 29
for political reasons more so than for actual area need; it is the one CRA for which the 
city’s tax incentive officer receives the most phone calls for people wanting to build new 
homes (J. Morell, personal communication, August 7, 2008).  This is not a contemporary 
or unique occurrence.  Indeed, Swanstrom (1985) provided an example of tax abatement 
offered in Manhattan to build office towers in the 1970s, which was not needed and not 
supported by market conditions (they would have been built anyway).  
An underlying tension in the local conception and administration of RPTA 
programs is one of balancing public and private sector interests although, as Malpezzi 
(2003) surmises, the public-private distinction is more of a spectrum than a distinct 
separation.  Common underlying goals of the RPTA programs discussed above are to 
revive the urban housing market, attract desirable households to reside in the city, and 
remove blight.  Additional goals may be to preserve historical structures and areas, as 
well as promote green building.  All of these goals can create tension between what the 
city wants on behalf of all its residents, and what developers want in terms of their profit 
margins.  As Buss & Redburn (1987) describe it: 
The misapplication of public subsidies has also to do with the inherent difference 
between the incentives/opportunities for private investors and the public 
responsibilities that public officials are charged with...nearly all private 
entrepreneurs...invest their capital with the expectation that the return on investment 
will be commensurate with the risk undertaken...the public sector, on the other hand, 
has traditionally…invested capital in areas where the financial return is long term, 
indirect, and uncertain. (pp. 292-293) 
 
These two perspectives do not have to be in conflict necessarily but are often framed as a 
game in which the city ends up losing, either by playing too hard and losing the 
development contract/firm location decision, or by being too generous with incentives so 
that the benefits to the firm outweigh those to the city (e.g., Blair & Kumar, 1997; 
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McGuire, 1991).  It appears that no published study has examined RPTA on a set of 
outcomes derived from both public and private sectors. 
 
2.4  Incentives as Tax Policy 
  Public policy is an intentional course of action followed by a governmental entity 
and backed by the coercive power of the state for resolving an issue of public concern 
manifested by laws, public statements, regulations, or widely accepted and visible 
patterns of behavior (Cochran, et al. 1999).  In the case of economic development, why 
does the public sector need to create policies intended to influence the private market?  
These policies are designed to move market-based activities to areas that have been 
avoided because of perceived higher costs or risks (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989).  
Economic development policy provides administrators and officials with taxes, services, 
and regulations in their competitive bag of tricks. There are three characteristics often 
used to describe policies as “good:” transparency (openness of processes, decisions, 
outcomes), congruency (conforming to the law), and simplicity (not vague).  The way 
policies involving tax incentives are administered seems to violate these features.  Very 
often transparency is lacking in what can be considered “backroom deals” between public 
officials and corporate executives regarding the offerings being made.  Violation of this 
characteristic seems to be less with RPTA and more with commercial/industrial projects.  
Congruency, it can be argued, is currently being violated by the City of Lorain in its 
attempt to make RPTA retroactive for a particular CRA (Green, 2008; 2009), considering 
there is no provision in the state law for retroactive RPTA.  Finally, when it comes to 
administration of tax abatement policy, it can be argued that simplicity is often violated.  
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Tax abatement is a part of the broader category of tax policy, which Peretz (1996) points 
out, is inherently more complex than other policies.  Giertz, McGuire, Nowlan (1996) 
define simplicity of tax policy as easy compliance for the taxpayer and easy 
administration for the collection agency.  Issues such as the fairness of property 
assessment and distributional concerns regarding tax burden are but two examples of how 
complicated tax policy can be.  As Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) contend, “An 
equitable tax system cannot be simple...Tax policy is an art no less than a science; and 
equity is to be sought as a matter of degree rather than as an absolute norm" (p. 228). 
 As briefly outlined in Chapter I, the use of tax abatement (and incentives in 
general) by the public sector to lure businesses and residents back to the city is not 
without controversy.  Historically, according to Swanstrom (1985), tax abatement can be 
viewed as the successor to urban renewal projects from the 1950s and 1960s, but with 
two important distinctions.  First, the federal government subsidized two-thirds of urban 
renewal projects compared to contemporary administration of local incentives where, 
Swanstrom claims, the subsidy is borne by local taxpayers.  Second, communities and 
developers used to have to follow a federally approved plan; he argues that there is little 
public control over tax abatement plans by developers.  Jacobs (1961) was extremely 
critical of urban renewal policies, which she believed destroyed communities and created 
isolated, unnatural urban spaces.  If Swanstrom’s criticism of tax abatement policy is 
valid, then residential property tax abatement (RPTA) may not bode well for Ohio’s 
urban neighborhoods and may place an unfair burden on residents who do not live in tax-
abated homes.   
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 The economic development literature has devoted substantial attention to the 
impacts of tax incentives for business and industry.  Far less work has focused on the 
effects of residential tax incentives.  This section reviews the literature on the role and 
impact of public sector incentive programs offered to both firms and homeowners.  
Krumholz (1991) defines local economic development activity as "a process by which 
local governments manage resources to stimulate private investment opportunities in 
order to generate new jobs and taxes" (p. 292).  Rasmussen, Bendick and Ledebur (1984) 
define economic development incentives as giving "…public money to private 
enterprises in order to encourage these enterprises to alter their operating decisions in 
some socially desirable way" (p. 24).  In essence, cities give up some revenue today for 
the promise of higher revenues in the future (Malpezzi, 2003).  After years of incentive 
packages being administered, local governments have come under pressure to provide 
quantifiable evidence that the policy goal is being reached, namely, that this tool has 
increased private investment (Smith, 2006). 
 Many evaluations conducted in the 1980s and 1990s illustrated the possibility of 
negative effects of using incentives in the production of zero-sum gains (e.g., Blair & 
Kumar, 1997; Ladd, 1998), prisoner’s dilemmas (e.g., Morse & Farmer, 1986; Anderson 
& Wassmer, 1995), and unhealthy inter-jurisdictional competition, (e.g., McGuire, 1991; 
Ladd, 1998).  In Detroit, communities wanted to avoid being perceived as "non-friendly" 
to business, and it appears that firms used the incentives offered by one community to 
strong-arm another community into providing a better incentive package, less they lose 
the possibility of the firm locating in their community (Anderson & Wassmer, 1995).  
Bingham and Bowen (1994) evaluated the impact of economic development program 
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funding on state economic vitality and found no significant relationship.  Bartik (1991) 
examined economic development and asked the question of who benefits.  In terms of job 
growth policies, he concluded that unemployed residents get jobs in the short run, which 
can positively impact their long-run prospects, and that any net benefits from these 
policies are most likely to be positive in the worst areas.  However, in terms of net 
benefits for tax abatement policies, Bartik reached a different conclusion stating that if 
land value increases are the only benefits from these policies, then the problems of the 
poor and disadvantaged are not being addressed.  This conclusion is relevant because of 
the disproportionate number of lower-income households that live within urban 
neighborhoods.  Sawicki & Flynn (1996) argue that,  
Public policy often aims at moving individuals in order to generate improvements 
in geographically-based indicators. For example, the de facto goal of a city policy 
often seems to be to displace poorer households with richer ones, thus raising the 
socioeconomic standards of the area. The action may make the city more solvent 
fiscally, but the result is not necessarily an improvement in the lives of some 
residents. (p. 15)  
 
Positive effects from incentives are found in Wong’s (2002) study of the use of incentives 
in England.  He concluded that, “the 'welcome mat' effect of financial incentives, 
relocation packages and other activities of local development agencies is critical to attract 
foreign inward investment," (p. 1843).  
Sands, Reese and Khan (2006) note that incentives have been reported to be 
effective as well as ineffective in the literature because of differing research 
methodologies, variation in the operationalization of "effectiveness", differing units of 
analysis (individual, local, county, region, state), and differing time periods.  Their 
general conclusion is that the more effective abatement programs seem to be local 
initiatives that are geographically targeted and evaluated periodically.  The authors 
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include a discussion of best practices, or what local governments should consider before 
granting tax abatements.  Their recommendations include focusing on particular areas, 
ensuring the proposed incentive is compatible with the local population, and including 
claw backs or some recourse in the event that the private sector does not deliver on what 
was promised to the city (also Ledebur & Woodward, 2003).   
Krumholz (1991) argues that hard bargaining rather than making offerings of 
inducements would be a better move for municipalities; in essence, "cities should 
negotiate as equals" (p. 292).  Professor Krumholz believes inducements should be 
carefully programmed and development should be balanced between "weaker" 
(neighborhoods) and "stronger" areas (downtown), although downtowns often become 
the focus of development.  Rasmussen, Bendick and Ledebur (1984) recommended that 
enticements to businesses to influence their location decisions should come from the 
federal government:  "...state and local government may be well suited to administer, but 
not finance, many forms of firm-specific economic development incentives” (p. 24).   
Morse and Farmer (1986) also examine effectiveness of tax abatements for 
business in a sample of Ohio's CRAs (n=24) and conclude that tax abatements for 
businesses only work if the state aid formula to these areas is adjusted to reflect the loss 
of public revenue from the abatement.  Based on their conclusion, one has to ask whether 
any incentive policy is effective considering that the state would have to continue to 
provide additional subsidy designated areas.  Dalehite, Mikesell and Zorn (2005) provide 
a comprehensive overview of state abatement programs, and recommend that tax 
abatement be used for select parcels, have a time limit on the reduction (also Courant, 
1994), and that it is the only incentive offered (i.e., it cannot be used in conjunction with 
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other incentive programs).  Their main conclusion is that abatement programs tend to be 
overly generous and, similar to others (e.g., Sands, Reese & Khan, 2006), conclude that 
targeting blighted areas may be the only way to guarantee positive net benefits for the 
city.   
 Similar to the incentives discussed previously, a goal of RPTA is to increase 
residential investment where disinvestment has occurred.  Is there anything inherent in 
the CRA legislation that guarantees RPTA (or incentives for firms) will spawn growth in 
an area?  As Coffin (1982) points out, "there is in principle no mechanism in the tax 
reduction itself which would be expected to increase the long-term growth rate of the 
jurisdiction” (p. 18).  Krumholz (1991) argues that there is little support that incentives 
(“subsidies”) fulfill the public purpose of neighborhood revitalization.  Jacobs (1961, p. 
532) warns that urban areas must be capable of holding their populations "to stay put by 
choice over time" and a temporary property tax break may not be enough to support such 
a choice.   
Additionally, the research performed does not support the notion that tax 
incentives alter firm’s inter-regional location decisions, although they may influence the 
location decision within the region (e.g., Coffin, 1982; Morse & Farmer, 1986) or 
between a few locales (Ledebur & Woodward, 2003).  Does this marginal influence hold 
true for households?  Mark, McGuire and Papke (2000) control for jurisdiction and time 
effects in their panel study spanning twenty-five years to examine whether taxes are an 
important determinant of economic development in Washington, D.C.  In their analysis 
of the revealed preferences of buyer behavior, the authors did not find local property 
taxes to be a significant factor in residential location choice.  Conversely, Bier, et al. 
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(2007) found that over a quarter of those surveyed who recently bought a tax-abated 
home in Cleveland (n=44) stated that they would not have done so without RPTA, and 
over half who were planning to buy a home in the near future (n=101) would not consider 
purchasing a new home in Cleveland without RPTA. 
Dardia (1998) and Smith (2006) examine redevelopment programs within TIF 
districts, and define effectiveness as an increase in property values.  Tax-increment 
financing (TIF) uses incremental tax revenue from a revitalized area to finance the 
infrastructure that made the revitalization possible.  The authors did not reach similar 
conclusions regarding the effectiveness of incentives.  Dardia (1998) performed matched- 
paired testing, and used property assessment values of 38 projects in California TIF 
districts from 1983 to 1996.  Each project area was matched to a Census block group 
based upon location and two conditions of blight (average vacancy and poverty rates), 
and the differences in the growth of assessed values in a project and its matched or paired 
area to determine effectiveness.  Dardia’s study is particularly interesting because he 
determined that the project areas, in order to be considered self-financing (and therefore 
effective), needed to grow at a faster rate than the comparison areas since a majority of 
the increase in property taxes was reinvested back into the TIFs.  He found fewer than 25 
percent of the projects came close to being responsible for the property tax revenues they 
received; the rest of their funding was government subsidy.  Smith (2006) examined the 
Chicago multifamily real estate market in order to determine the influence of TIF 
designation on the real property appreciation rates. The results indicated that properties 
located within a designated TIF district exhibit higher rates of appreciation after the area 
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is designated when compared to those properties selling outside TIF districts, or to those 
properties that sell within TIF district boundaries prior to designation.  
 Tax policy seen from an economic perspective highlights the effect of tax policies 
on economic growth and on efficient use of resources, while speculating on the potential 
distortions results from such policies. Determining if a public policy is economical may 
make one ponder the question of for whom is it economical.  Do all those impacted from 
said policy inherent the same burdens as well as benefits?  Much of the emphasis in the 
legislation and the empirical research examining tax incentives is from an economic 
perspective.  For example, Bier, et al. (2007) highlight the additional benefits to 
Cleveland resulting from its RPTA such as appreciated land value, earnings tax, and 
improved property values of nearby homes.  Conversely, Courant (1994) argues that 
analyses of tax incentives should include all social costs, including externalities:  "What 
we should seek to measure in our assessments of local economic development policies is 
changes in the level and distribution of economic welfare" (p. 863).  Malpezzi (2003) 
concludes that distributional considerations have implications for state and local fiscal 
conditions, giving the example of a poverty rate one percent higher than average spends 
an extra $2.20 per capita on police.  Fosler (1991) writes, "the experience of state and 
local economic development efforts reflects a series of economic relationships that is 
both broader and richer than those captured in conventional economic theory” (p. 250).  
Krumholz (1991) advocates for economic development practitioners to emphasize 
upgrading education and increasing the employable population rather than focusing on 
capital and subsidies.  Hissong (2003) argues that cities need to incorporate social and 
political forces, and to understand the community "as something in which the economy is 
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embedded as part of the overall social relations; markets do not emerge out of a vacuum 
but out of the social circumstances that surround them” (paraphrasing Polanyi, p. 133).  
Dror (1967) regrets the “invasion” of economics into public decision making.  He argues 
that critical elements (e.g., future non-economic impact) of policy making get ignored by 
viewing it only in economic terms.   
 Mikesell (1998) and Peters (1996) see tax policy development as primarily 
political:   
They [taxes] are amounts established through the operations of a political process 
in which a structure of laws, not a series of market transactions, determines how 
the cost of government will be distributed among elements of the private 
economy, (Mikesell, 1998, p. 173). 
 
He observes that the tax system is more than what is written (statues defining tax base 
and rates); it involves the administration of that system and how private entities respond 
to that administration, the interactions of which are essentially political.  Peters (1996) 
sees the political process as having its own internal logic that can conflict with other 
criteria such as simplicity, fairness/equity, and openness (i.e., transparency).  He notes 
that government has to figure out how to find ways to pay for the services while escaping 
notice of the pursuit of payment.  This may be one reason why RPTA is so politically 
palatable; there is no pursuit of payment in the short term.  Peters also argues that 
politicians can rarely use tax policy to their advantage in electoral politics.  One could 
argue RPTA is an exception.  As an owner of an RPTA property, one receives city 
services while paying a minimal amount of land taxes in the shorter term, and non-RPTA 
property owners are not aware of the potential of an increased tax burden to cover the 
costs of RPTA.  All tax decisions are political decisions, but tax policies also may be 
used as mechanisms for social control (Peters, 1996).  "Sin" taxes will hopefully curb 
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undesirable behavior, and RPTA will hopefully encourage people to move back to city 
neighborhoods.   
Some authors argue that there are positive non-economic impacts resulting from 
incentives, particularly RPTA, such as pride of homeownership.  Abatements can give 
some people mortgage ability that they may not otherwise have qualified for (Bier, et al., 
2007).  DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) argue that homeownership may encourage 
investment in local amenities and social capital because homeownership gives individuals 
an incentive to improve their community and because it creates barriers to mobility.  
Using the U.S. General Social Survey, the authors conclude from their analysis that 
homeowners invest more in social capital, and that a large portion of the effect of 
homeownership on these investments comes from lower mobility rates for homeowners.  
Hence, RPTA may encourage the initial home purchase in an urban neighborhood, but 
the effect of such a purchase may have an impact beyond the parcel.   This positive 
outcome may not apply to all income classes, however.  Ambrose (1998) asked whether 
subsidized loans increase home ownership in low-income neighborhoods.  He found 
current subsidies to be too low relative to the costs of homeownership, and particularly 
less attractive to low-income families. He discussed the risks and costs involved to 
homeowners who take on a mortgage and the care of their own home and property.  
Although abatement can help some people obtain a mortgage they may not have qualified 
for otherwise, the unforeseen costs of homeownership and/or uncontrollable factors (job 
loss, illness) may result in home loss.  This assertion is sustained by Bier, et al., (2007).  
They found that twenty percent of tax-abated homes went into foreclosure.    
 40
There remains no consensus whether tax incentives comprise “good” public 
policy.  What, then, accounts for the popularity of incentives as policy?  As Swanstrom 
(1985) mentions and Ledebur and Woodward (2003) observe, incentives “provide 
policymakers with one of the few discretionary tools available that could sway private 
decisions in the short run", (p. 76).  In addition, officials seeking reelection can “hang 
success” on securing additional jobs and/or residents for their respective community.  
Third, tax incentives can be framed as something that does not cost anything for the 
taxpayer; i.e., no public money was spent on the very visible, new-constructed structures.  
Rebuilding infrastructure can be presented as something that needed to happen anyway 
and that is beneficial to all residents of an area, not just those in RPTA homes.  
 Graham Allison (1980) argues that there is a constitutional difference between 
private sector and public sector administration of policy due to the separation of powers 
principle.  Private industry is centralized under a chief executive officer, but local public 
administrators answer to numerous elected officials and citizens.  Business is expected to 
operate in its own self-interest (Beckett, 2000) but this behavior can be in conflict with 
operating in the public interest.  Indeed, there is an assumption about public policy, an 
example of which can be found in the legislative language pertaining to RPTA, which is 
that it is of a public purpose.  Conversely, Kincaid (1991) argues that competition 
between public and private interests is inherent part of the American federalist system 
and that “it [competition] is not accidental or an undesirable by-product of democracy; it 
is a constitutionally protected value”, (p. 97).  Ostrom (2005) concurs and sees opening 
the public sphere to “entrepreneurship” as key to increasing the quality of public goods.   
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 Another issue rests with the goal of private enterprise, which can be to maximize 
profits or market domination.  If the goal of government is to operate like the private 
sector and maximize profits then, Beck (1993) argues, government should pursue 
discriminatory taxation practices because it will enhance its ability to fulfill this goal.  
Bewley (1981) tested the revenue-maximizing hypothesis for government and concluded, 
“I find a [Tiebout local expenditures] model with homogenous communities and profit-
maximizing governments startling and strikingly in conflict with my everyday 
experience" (p. 735).  In essence, there are normative democratic values (such as liberty 
and equality) that cannot be ignored when pursuing private sector principles in the public 
sector.  
 Another approach to minimizing negative impacts of incentives is to structure the 
policy so that costs and benefits are distributed throughout the metropolitan region.  
Through zoning restrictions suburbs in metropolitan regions are able to limit the number 
of poor people they are willing to allow in their respective communities.  Therefore, the 
central city has a disproportionate number of poor people for whom to provide services. 
Set-asides such as affordable housing units have not redistributed lower-income 
households to the degree needed to decrease the burden placed on central cities.  Apart 
from Corman and Mocan (2005), uncovering relationships between residential tax 
incentives and redistribution appears to be missing from the already sparse literature 
examining RPTA.  It is argued that an equitable stance would be for the region to bear the 
collective burden for the costs of the central city providing incentives, with regional tax 
sharing offered as a solution (e.g., Orfield, 2003; Reschovsky, 2000), although this 
approach comes with its own set of problems not the least of which is securing the 
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political will of many local jurisdictions to participate.  However, a detailed discussion of 
regional tax sharing and its relationship to RPTA policy is beyond the scope of this study.   
 
2.5  Theoretical Issues  
 If Waldo (1948) is correct, then every public sector decision has a political theory 
behind it.  The decision to give tax abatements to certain homeowners in certain 
designated geographic areas can be grounded in the argument that, not only does RPTA 
directly provide a short-term benefit to individual homeowners who buy abated 
properties, but also the policy may benefit the greater good in the longer term through 
increased property values, spurring other local development, and building social capital 
and community cohesion.  One of the goals of this dissertation is to test this utilitarian 
principle by uncovering relationships between RPTA and overall changes in 
neighborhoods.  RPTA is a tax policy presented by public officials as an economic 
development tool designed to influence potential home buyers’ purchasing decisions and 
increase overall investment in previously distressed areas.  This section of the literature 
review begins with an examination of American property tax policy as it relates to inter-
jurisdictional competition and equity.  Ultimately, the discussion over each of these 
concepts seems to center around how the argument is framed, either viewing residents as 
consumers and neighborhoods as “collective consumption units” (E. Ostrom, 2005, p. 2), 
or residents as members of something beyond the economic vernacular and the function 
of local governments as more than a service delivery agent.   Then, an overview of 
theories of neighborhood change is provided, followed by a discussion of the theory of 
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broken windows policing.  The final theoretical issue in this section examines some 
ideological concepts that continue to influence American residential location patterns.  
 
2.5.1  Inter-jurisdictional Competition 
 This discussion begins with Tiebout’s (1956) theory of local expenditures, which 
lays the groundwork for all further discussion in the literature on inter-jurisdictional 
competition (IJC).  Examining IJC is fundamental to an examination of tax incentives 
because our federalist political system is structured in such a way that there are many 
local jurisdictions in a given urban area in competition with one another for opportunities 
to maintain or increase revenues.  In the case of RTPA, property tax revenues may not 
increase but revenues should increase from other taxes collected from new residents and 
private development who were wooed away from nearby jurisdictions.   From the Tiebout 
perspective (see also Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961; Oates & Schwab, 1991; E. 
Ostrom, 2005, and others), property taxes are benefit payments for the services produced 
and financed by those taxes.  If many local governments compete against one another, 
than all local taxes become benefit taxes with an obvious incentive for efficient service 
delivery (Oates & Schwab, 1991).  Courant (1994) argues that at the local level the 
common public services package consists of primarily infrastructure maintenance and 
public safety.  Therefore, “given that water and sewer are already covered by user 
charges, a property tax is not a bad approximation of a user charge [benefit tax]”, 
(paraphrasing George Break, p. 877).  However, Courant concedes that the use of 
property taxes to finance public schools complicates the benefits approach to property 
taxes.  Kenyon and Kincaid (1991) concluded that the Tiebout model is economically 
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efficient in that the optimal mix of public goods at minimal cost is delivered, but that it is 
not equitable because there are no excess local taxes available to pay for public goods or 
services needed by residents who are unable to pay property taxes.   Not all scholars are 
in agreement regarding the notion of property taxes as benefit taxes because tax systems 
are complex and unclear, and so it is difficult to say how closely a given tax system 
mimics benefit taxation (Goodspeed, 1998), and it is difficult to determine who actually 
bears the tax burden (Zodrow, 2006).   
 Viewing the property tax as a benefit tax has possible implications for RPTA 
programs, from increasing the property tax burden on nearby un-subsidized property 
(negative externality) to having no aspects of redistribution.   Property tax capitalization 
happens when a change in taxes or public services causes a change in housing price 
(Sirmans, Gatzlaff, & Macpherson, 2008).  Mandell (2003) considers the possibility that 
property taxes are capitalized into housing prices.  If so, are taxes on land (not on the 
improvements) neutral and therefore better than property taxes?   This is an issue that can 
be made by proponents of RPTA, namely that the abatement is capitalized into the 
housing price resulting in homeowners “getting more house for their money”, with 
homeowners only paying taxes on the land.  Mandell (2003) concludes that only under 
specific and generally unrealistic circumstances does the property tax behave in this way:  
"It is hard to establish whether a high tax rate results in low housing values (through 
capitalization) or low housing values result in a need for high tax rates", (p. 11).  Yinger 
(1999) concurs; “except under extreme conditions, the local property tax does distort 
housing decisions, regardless of voters' perceptions about capitalization", (p. 322).  These 
“extreme” conditions are powerful (perfect) zoning laws and (perfect) mobility, which 
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describe certain suburbs only and do not apply to large and heterogeneous cities (Ladd, 
1998).  In essence, even if property taxes were fully capitalized into housing prices, it still 
does not establish whether the property tax should be viewed as a user charge on benefits 
received (Zodrow, 2006).  
 Another potential issue with the Tiebout model is the unintended spillover effects 
(externalities) that may occur outside of the market.  The possibility of externalities 
resulting from administration of tax policy is relevant to RPTA in that there may be 
spillover effects, positive or negative, impacting the areas in which tax-abated homes are 
located.  Moreover, does RPTA create externalities that can lead to inefficient location 
decisions (Oates & Schwab, 1991)?  Reschovsky (2000) notes that some authors have 
argued that the Tiebout model does not necessarily generate an efficient allocation of 
public goods, with others asserting that the theory may hold but the assumptions upon 
which it is based do not.   
 In the Tiebout model, one assumes that the consumer-resident (referred to as the 
consumer-voter in his model) is perfectly mobile, and can move (“vote with their feet”) 
to a community that optimizes their preferences for public goods.  In this view, local 
taxes-services packages are what make communities unique and, therefore, influence the 
location decisions of the consumer-resident. Tiebout’s model relies on this exit 
mechanism, but there are other approaches offered that do not have to assume perfect 
mobility.  For instance, Hirschman (1970) discusses a voice mechanism of complaining 
to your elected official.  As Warner & Hefetz (2002) argue, "…both localism and markets 
are equated with voice and freedom, but consumer voice and citizen voice are not the 
same" (p. 85).  High rates of residential mobility prove detrimental to areas of decreasing 
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population and “foster institutional disruption and weakened social controls over 
collective life” (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1997, p. 920). 
Tiebout's description of consumer-residents may be applicable to a certain 
segment of society, namely white middle- and upper-class potential home owners who 
would consider moving to urban neighborhoods if it was a good investment.   This group 
has mobility (or they would not be looking to buy a house), they have choices of 
communities (unlikely to experience housing discrimination), and there are incentives 
being offered (RPTA) to influence their choices.  The survey results in Bier, et al. (2007) 
seems to support Tiebout's assumptions somewhat in that those homeowners who took 
advantage of Cleveland’s RPTA program were mobile, had an array of choices of 
communities, and were aware of the incentives being offered.  As a result it could be 
argued that Tiebout's theory of local expenditures is a good descriptor for the behavior of 
certain groups, but not for others.   
It has also been argued that the assumption of mobility, let alone perfect mobility, 
is a faulty one.  Bartik (1991) argues that households are extremely immobile due in part 
to having a “sense of place” as well as the substantial costs associated with moving.  
Courant (1994) also counters the assumption of ease of mobility:   
First, it is worth noting that the transactions and transition costs associated with 
leaving one's current place of residence in response to structural unemployment 
may be quite large. Selling one house and buying another uses up perhaps 15 
percent of the house value; moving itself may cost thousands of dollars. There are 
nontrivial capital losses involved in losing a good deal of location-specific 
knowledge that is of both social and economic value. Children who are attached 
to their social setting add to these costs. I can easily believe that for many 
households, willingness to pay for finding reasonable employment near home, 
rather than having to leave the area, could be worth a year's pay or more. (p. 873) 
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These two comments move beyond the resident-as-consumer metaphor with the inclusion 
of non-economic factors that may influence residential location choices.  In answer to the 
question of residential mobility, it depends on whose model you use (Mandell, 2003). 
 Another assumption of Tiebout’s theory is one of perfect information.  The 
perfectly mobile consumer-resident can vote with their feet because they have all that is 
required to make a fully informed choice of which community has the taxes-to-services 
ratio they most prefer.  One can envision a resident-consumer moving to a community 
where the prices (taxes) of community services are set (another assumption) and fully 
known, and the resident-consumer knows the exact amount of services she wishes to 
purchase.  As Tiebout describes it, "If consumer-voters are fully mobile, the appropriate 
local governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are adopted by the 
consumer-voters" (1956, p.424).  In essence, administrators need to uncover the resident-
consumer's preferences for public goods and services, and then tax her accordingly to pay 
for these services.  This assumes, of course, that the government will allocate funding 
based purely on the preferences of its resident-consumers, without influence from any 
other parties or factors.   Another fundamental problem with uncovering resident-
consumer preferences is that there is no good mechanism by which residents register their 
preferences for public goods and services other than the flawed political process of voting 
and/or complaining to a representative in the hopes of influencing local revenue-
expenditure patterns.     
 Finally, assuming that the tax-services mix is set seems grounded in the 
assumption that communities are static entities.  Rosenthal (2008) concluded that 
neighborhoods are not static, but that there exists cycles of neighborhood decline and 
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renewal.   If communities are indeed dynamic one has to question whether is it possible 
to ever have the production, allocation, and distribution of public goods and services 
aligned with current resident-consumer preferences, or if prospective resident-consumers 
ever have full information to make a location choice given this dynamic nature of 
communities.  Indeed, there is a theoretically optimum community size in Tiebout’s 
model defined as "the number of residents for which this bundle of services can be 
produced at the lowest average cost" (1956, p. 419).  In the case of urban neighborhoods, 
which are part of large municipalities, can a city be "too big" to ever accommodate 
preferences?  How does this issue play out in retaining residents over the longer-term, 
say, beyond the years of tax abatement?  Moreover, cities are facing higher demands for 
public services from poorer and aging residents, with lower revenues with which to 
provide these services (Reschovsky, 2000; Ladd & Yinger, 1991).  Indeed, "dozens of 
studies show that the cost of public services is higher in communities with more 
concentrated poverty or disadvantage" (Yinger, 1999, p. 318).  From a resident-consumer 
perspective, assuming full information, RPTA may not provide enough incentive for 
folks to move to urban neighborhoods because the cost for city services is greater than 
the benefit received, coupled with payment for services consumed by other, 
disadvantaged residents. 
The approach taken by Tiebout’s theory is grounded in a stream of economic 
thought known as public choice.  Public choice advocates find it desirable to place the 
majority of governmental action at the lowest possible levels because local governments 
would provide more innovation and true competition.  The reality is that higher levels of 
government weigh in on policy and tax decisions that impact local development patterns, 
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which in turn influence individual location decisions.  It is assumed that individuals are 
rational economic actors driven by competitive self-interest (Terry, 1998) who rank 
bundles of public goods and services in the same way they rank private goods.  Public 
choice theory supports privatized cities that can exclude others (Frug, 2000), and control 
revenue (Briffault, 2000).  It is also assumed that these individuals have the ability to exit 
a community if their chosen local jurisdiction no longer fulfills their preferences, and that 
any location choice they make is free from any restriction (i.e., no housing 
discrimination).  From the public choice perspective, aggregation of all individuals’ 
choices results in the collective choice of a community.  However, Sen (1970) argues that 
individual preferences reflect the forces that determine said preferences in a society: "Just 
as social choice may be based upon individual preferences, the latter in their turn will 
depend on the nature of society" (p. 5).  
Frug (1999) rejects the benefit tax models on two points.  First, he rejects the 
notion that homogeneity promotes efficiency, and that rich and poor want to live apart 
because they want different types and levels of city services: 
Our fragmented communities should not be viewed as voluntary associations 
because of exclusionary zoning, discriminatory practices, etc.  Nobody ‘has a 
taste for’ bad schools and services.  People do so because they feel they have no 
other choice.  The prosperous suburban high school feels like a private school, 
where the ‘exclusive’ quality is maintained through exclusionary zoning rather 
than an admissions office (p. 174). 
   
Second, Frug argues it is wrong to assume city services are only objects of consumption, 
and call for community leaders to be more than mere goods and services providers.  He 
argues that, to equate citizenship with consumption is to diminish the notion of 
citizenship; choice should not be based merely on exit and consumption.  Warner & 
Hefetz (2002) believe that citizens create choices that can advance their community.  
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Clark (1996) provides a list of flaws in neoclassical economic theory as it applies to real 
estate markets:  there is no homogeneity of objects traded (each property is unique); there 
are relatively few buyers and sellers, both of whom have less than full knowledge; the 
markets are highly localized and segmented wherein the supply of land is relatively fixed, 
yet demand is volatile.   
 Kenyon (1997) provides a review of several models of inter-jurisdictional 
competition (IJC) including the Tiebout and Oates-Schwab models, McGuire's (1991) 
model of destructive competition that assumes individuals have preferences for 
redistribution and thus choose revenue systems based upon ability-to-pay taxes, and 
Wolkoff's (1985) model of competition of business using economic development 
subsidies.  Kenyon concludes that IJC is prevalent, should not be squelched, and would 
be better if channeled and regulated.  Reschovsky (2000) hold a very different view of 
IJC, arguing that it exacerbates sprawl and the degradation of metropolitan areas.    
Kincaid (1991) warns that, "a wholesale embrace of competitive federalism [i.e., 
IJC] could have its own undesirable consequences” (p. 88).  These models of IJC apply to 
the current study because RPTA helps create unmediated market competition in that 
jurisdictions are in direct competition with each other for a limited pool of desirable 
residents moving to a given region.  However, unmediated does not equal unregulated 
competition; state-level departments of development as well as the judicial system can 
fulfill a regulatory role regarding RPTA.   
From the perspective that IJC is beneficial, cities are in competition with one 
another and need to approach their public policy decisions regarding land use with 
competition in mind.  Potential homebuyers weigh public goods and services bundles 
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offered by communities and choose “that community which best satisfies his [her] 
preference pattern for public goods” (Tiebout, 1956, p. 418).  Oates (1969) stated that 
households actually take public policy into account when choosing a community in which 
to live.  Netzer (1997) believes that IJC for businesses can result in an externality because 
the location of a firm will affect more than just its chosen jurisdiction; unless you have 
fiscal zoning (used to attract occupants whose tax contribution is greater than their public 
services usage (Podgodzinski, 1993)), all of the advantages of economic growth in a city 
do not accrue to the specific municipality in which it occurs.  However, Rosentraub 
(2003; 2006) points out that the costs, as well as the advantages of such growth can be 
distributed beyond the municipality.  Additional interesting work has been done 
examining the impact of tax abatements and other location incentives on inter-
jurisdictional competition (e.g., Anderson & Wassmer, 1995; Blair & Kumar, 1997; 
McGuire, 1991).   
 McGuire (1991) argues that the Tiebout model of IJC is efficient in production 
and allocation of public good and services, but that it is not equitable in its distribution of 
resources and residents, leaving some jurisdictions with an unfair advantage.  Fair 
treatment requires tax burdens reflecting ability to pay regardless of residential location.  
This issue may fall away if redistribution is effectively pursued at a higher level of 
government.  Indeed the conventional economic wisdom (e.g., Ostrom & Schwab, 1991; 
Helms, 1985; Ladd, 1998) is that redistribution should remain the purview of federal 
government, which in theory would help maintain a more equitable distribution of public 
goods and services.  McGuire (1991) counters the Tiebout model with her model of 
destructive IJC among state governments, where there is strong incentive for 
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governments to compete for mobile (and often wealthier) residents and businesses by 
cutting taxes and reducing the tax burden, or shifting the burden to the non-mobile and 
non-wealthy.  She argues that this strategy may result in governments collecting less 
revenue and therefore providing a lower level of public goods, or charging higher taxes to 
immobile/poorer residents.  After a time, the competing jurisdictions are all worse off.    
 Wolkoff (1985) presents a model of IJC that takes tax abatement into account.  He 
comments that in practice abatements to firms are almost always granted, and no system 
is in place to determine when it should be offered and how generous an offer should be 
made.  Since RPTA is viewed as a legislative entitlement with relatively uniform 
program parameters, there is arguably no “backroom dealings” regarding residential 
abatement, unlike abatement agreements with businesses (M. Rosentraub, personal 
communication, August 29, 2006).  Wolkoff concludes that economic development 
administrators seem to overestimate the influence the abatements have on firm 
investment decisions, or they pay too little attention to the likelihood that investment will 
proceed without the abatement.  Similar to Krumholz (1991), Wolkoff recommends that 
full abatements not be viewed as an entitlement, but rather given as an award.  For 
instance, projects that require less from the city (e.g., less infrastructure improvements) 
should get a greater abatement.  However, it may be impossible to put the abatement 
genie back in the bottle now that there are years of precedent for full abatement offerings 
as the expected standard.  Critics of IJC (e.g., Netzer, 1997) worry about the limiting of 
government’s ability to perform redistributive functions and that, “we're trading social 
equity for public efficiency” (Kincaid, 1991, p. 88). 
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2.5.2  Equity 
The definition and conceptualization of equity changes and is a function of 
disciplinary norms and normative values.  Social equity is a normative approach where 
public officials and administrators advocate on behalf of those of lower socioeconomic 
status, thus giving a voice to those with less power and ability to influence the public 
decision making process.  Social equity advocates in public administration and urban 
planning (e.g., Frederickson, 1971; Krumholz & Clavel, 1994) often criticize public 
policy development as inadequate because, in drafting policy goals and objectives 
legislators often fail to ask, “Goals and objectives for whom?” and fail to give 
consideration to the most disadvantaged in society.  However, answering this question is 
complicated and involves social philosophy and value judgments (Musgrave & 
Musgrave, 1989).  In essence, “revenue policy and expenditure policy reflect the values 
of the society” (Ross, Levine, Stedman & Murray, 1991, p. 415).  Social equity as a value 
can impact all members of a community, not just public decision makers:   
The society in which a person lives, the class to which he belongs, the relation 
that he has with the social and economic structure of the community, are relevant 
to a person's choice not merely because they affect the nature of his personal 
interests, but also because they influence his value system including his notion of 
‘due’ concern for other members of society (Sen, 1970: 6).   
 
When economic goals are the only stated pursuit of a given public policy, for example, 
these can be perceived as antithetical to objectives of equity and to democratic practices 
(Hummel, 1994).  Income redistribution advocates, such as Bradbury and Kodrzycki 
(1997), argue that there is a broader array of issues that must come into consideration 
when writing public policy:   
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...policymakers have additional goals besides economic development, including 
an equitable distribution of income and the evenhanded treatment of different 
business activities (p. 2).  
 
 This conception of social equity differs from the discussion found in the public 
finance literature, wherein equity is equated with redistribution of resources, goods and 
services, tax burden, and/or income.  Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren (1961) view equity as 
an "equitable distribution of costs and benefits" (n 13, p. 836) in a framework that 
considers local taxes to be payment for the benefits received by the one making the 
payment.  This is referred to as the benefit equity principle (Musgrave & Musgrave, 
1989).   However, Reschovsky (1991) is critical of this view and argues that looking at 
local taxes as benefit taxes cannot adequately consider redistributive policies and 
requirements, suggesting that, 
there is a great deal of fluidity in the state and local fiscal environment, with 
competition pushing some governments toward benefit taxation, while other 
governments resist such moves, presumably for reasons of tax equity. (p. 150) 
 
 Assuming that equity as redistribution is a legitimate and worthwhile public 
policy objective, the question then becomes at what level of government should it be 
pursued.  A common argument is that redistribution should be pursued only at the federal 
level of government.  The first reason given is that only the federal purse is large enough 
to pursue adequately such policy:   
By including the general welfare as a legitimate objective of federal finance, the 
Constitution refrains from setting specific limits to the federal government’s 
expenditure function. (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989, p. 25) 
 
Also, the amount of redistribution undertaken at the local level is limited by the potential 
in-migration of the poor and out-migration of the rich (Oates, 1972).   Epple and Romer 
(1991) examined the role of mobility as a constraint on redistribution, with results 
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showing a sorting of the poorest households to communities with the most redistribution.  
Epple and Platt (1998) discuss a "zone of indifference" for some households, wherein 
taxes can increase (to a point) and yet they do not move out of the city.  They argue that 
using the property tax for redistribution does not have to cause an out-migration of 
wealthier households; however, they find that the proportion of wealthier households 
relative to the total number of households in a municipality is a decreasing function of 
income. 
 The second reason given is that redistributional efforts at the state or local levels 
create competitive disadvantages in attracting and/or maintaining wealthier populations 
and firms.  The assumption here is that equity is viewed as a disincentive for household 
and business location decisions.  If the rich live outside the central city, then county-level 
or regional approaches (which are still at the local level) could bring about spatial 
redistribution (Netzer, 1997).  If redistribution is a pure "national public good” so that 
non-residents also benefit, then the level of redistribution provided by localities will be 
inefficiently low (McGuire, 1997).  If, however, preferences for redistributive policies 
differ wildly, then it begs the question whether redistribution is a national public good.  
In McGuire’s model (1997), she assumes people value redistribution, therefore they 
choose revenue systems based upon ability-to-pay taxes.  Fox (2001), on the other hand, 
argues that people and businesses move to avoid redistribution.  Reschovsky (1991) 
found that state and local governments do in fact have redistributive social programs, and 
concluded in his test of Oates & Schwab’s model of perfectly competitive behavior of 
local and state government that,  
 56
there is a great deal of fluidity in current state and local fiscal environment, with 
competition pushing some governments toward benefit taxation, while other 
governments resist such moves, presumably for reasons of equity, (p. 150).  
 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) argue that distribution is a policy issue more so than a 
market outcome.  They warn that there is a limit to redistribution, “a further increase in 
tax rates eventually hits a ceiling”, (p. 83), and that society must accept some efficiency 
costs with an equity gain, but argue that the cost should be minimized.    
 A subcategory in the public finance literature on equity as redistribution focuses 
on tax equity.  Tax equity can be defined as having each taxpayer contribute his or her 
fair share to the cost of government (Smith, 1776; Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989), which 
could be expanded to include imposing a higher tax burden on those with greater ability 
to pay (Giertz, McGuire & Nowlan, 1996), but avoids questions such as what is a fair 
share, and also how much should be the imposition.  Adam Smith’s original perspectives 
and treatises emphasized the need for progressive taxation (tied to the benefits of an 
absence of chaos) establishing the normative value that progressive tax payments were 
inherently equitable. 
 Fairness in taxation is also conceived of in terms of horizontal and vertical equity.  
Horizontal equity involves an individual’s ability to pay, while vertical equity is 
concerned with the distributions of burdens across individuals with differing abilities to 
pay (Giertz, McGuire, & Nowlan, 1996).  Some approaches that can be used for 
redistribution in this arena are tax-transfer schemes, progressive taxation, and taxes on 
expensive luxury items with subsidies to other goods purchased by person of lower 
income (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989).  There are two parts to any tax, the base and the 
rate.  There are three ways to measure the tax base: ad valorem (the dollar value), excise 
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(the number of units or by volume), or grouped by classes based on same criteria such as 
permits and licenses (Carter & Hildreth, 1992).  There are two types of rates.  The first 
type is called face, nominal or statutory, and the second type is effective.  The face rate is 
what is listed in formal statements; the effective rate is the amount of tax actually paid, 
and these two types can differ greatly (Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989; Carter & Hildreth, 
1992).     
Throughout U.S. history property tax has been the purview of local jurisdictions 
(Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989), and remains the primary revenue source for localities 
with school districts almost totally dependent and counties heavily reliant on it (Carter & 
Hildreth, 1992).  When discussing property tax equity in particular, one could argue there 
exists a redistributive relationship between tax burden and an ability to pay by virtue of 
housing price: "Property taxes on real estate are loosely related to ability to pay because 
wealthier persons are likely to own more expensive homes, but the relationship is not 
tight" (Rubin, 2005, p. 47).   
 For property taxation, vertical equity describes a state where differences between 
assessed values and market values are equal across property value ranges (IAAO, 2004).  
For example, lower value homes should be assessed at an equal proportion of their 
market value, as are homes of higher values (Allen & Dare, 2002).    The reality is often 
an over-assessment of property of low-income homeowners (Ross, Levine, Stedman & 
Murray, 1991).  Assessment is defined as the process of determining the value of 
property or land for tax purposes (Carter & Hildreth, 1992).  Inequities already occur 
between the tax rates of given jurisdictions, but these differing rates are assumed to be 
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known (or easily retrieved) by the informed potential homebuyer.  However, the 
assessment process is somewhat ambiguous:  
The greatest problems facing property tax appraisers is that to arrive at a pinpoint, 
accurate tax bill, which is the primary focus of taxpayers, one must go through a 
process beginning with the appraisal, which, by its nature, is only an estimate. 
(Clark, 1996, p. 27) 
 
Sjoquist and Pandey (2001) found horizontal and vertical inequities in their examination 
of disparity ratios (assessment-to-sales) for residential properties post-Proposition 13 in 
California. Bowman and Mikesell (1978) examined differences in property tax 
assessment uniformity in Virginia, and found that about 70 percent of the variation in 
property tax assessment is associated with uncontrollable economic and housing market 
factors.  Variations in assessment-to-sales ratios among properties impose different 
effective rates on otherwise equally-situated properties resulting in "arbitrarily high 
portions of governmental costs to certain properties" (p. 137).  Musgrave and Musgrave 
(1989) concur, commenting that although there are policy reasons for differentiating 
between types of property, the actual practice results in "substantial and unjustifiable 
differentiation between specific properties within the same general category" (p. 417).   
Birch, Sunderman, and Smith (2004) attempt to uncover vertical inequity at the 
neighborhood level using median assessment ratios and find inequities in several 
neighborhoods, accounting for fifty percent of total home sales in the city. 
 A common approach in the academic literature is juxtaposing equity against some 
other policy objective:  equity versus growth, ability-to-pay versus benefit, efficiency 
versus equity.  Swanstrom (1985) describes tax abatement as being "the classic tradeoff 
between equality and growth", (p. 139).  Giertz, McGuire, Nowlan (1996) argue that 
policy objectives of efficiency, equity and simplicity are often mutually incompatible, 
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and cite “sin” taxes an example of placing a disproportionate amount of the tax burden on 
lower-income people.  Bartik (1991) argues the need for long-term consideration because 
local growth may push up property values to a greater extent than it increases real wages 
or employment prospects for the bottom part of the income distribution.   
 One can be more optimistic, viewing the above as false dichotomies.  For 
example, Hill claims that while efficiency and equity do not necessarily fit hand-in-glove, 
they can because asset building is community development, which is where equity is 
housed.  A policy can be designed to redistribute in order to create opportunity (such as 
low income housing set-asides) or to redistribute income (personal communication, 
November 2006).  In following this logic, the ability for equitable growth to occur or for 
efficiency and equity to coexist is possible in a well-designed policy.  Bier, et al. (2007) 
saw a redistribution of wealth in terms of increased market value of non-abated 
residential properties in Cleveland; the geographically closer the non-abated home was to 
an abated home, the greater the value increase.  This study examines whether such 
desirable changes are seen at a larger geographic level—the neighborhood.  Others argue 
that most public services (public safety, environmental, infrastructure, libraries) 
redistribute wealth because they benefit all residents, unless a service is specifically tied 
to property (Netzer, 1997), which is the case with RPTA.   When talking about residential 
tax abatement and equity, the implication seems to be that there is some aspect of the 
policy that gives an unfair advantage to some people at the expense of others, and that 
something of value needs to be redistributed to members of the community in order to 
compensate for this perceived unfair advantage.  The language in the Ohio Revised Code 
emphasizes what would be considered economic outcomes such as increasing household 
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incomes and local investment.  However, the legislative language does not include 
explicit objectives addressing equity considerations.  It could be argued that RPTA 
programs are, by definition, equitable programs at the neighborhood level because they 
target formerly underserved areas in order to provide new opportunities to the 
disadvantaged who already reside in those areas.  RPTA critics argue the opposite 
position suggesting abatements do not help the poor but merely provides a tax break to 
middle- and upper-income households.  Sands, Reese and Khan (2006) argue this point 
for incentives to firms in that "selectively reducing the burden of local property taxes 
seems to provide the greatest benefits to prosperous firms and prosperous communities, 
raising serious questions of equity" (p. 54).  Conversely, one could argue that RPTA acts 
as an [small] equalizer in that it makes certain desirable housing affordable to those who 
could not afford it otherwise. 
 
2.5.3   Neighborhood Change 
 Both Galster (2001) and Aber, Gephart, Brooks-Gunn and Connell (1997) argue 
that changes in neighborhoods are driven by external forces.  Galster (2001) states that, 
"the most fundamental sorts of neighbourhood changes are externally induced" (p. 2118).  
Aber, et al. (1997) use social disorganization theory to examine the impact 
neighborhoods have on the individuals living there, and present a set of exogenous forces 
(globalization, economic restructuring, migration, public policies) they say shape the 
characteristics of neighborhoods and communities. Chow and Coutlon (1998) test 
empirically William Julius Wilson’s hypothesis that the social conditions of inner-city 
neighborhoods are worsening because those conditions have become concentrated over 
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time (concentration effects).  Examining Cleveland’s inner-city areas, the authors found 
that eight of the ten indictors of negative social conditions increased, and that these 
conditions became increasingly intertwined over time.   
 Coulson and Leichenko (2004) examined the impact of historical designation on 
three common theories of neighborhood change:  tipping, gentrification, and filtering.   
Tipping is the change in racial or ethnic composition of a neighborhood or community, 
where there is some threshold amount of “other” that is reached and becomes intolerant 
for the majority to continue to reside in that area.  Gentrification is the dramatic shift in 
neighborhood composition toward residents with higher levels of educational 
achievements and income (Freeman & Braconi, 2004).  Filtering describes the process of 
poorer families occupying older homes that originally were built for higher income 
households because the slow decay of the housing stock encouraged higher income 
households to move away (Rosenthal, 2008).  Coulson and Leichenko (2004) found that 
historic designation of a neighborhood does not support these theories of neighborhood 
change, and does not lead to any neighborhood turnover based upon demographic 
composition of neighborhoods.  Similarly, Freeman and Braconi (2004) did not find rapid 
turnover due to gentrification in New York City neighborhoods in the 1990s.  However, 
Rosenthal (2008) did find filtering to impact neighborhood change, although the duration 
of change attributed to filtering varied among neighborhoods.  
RPTA was conceived of because of decline and disinvestment in city 
neighborhoods.  Keating and Smith (1996) outline three categories of causes for urban 
decline:  physical decline (technological, architectural), institutional factors (zoning, code 
enforcement) and social characteristics (i.e., racial composition).  It can be argued that 
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RPTA addresses all three categories, albeit to varying degrees.  The policy most 
obviously addresses the physical decline of an area through incentives for new 
construction, as well as rehabilitation and historic preservation of existing structures.  
Communities promoting RPTA support use of the policy and address institutional factors 
by, for instance, allowing rezoning of areas for residential development and declaring 
areas as historical districts.  Finally, RPTA can address social characteristics by creating 
a supply of housing in urban areas that potentially increases the number of middle to 
higher income households in that neighborhood.  To date no local RPTA policy has 
explicitly listed changes in racial or ethnic housing segregation patterns as a policy 
objective and, unless a community specifically markets these areas in order to affect such 
change, it is likely that the current racial or ethnic compositions of the respective 
neighborhoods will remain.   If Jane Jacobs (1961) is correct that it is the city that is the 
true player in the worldwide economic game, then the vitality of city neighborhoods can 
be seen as fundamental to America’s economic strength and RPTA as one way to 
improve the overall strength of a city through inducing desirable changes in its 
neighborhoods.   
 Jacobs (1961) advocated that new construction should be introduced gradually 
rather than "cataclysmically" into an urban area, viewing new construction "as an 
ingredient of neighborhood diversity instead of as a form of standardization" (p. 423), 
and Galster (2001) concurs: "when new neighborhoods are created through large-scale 
construction or rehabilitation projects, they can change the relative attractiveness of 
existing neighborhoods" (p. 2115).  City officials could counter that the reality of vast 
expanses of dilapidated structures and vacant lots, in addition to depressed local 
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economies, leave the city no choice but to introduce large development projects and 
incentives such as RPTA to bring residents back to the city.  The question is whether 
there is a level or threshold at which such large-scale RPTA developments are associated 
with desirable changes in these areas. 
 
2.5.4  Theory of Broken Windows 
The theory of broken windows was presented in Wilson and Kelling’s essay in 
which they argue that disorder and crime are linked "in a kind of developmental 
sequence" where, "...if a window is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the 
windows will soon be broken” (1982, p. 30).  Following this logic, a broken window 
represents an unstable neighborhood where people do not take care of their property.  
Serious crime may not yet flourish, so the argument goes, but is likely coming down the 
pike if the trajectory of disorder and disrepair continues.  Broken windows policing as a 
public safety policy is an approach whereby a community has aggressive policing efforts 
for lower-level crimes (Corman & Mocan, 2005).  Some trace the theory of broken 
windows to a broader incivilities thesis, which posits that neighborhood disorder can lead 
to residents withdrawing from the community and increasing their fear of crime in their 
community (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008).   Wilson and Kelling (1982) cite a study 
conducted by the Police Foundation examining the use of foot patrol as a way of cutting 
crime.  Although the study found that foot patrol did not reduce crime, residents 
perceived foot patrolled areas as safer, and had a more favorable opinion of police.  They 
further cite a study of a Boston public housing project where the greatest fears were 
expressed by persons living in disorderly buildings, not in the buildings with the most 
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crime.  The authors also claim that there are informal codes of acceptable neighborhood 
conduct that is represented by order and a distrust of outsiders, and the key to effective 
broken windows policing is to  
identify neighborhoods at the tipping point--where the public order is 
deteriorating but not un-reclaimable, where the streets are used frequently but by 
apprehensive people, where a window is likely to be broken at any time, and must 
quickly be fixed if all are not to be shattered. (p. 35) 
 
Wilson (2002) cites Kelling's continued research as supportive of broken windows, 
wherein an increase in the number of misdemeanor arrests was accompanied by a 
decrease in serious crime after controlling for high unemployment, drug use, and increase 
in young men of crime-prone age.  Giacopassi and Forde (2000) conducted a study that 
lends support to broken windows and links homicide with traffic fatality rates, which are 
used as proxies for incivility and aggression.  They amusingly conclude that broken 
windows policing needs to include “crumpled fenders” policing, for if one can ignore 
traffic laws with impunity perhaps one could get away with other more serious crimes in 
the area:  "broken windows and crumpled fenders both may be seen as indicators that 
police are either unconcerned or lack the ability to enforce community standards" (p. 
403).  Freeman (1999) comments that additional police patrols at criminal hot spots have 
been shown to be effective.   
The theory of broken windows is not without its critics (e.g., Sampson & 
Raudenbush, 1997; 1999; Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001).  Sampson & 
Raudenbush (1997;1999) found concentrated poverty and mixed land use to be associated 
with physical and social disorder, and argue that it is collective efficacy that explains 
lower rates of crime and observed disorder, not aggressive policing for low-level crimes. 
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The authors define collective efficacy as “social cohesion among neighbors combined 
with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good” (1997, p. 918).  They 
conclude that the link between broken windows policing and crime is unsupported, 
except possibly for robbery.  It has been argued in the literature that the theory does not 
suppose a direct link between disorder and crime, but rather with fear of crime and a 
withdrawing from the neighborhood by residents as mediating factors between disorder 
and crime (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008).  Corman and Mocan (2005) used misdemeanor 
arrests as their measure of broken windows policing, and controlled for economic and 
deterrence effects.  They found that misdemeanor arrests had an impact on motor vehicle 
theft, robbery and grand larceny, but “we do not find strong evidence to support the 
contention that broken-windows policing strategy affects other crimes" (p. 262).   
Hinkle and Weisburd (2008) recently found an unexpected outcome.  They noted 
that police intervention for lower-level crimes significantly increased the probability of 
residents’ feeling unsafe.  While they did find support for the notion that disorder leads to 
a fear of crime, they suggest that communities need to focus on how broken windows 
policing is implemented.  Pertinent to this dissertation, the authors also found physical 
disorder, literally broken windows, to be significantly and positively related to fear of 
crime. Other potentially negative consequences for increased broken windows policing 
are its impact on the civil liberties of minorities, higher cost of police resources, and the 
impact misdemeanor arrests will have on future labor market viability for individuals 
(Corman & Mocan, 2005).   
One question common in the criminal justice literature on this topic is whether 
people’s perceptions or objective measures of neighborhood characteristics are more 
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significantly related to crime.  For example, Schafer, Huebner and Bynum (2006) found 
that “fear and safety were related more with subjective perceptions of neighborhood 
quality than with objective measures of neighborhood dangers" (p. 296).  Austin, Furr 
and Spine (2002) used a standardized scheme for evaluating the conditions of 
neighborhoods rather than residents’ perceptions, and found that housing quality affected 
both neighborhood satisfaction and perceptions of safety.  Physical deterioration of a 
neighborhood increased perceptions of danger.  They conclude, "neighborhoods, as 
sources of identity and social support, were undermined if the neighborhood was in 
disrepair" (p. 426).  A favorable answer to either position is important when analyzing 
the potential impact RPTA has on a neighborhood measure of crime.  If perceptions have 
a greater impact, then a well-designed policy of broken windows policing may be useful 
in allaying residents’ fears.  Similarly, if it is characteristics such as physically decaying 
structures, abandoned cars and excess litter that impacts people’s opinions about their 
neighborhood, then maybe increasing annual expenditures for police and community 
development (i.e., “weed-and-seed”) would have greater impact (Ren, Zhao & Lovrich, 
2008).   
RPTA may impact the theory of broken windows in that a neighborhood’s 
physical disorder or disrepair (i.e., blight) is a significant factor associated with residents’ 
fear of crime or perceptions of safety.  RPTA creates new physical structures in an area 
and, in many cases blight was removed in order to erect these new homes.  Further, 
neighborhood stability has been shown to have a significant association with lowering 
fear of crime, and RPTA contributes to neighborhood stability by increasing 
homeownership. Also, one of the goals of RPTA is to increase population in designated 
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areas but, as Freeman (1999) points out, “a one percent increase in crime rate induces a 
one to two percent decrease in city population.  The effect is larger for families with kids 
and higher income groups” (p. 356). Thus, the inclusion of some kind of discussion 
regarding crime is relevant to an analysis of RPTA’s impact on neighborhoods. 
Summarizing survey responses from RPTA homeowners in Cleveland, Bier, et al. (2007) 
comment: 
Respondents did not indicate a willingness to accept reduced property taxes for 
assuming higher risks related to crime.  There is a clear indication that 
respondents are as interested in safe neighborhoods as they are in getting as much 
house possible for their money (p. 44). 
 
 
2.5.5 American Ideology:  The anti-urban—pro-rural dichotomy  
Warner (1962) describes a contradiction that could be referred to as an anti-
urban—pro-rural dichotomy wherein the city is viewed as artificial and incomplete while 
the country is perceived as simple, timeless and gratifying.  Warner traces this dichotomy 
back at least to Roman times, but argues it is imitated in the United States by the ideal of 
the English county gentleman who goes to the city for business while "at the same time 
living a well-rounded life on his estate" (p. 13).  Before street railway, this was 
accomplished through having a city residence and a country house.  Improvements in 
transportation made the ability to work in the city and live in the hinterland a reality for 
the more mobile middle- and upper-income classes.  This dichotomy continues to 
influence residential development in America.  What began as early American sentiments 
of anti-urbanism, rural living as moral goodness, the noble yeoman farmer, and the 
conquest of frontier America continue to operate in the collective American psyche as we 
pursue our residential settings in the 21st century.  
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2.5.5.1  Anti-Urbanism 
Anti-urban sentiment has a long history in American thought and can be traced back 
to the writing of the founding fathers, notably in the letters of Thomas Jefferson.  For 
instance, in a letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush during Philadelphia’s yellow fever epidemic, 
Jefferson (1800) wrote: 
The yellow fever will discourage the growth of great cities in our nation, & I view 
great cities as pestilential to the morals, the health and the liberties of man.  True, 
they nourish some of the elegant arts, but the useful ones can thrive elsewhere, and 
less perfection in the others, with more health, virtue & freedom, would be my 
choice. 
 
Dr. Rush concurred, stating that cities are “reservoirs of all the impurities of a 
community” (Letter to Thomas Jefferson, October 6, 1800).   
The out-migration of urban populations to the hinterland is deeply rooted in this 
anti-urban sentiment, described in Warner’s Streetcar Suburbs (1962) as  
…an attitude which had always contained the notion of escape from city 
restraints, organizations, and objects.  The city's ways and forms were conceived 
of as too artificial and of the wrong quality to support a moral life. (p. 12) 
 
Clapp (1978) argued that urban problems fuel negative images of urban life and force 
those who are mobile to "opt for departure at the earliest opportunity", (p. 1).  Once they 
have “escaped”, suburban residents wanted the political autonomy of being separate from 
the central city and its problems, and to keep the "problems" in the city by use of 
exclusionary zoning (Booth, 2002).   
Anti-urban perceptions are continuing into the twenty-first century, although 
Walker and Fortmann (2003) argue that today's anti-urban attitudes differ from those of 
the nineteenth century middle class. They argue that the current perception is a fear of the 
city, rather than the nineteenth century view of the city as an unhealthy environment in 
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need of change (e.g., better sanitation, green space).  They argue that this distinction has 
led to retreat and indifference:  "today the bourgeoisie has lost much of its guilty 
conscience about cities.  It has retreated to purified spaces in the countryside" (p. 58).  
Bayoh, Irwin, and Haab (2006) concur, arguing that current residential community choice 
decisions are driven more by flight-from-blight factors than by natural evolution.  
Arguably the greatest factor impacting forsaken city neighborhoods is racism and the 
perceived urban woes attributed to African Americans.  As Glaab & Brown (1967) 
describe it,  
Racial segregation drastically limited the possibility of upward mobility by 
individual or group.  The black metropolises...were areas where few could benefit 
from the economic and cultural advantages of the city but where all the long-
standing urban problems of crime, poverty, and disease existed in aggravated 
form...and reflected a general tendency to increased economic and cultural 
segregation in the twentieth century metropolis...the wealthier and more powerful 
members of the community steadily moved to the outer zones of the city and to 
the new suburban areas. (p. 287) 
 
As city public officials attempt to combat anti-urban bias and to curb the flow of 
population out of their cities, the notion of providing incentives to influence the location 
decisions of households and businesses became an important public policy pursuit.    
 
2.5.5.2 The Rural Ideal 
Along with anti-urban sentiment, the pursuit of the rural ideal can be traced back 
to early American thought.  The Jeffersonian vision of the good and moral life was to be 
found in the country (Booth, 2002), and exemplified in early writings to that effect: 
I think our [American] governments will remain virtuous for many centuries; as 
long as they are chiefly agricultural…When they get piled upon one another in 
large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe. (Jefferson, 1787) 
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In the 1800s, moving to the suburbs was how the rural ideal was pursued by city 
dwellers.  According to Glaab (1963) the flight from the city was not a post-WWII 
phenomenon and "as early as 1823, a New York real estate advertisement described 
country lots an easy 15-25 minutes by foot from the city's business district” (p. 229).  In 
1873, a pamphlet described real estate offices as being  
crowded daily with eager purchasers, and everybody...is kept busy explaining 
subdivisions, answering questions...and such other points as the prospective 
ruralist would naturally take into consideration. (emphasis added, In Glaab, 1963, 
p. 233)   
 
The nineteenth century pursuit of the rural ideal affected modern planning policy by 
supporting the notion that open small communities were the best settings for family life 
(Warner, 1962).  Public policy encouraged the expansion of public services so that this 
ideal could be realized, thus influencing the way in which American cities developed.  A 
century later, public programs such as residential property tax abatement were 
implemented as a way to try and recapture the disappearing residential base of the city.   
The pursuit of the rural ideal continues, with people moving several communities 
away from the perceived border of decaying cities, which now includes their older 
suburbs.  As Booth (2002) describes it, “The countryside beyond the suburbs seems to be 
gaining magnetic powers” (p. 4), and this migration “seems to be motivated by values 
that are essentially rural in origin" (p. 2).  In a recent study conducted by the Pew 
Research Center (Morin & Taylor, 2009), a nationally representative sample was asked, 
if you could live anywhere would you prefer to live in a city, a suburb, a rural area or a 
small town.  Only 25 percent said the suburb is their ideal community type, with small 
towns and rural living comprising 51 percent of responses.  Given the nature of this 
dissertation, it is interesting that 23 percent of respondents chose urban living as their 
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preference, which may bode well for city officials trying to lure residents back into urban 
neighborhoods.  In a different survey, wherein one thousand randomly selected registered 
voters in the Sierra Nevada region were asked why they moved to the region, one of the 
dominant responses was the ability to live in a rural area (Booth, 2002).  Walker and 
Fortmann (2003) concur, citing that "a typically well-educated middle-to-upper class 
migrated to Nevada County seeking refuge from the city and pleasure in being close to a 
perceived 'natural' landscape" (p. 484). 
 Jeffersonian views continue their influence on American culture and can be found 
in the romantic view of the American family farm, embodied in the noble yeoman farmer.  
Farming is perceived to produce the human virtues of patience, humility, and a hard work 
ethic (Mariola, 2005), as well as producing real “American heroes” (Peterson, 1990).  
Generally, Americans with enough mobility can pursue such romantic notions when 
making decisions about where they will live and raise a family.  As Peterson (1990) 
describes it, "The American pastoral's synthesis of progress and tradition...beckons 
endless numbers of newcomers into the garden" (p. 12). 
In reality Americans are not leaving city or suburban types of employment to 
work on the farm but rather to live in low-density housing divisions, what Mariola (2005) 
describes as "countrified city", and exemplified by the mid-1970s accelerated loss of 
productive cropland to urban populations moving to the countryside.   He criticizes this 
purely economic approach to land use, arguing that  
Pastures and parking lots are not compared using aesthetic or ethical criteria, but 
on a cost-benefit basis only...There is simply no recognition that land may have 
any value other than the money that changes hands upon its purchase.  The land is 
more 'valuable' as a farm for the sole reason that the developer cannot afford to 
turn it into a park[ing lot].  
(p. 215) 
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Another variation on the theme of the rural ideal is the romantic notion of the 
American frontier, which is also interrelated to the other attitudes previously discussed.  
In essence, "While the American frontier and Jeffersonian agrarianism represent distinct 
myths, the two are interconnected in agricultural discourse" with "the myth of the 
agrarian frontier retain[ing] a significant role in contemporary land-use rhetoric" 
(Peterson, 1990, p. 9).  Indeed, whether it is the romantic view of the American frontier 
or that of the yeoman farmer, it can be argued that both archetypes may help explain 
migration patterns out of cities (Louv, 2008). 
Like their yeoman brothers, brave men were carved from the hard work needed to 
tame nature, resulting in the mythic hero of the American frontiersman.  According to 
Louv (2008), there are three American frontiers.  The first was the actual Lewis and 
Clark type frontier expansion.  The second frontier was a romantic link to and respect for 
the family farm described by Peterson (1990) as, “the newly-acquired farm lands 
represent a frontier that promises the satisfaction of all demands and the reconciliation of 
all contradictions” (p. 13).  The second and third frontiers occurred concurrently, with the 
third frontier comprised of what Peterson (1990) describes as a “suburban manifest 
destiny, when boys still imagined themselves woodsmen and scouts, and girls still 
yearned to live in a little house on the prairie” (p. 18).  In essence anti-urban bias and 
romantic notions of rural living, Jeffersonian agrarianism and the American frontier myth 
all feed an urban exodus, are implicitly ingrained in the American psyche, and continue 
to influence residential location decisions that have a detrimental impact on America’s 
urban neighborhoods.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
The major findings of this literature review as they relate to this dissertation are first, 
that administrators of RPTA are constantly trying to balance between public and private 
interests in an effort to increase development in certain geographic areas of the city.  The 
hope is that increased development would start a cycle of increased revenues for the city, 
leading to increased levels of public goods and services for the residents provided at 
lower costs (resulting from the presence of more higher-valued real estate), leading to 
higher levels of resident satisfaction that contributes over time to higher levels of 
development reflected an increased demand to live in urban areas.  This theory is 
examined through the hypotheses posed in this study regarding the relationship between 
RPTA and private sector development, namely certain aspects of the housing lending 
market and number of businesses. 
Second, a discussion of inter-jurisdictional competition (IJC) was included because 
it addresses a pragmatic and real concern for municipalities trying to revitalize their 
urban neighborhoods through offering incentives and whether or not these incentives are 
working.  In other words, are tax incentives for firms and residents fulfilling the original 
intentions of policymakers?  As noted, much of the academic literature is concerned with 
incentives for firms, which is why this dissertation helps to fill a void in the literature by 
addressing incentives for residents.  If study results indicate that RPTA holds desirable 
relationships with measured changes in urban neighborhoods, then one could infer that 
from the perspective of the central city RPTA does not adversely affect IJC.  In essence, 
urban neighborhoods have become options for mobile residents once again.  
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Third, a discussion of equity was included in the literature review because the term 
is defined and operationalized in this dissertation as one of the indicators of 
neighborhood change. Because equity is a concept neither universally defined nor 
commonly examined in studies of tax incentives, an extensive discussion of the concept 
seemed warranted.   Fourth, a brief discussion of common theories of neighborhood 
change was included in this review because these theories set the stage for why incentive 
policies such as RPTA were even conceived by policymakers, namely that urban 
neighborhoods were no longer attractive because of changing neighborhood 
characteristics over time.  Moreover, this dissertation examines the impact of RPTA on a 
set of indicators of neighborhood change, which is how policy effectiveness is being 
defined for purposes of this study. 
This study hypothesizes that RPTA will have a significant relationship with crime.  
There is, however, no agreed upon approach to defining, recording or measuring the 
concept.  Therefore, the theory of broken windows was included in this review of the 
literature as the selected approach to examining crime in urban neighborhoods.  The final 
section included a discussion of a pervasive view impacting residential location 
decisions, namely an anti-urban—pro-rural bias.  This dichotomy, grounded in hundreds 
of years of American migratory patterns, has currency today because it continues to 
influence people’s location decisions.  Therefore, if results of this study suggest that 
RPTA has no significant relationship with measures of neighborhood change, then such 
policies as they are currently administered may be ineffective in stemming the flow of 
population from urban areas. 
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CHAPTER III 
FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1  Conceptual Framework 
This study is an exploration of a popular public policy program intended to 
stimulate redevelopment in designated urban areas.  As such, it is useful to develop a 
conceptual framework that (1) links the policy with the observed context from which it 
arises, (2) identifies the theoretical concepts influencing policy development, and (3) 
makes explicit the desired policy outcomes.  Figure 1, Exploring the Impact of 
Residential Property Tax Abatement (RPTA) Programs on Indicators of Neighborhood 
Change, is the conceptual model constructed for this study, and outlines a way in which 
RPTA may be related to urban neighborhoods.  This conceptual model is derived from 
the academic literature and from legislation discussed previously in the literature review.     
The Observed Context for Action included in the conceptual model is a broad 
brush-stroke of the conditions of Ohio’s urban areas prior to the implementation of 
RPTA.  Similar to other cities in the “rust belt,” Ohio cities were suffering from 
depressed housing market conditions including a lack of mortgage lending activity and 
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depressed local economies as the state continued to lose its manufacturing base.  Within 
such older metropolitan areas, businesses were relocating to outlying areas (Bogart & 
Ferry, 1999; Lee, 2007), and the population levels in center cities declined in response to 
perceived negative social conditions such as high crime and poverty rates, and negative 
physical conditions such as a dilapidated housing stock and decaying infrastructure (e.g., 
Kasarda, Appold, Sweeney & Sieff, 1997; Freeman, 1999).  In addition, declining 
transportation and communication costs made it easier for businesses and residents to 
move to decentralized locations (e.g., Warner, 1962; Judd & Swanstrom, 2002).   It is 
these observations of urban neighborhood decline that not only generated theories 
attempting to explain these observations but also influenced the development of financial 
incentives as desired public policy.  Referring to Figure 1, the first theory to be discussed 
as influenced by the Observed Context of Action and influencing the Policy Action taken 
is inter-jurisdictional competition (IJC).  City officials view RPTA as a way of effectively 
competing with surrounding jurisdictions for the limited resource of residents of higher 
socio-economic status.  Underpinning the concept of IJC is the classical theory of supply 
and demand.  Because housing conditions in urban neighborhoods were perceived as no 
longer desirable, policy makers provided direct incentives such as providing 
infrastructure improvements and/or waiving of fees, along with promises of the future 
incentive of profits from new construction sales, in order to increase the housing supply. 
 On the demand side, policy makers provided several years of property tax abatement to 
homebuyers in exchange for choosing to purchase homes in designated CRAs.   
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Observed Context for Action
• Depressed Local Housing 
Market Conditions 
• Depressed Local Economies
• Negative Social Conditions 
• Negative Physical Conditions
 
Theory 
• Inter-jurisdictional 
Competition  
• Neighborhood Change
• Anti‐Urban/Pro‐Rural 
Dichotomy 
• Broken Windows 
• Equity 
Policy Action
Residential 
Property Tax 
Abatement  
Changed Context
• Improved Local Housing Market Conditions 
• Improved Local Economies 
• Improved Social Conditions 
• Improved Physical Conditions 
 
Desired Policy Outcomes 
• Increased Private Investment 
• Removal of Blight 
• Decrease in Number of Crimes 
• Tax Equity
Figure 1 
 
Conceptual Model:  Exploring the Relationships between Residential Property Tax 
Abatement Programs & Indicators of Neighborhood Change 
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 Second, theories of neighborhood change have attempted to explain the trajectory 
of decline in urban neighborhoods.  Moreover, ideas about neighborhood change have 
influenced RPTA policy development.  For example, the idea of filtering supports the 
notion that aging housing stock is less desirable than new construction.  A designated 
CRA can become gentrified as pockets of RPTA new housing are developed, which can 
also result in patterns of racial and economic segregation in an area if housing 
development is not affirmatively marketed (defined as making a deliberate effort to reach 
more than white and higher income potential homeowners through targeting marketing 
campaigns to reach diverse populations).    
Third, an American anti-urban bias that is rooted in negative feelings about racial 
and ethnic minorities and poor people (e.g., Glaab & Brown, 1967; Booth, 2002) has fed 
the exodus of people from urban neighborhoods into the suburbs, and a pro-rural bias has 
continued to influence residential location choices beyond suburban areas (e.g., Warner, 
1962; Walker & Fortmann, 2003; Morin & Taylor, 2009).  RPTA can be seen as one way 
in which city officials try to influence these location decisions through the offering of a 
financial incentive in order to lure people back to urban neighborhoods through pricing 
effects.  An issue is whether or not the fiscal incentives offset any perceived biases or 
preferences for suburban and more homogenous communities.   
Fourth, the theory of broken windows and its influence on crime relates to RPTA 
policy in that new market rate housing development should have the desired impact of 
decreasing the level of criminal activity in these designated areas by decreasing blight 
and increasing neighborhood stability through increased levels of homeownership.  
Finally, according to public finance theory, one of the normative considerations in 
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creating tax policy such as RPTA should be tax equity.  Indeed, one indictment against 
RPTA policy is that it creates vertical property tax inequity by placing an increased tax 
burden on the non-abated homes in the area, which are generally of lower value 
(Bartimole, 2007). 
In the conceptual model, there is a set of Desired Policy Outcomes expected to 
result from effective administration of RPTA and is derived from the legislation.  One 
desired outcome is that RPTA will increase private investment in areas that have 
experienced disinvestment.  Private investment is increased through increased availability 
of market rate housing followed by increased mortgage lending activity to purchase said 
housing.  The resulting increase in the residential population in designated areas should 
result in increased activity in the local economy because of increased demand for goods 
and services.  The second outcome—decrease in blight—should be achieved as RPTA 
helps to increase the number of owner-occupied homes, resulting in decreased blight as 
homeowners maintain their properties and influence others to maintain their properties 
thus improving the physical conditions of the area.  Another desired policy outcome is a 
decrease in the number of crimes, which is expected as the physical landscape improves 
and more homes become owner-occupied.  Tax equity is the final desired outcome 
evaluated in this study and is derived from the political debate of RPTA, specifically 
addressing the criticism that RPTA places a higher tax burden on those who can least 
afford it, and also derived from public finance theory that tax policies should be 
equitable.   
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3.2  Hypothesis 
The research question is whether there is a statistical relationship between 
residential property tax abatement (RPTA) and changes in urban neighborhoods as 
measured on a set of indicators.  Table 5 presents the specific hypotheses as they pertain 
to each of the neighborhood indicators stated in the research question. 
   
Table 5 
 
Hypotheses Representing Indicators of Neighborhood Change 
 
  
Hypothesis 
 
 
References 
 
H1 
 
RPTA is significantly (+) related to home 
purchase mortgage loan approval rates. 
 
Galster, et al. (2004; 2005); ORC 
3735.65; local ordinances. 
 
H2 
 
RPTA is significantly (+) related to the 
number of home purchase mortgage loan 
applications. 
 
Galster, et al. (2004; 2005); ORC 
3735.65; local ordinances. 
 
H3 
 
RPTA is significantly (+) related to the 
median dollar amount of home purchase 
mortgage loans originated. 
 
Galster, et al. (2004, 2005); ORC 
3735.65; local ordinances. 
 
H4 
 
RPTA is significantly related (+) to the 
number of businesses. 
 
Galster, et al. (2004, 2005); ORC 
3735.65; local ordinances. 
 
H5 
 
RPTA is significantly related (-) to Type I 
crimes. 
 
Corman & Mocan (2005); Toledo 
Ord. No. 170-04; NEO CANDO. 
 
H6 
 
RPTA is significantly related (-) to Type II 
crimes. 
 
Corman & Mocan (2005); Toledo 
Ord. No. 170-04; NEO CANDO. 
 
H7 
 
RPTA is significantly related to assessment 
ratios. 
 
Birch, Sunderman & Smith, (2004); 
Cornia & Slade, (2005). 
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The first four specific hypotheses are designed to measure the first two policy 
outcomes in the conceptual model.  It is hypothesized that RPTA will have a significant 
relationship with measures of private investment primarily as they relate to the mortgage 
lending industry and number of businesses.  First, it is expected that RPTA will be 
significantly and positively correlated with home purchase mortgage loan approval rates.  
A positive correlation is interpreted to mean that an increase in the approval rates of 
home purchase mortgage loans will be significantly associated with having RPTA homes 
in a neighborhood.  Second, it is expected that RPTA is positively correlated with the 
number of home purchase mortgage loan applications.  A positive correlation is 
interpreted to mean that an increase in the number of home purchase mortgage loan 
applications will be associated with the presence of RPTA homes in a neighborhood.  
Third, it is expected that RPTA will be positively correlated with the median dollar 
amount of home purchase mortgage loans originated.  A positive correlation is interpreted 
to mean that an increase in the median dollar amount of home purchase mortgage loans 
originated will be significantly associated with the presence of RPTA homes in a 
neighborhood.  Fourth, it is expected that RPTA will be positively correlated with the 
number of businesses.  A positive correlation is interpreted to mean that an increase in the 
number of businesses will be associated with having RPTA homes in a neighborhood.     
It is expected that criminal activity is negatively related to RPTA.  In other words, 
the presence of RPTA homes in a neighborhood will result in a decrease in Type I Crimes 
and Type II Crimes.  Type I Crimes are violent crimes and property crimes, while Type II 
crimes include all other lesser crimes such as vandalism and disorderly conduct.  This 
categorization is one way of separating “broken windows” criminal activity (i.e., Type II 
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Crimes) from more serious crimes.  Results from the academic literature testing broken 
windows hypotheses are conflicting and “crime” is a complicated behavior to 
operationalize.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to categorize criminal activity in some 
logical manner.  This particular categorical scheme is taken from the Center on Urban 
Poverty and Social Change from the Mandel School of Social Sciences at Case Western 
Reserve University through their NEO CANDO online database system.  Finally, it is 
expected there will be a significant association between RPTA neighborhoods and 
assessment ratios.  In essence, the presence of RPTA homes in a neighborhood should be 
significantly related to the assessment-to-value ratios for homes.  One-tailed tests are 
employed for all hypotheses testing because theory indicates the expected direction of 
association listed in Table 5.  Statistical significance is evaluated at α = .05.  In essence, 
because a reasonable expectation for any public policy operating at the neighborhood 
level is that the policy is at least related to a set of policy outcomes, it is hypothesized 
that there will be a significant change in the policy outcomes in neighborhoods with 
RPTA, ceteris paribus.     
 
3.3  Null Hypotheses and Significance Testing 
 
The null hypothesis in this study is that there is no statistically significant association 
between residential property tax abatement (RPTA) and desired policy objectives as 
measured by several indicators of neighborhood change.  Table 6 provides the specific 
hypotheses for each indicator. 
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Table 6 
 
Null Hypotheses Representing Indicators of Neighborhood Change 
 
  
Null Hypothesis 
 
References 
 
NH1 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to home 
purchase mortgage loan approval rates. 
 
Galster, et al. (2004; 2005); ORC 
3735.65; local ordinances. 
 
NH2 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to the 
number of home purchase mortgage loan 
applications. 
 
Galster, et al. (2004; 2005); ORC 
3735.65; local ordinances. 
 
NH3 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to the 
median dollar amount of home purchase 
mortgage loans originated. 
 
Galster, et al. (2004, 2005); ORC 
3735.65; local ordinances. 
 
NH4 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to the 
number of businesses. 
 
Galster, et al. (2004, 2005); ORC 
3735.65; local ordinances. 
 
NH5 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to Type 
I crimes. 
 
Corman & Mocan (2005); Toledo 
Ord. No. 170-04; NEO CANDO. 
 
NH6 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to Type 
II crimes. 
 
Corman & Mocan (2005); Toledo 
Ord. No. 170-04; NEO CANDO. 
 
NH7 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to 
assessment ratios. 
 
Birch, Sunderman & Smith, (2004); 
Cornia & Slade, (2005). 
 
 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis is consistent with the public choice view that 
unfettered competition should remain the preferred public policy course of action, and 
residential location decisions should be the purview of housing markets.  Failure to reject 
the null also results in the rejection of the counter-factual scenario that, if it were not for 
RPTA, there would be no significant change in the neighborhood indicators.  Conversely, 
rejection of the null hypothesis is consistent with the utilitarian principle that RPTA 
benefits the greater good, assuming that the associations between RPTA and the 
indicators of neighborhood change are in the desirable direction.  If the direction of the 
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significant associations between RPTA and measurement of neighborhood change are 
undesirable, this result lends support to opponents of RPTA and questions the 
effectiveness of the policy.   
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1  Research Question 
This study asks whether there is a statistical relationship between residential 
property tax abatement (RPTA) and expected changes in urban neighborhoods as 
measured on a given set of indicators.  These indicators were chosen to operationalize 
RPTA policy objectives and are intended to uncover correlations seen at the 
neighborhood (i.e., census tract) level.  The indicators can be grouped under the broad 
concepts of (1) increased private investment; (2) blight removal; (3) decreased criminal 
activity; and (4) property tax equity (see Figure 1 in Chapter III).  If tracks with RPTA 
are not significantly associated with indicators if neighborhood change relative to tracts 
without RPTA then the policy, as it is currently being administered, may not be fulfilling 
its policy objectives at the neighborhood level.  However, if RPTA has the hypothesized 
statistical relationships (see Chapter III) with the indicators of neighborhood change, then 
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these results lend support to proponents that RPTA may be fulfilling desired policy 
objectives to some capacity.     
 
4.2  Research Design 
In attempting to devise a research design for this study, the nature of the research 
question and the place-based nature of the policy investigated necessarily limited the type 
of analysis that could be employed.  First, there could not be random assignment; either 
the neighborhood had RPTA or it did not and the researcher had no control over which 
neighborhoods fell into what category.  Second, the level of “treatment” could not be 
manipulated; there was no control over the number of tax-abated properties built in a 
neighborhood, the value of those homes, or the specific policy parameters (i.e., duration 
and rate), or when the homes were built.  In essence, this study is a natural experiment, 
which has been conceived of as a pretest-posttest non-equivalent group design, 
graphically displayed in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2 
Pretest-Posttest Non-Equivalent Group Design 
NRs O1 X O2 
 NRc O1  O2 
  
The pretest (O1) consists of a series of measurements on a set of neighborhood 
indicators for 2001, before a majority of RPTA homes were erected, and the posttest (O2) 
is a series of measurements on the same set of indicators for 2006.   This five-year lag is 
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intended to measure the cumulative changes that may have occurred in the outcome 
indicators (Galster, et al., 2004).  In the above figure, NRs represents the city 
neighborhoods (tracts) that have RPTA homes and Nc represents neighborhoods 
contiguous to those tracts but without RTPA.  The treatment is the number of new 
construction one- through three-family units receiving RPTA.  A time lag is assumed to 
occur between the construction of RPTA units and when market and neighborhood 
effects begin to register the change; newly built homes need to be sold and become 
occupied.  Following Galter et al.’s approach (2004) the time lag in this study is three 
years, with the neighborhoods in the subject group consisting of RPTA untis built 
through 2003, and posttest measures taken in 2006.  While a 2001 pretest measure is not 
a “pure” pretest measure because some tracts had RPTA homes built prior to 2001, in this 
study the pretest measure is providing control for variation on the neighborhood 
indictors, and provides a common temporal starting point for possibly uncovering the 
trajectory of change occurring at the neighborhood level on each respective outcome.    
Threats to internal validity question the existence of valid causal relationships for 
the population being studied (Moss & Yeaton, 2006).   Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 
(2002) recommend good research design first, followed by statistical adjustments to help 
control for these threats.  This study makes use of some good design controls such as the 
inclusion of pre-test measures and a comparison group.  However, there can be no 
random assignment or manipulation of treatment, so there are threats that need to be 
addressed and if possible, controlled for in order to interpret any valid relationships 
between the constructs operationalized in this study.  This section lists the possible 
threats to the internal validity of the proposed study, and how the researcher expects to 
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resolve these issues to the best of her ability and given the constraints established by the 
study itself.   
The greatest threat to a non-equivalent group design (NEGD) is selection bias 
(Trochim, 2006) and may account for observed differences between RPTA and non-
RPTA neighborhoods because the groups are non-equivalent by definition (Shadish, et 
al., 2002) and these group differences may have existed prior to RPTA.  Indeed, it is the 
presence of self-selection bias that has resulted in a natural experiment because the 
municipalities in the study chose to administer RPTA in certain areas (presumably more 
distressed) and not in others.  Use of a comparison group helps to diminish this threat, 
although the comparison group is de facto self-selected.  
The initial comparison group conceived of for this study included all non-RPTA 
census tracts for the four cities in the analysis.  In order to examine the usefulness of such 
a comparison group, the researcher conducted independent samples tests of the pretest 
measures.  The hypothesis tested in an independent samples test is whether the mean of 
each pretest measure is significantly different between groups.  Results indicated that 
there were significant differences between subject and comparison groups for several of 
the variables (p < 0.05).  These significant differences remained even after alternately 
removing the census tracts for each city.  However, when the researcher conducted the 
same analysis on a modified comparison group, the group composed of non-RPTA tracts 
geographically and politically (within the same municipality) contiguous to the subject 
group of tracts, only the number of businesses pretest measure was statistically 
significantly different between the two groups at p < 0.05 (Table 1A, Appendix).  
Shadish, et al. advise the use of non-equivalent comparison groups in quasi-experimental 
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design that are “deliberately chosen to have maximum pretest similarity to the treatment 
group on as many observed characteristics as possible”, (2002, p. 159).  Therefore, the 
contiguous tract comparison group was utilized as the comparison group in this study and 
the threat of selection bias was diminished for every neighborhood indicator except 
number of businesses.   
Another threat to internal validity applicable to this study is history.  As Shadish, et 
al. (2002) write:  “Even in field research…the plausibility of history can be reduced…by 
selecting groups from the same general location and by ensuring that the schedule for 
testing is the same in both groups” (p. 56).  In this study, the above criteria are 
maintained in that neighborhoods in both the subject and comparison groups are from the 
same geographic locations.  Also, variables are included to the model to control for 
variation in housing values, economic growth and city over the study period.  Although 
the researcher attempted to construct as complete a model as possible, which included 
using variables that have been derived from a larger set of indicators through previous 
research (see Galster et. al, 2004; 2005), there remains the possibility of variable 
omission bias. 
Attrition/mortality is not a plausible threat to this study because, for the time period 
under investigation, no neighborhoods lost or gained designation as RPTA areas. 
Theoretically, regression artifacts are possible threats in this study because, assuming 
RPTA tracts are suffering from extreme disinvestment relative to non-RPTA tracts, it is 
likely that there will be some improvement even if RPTA had no effect.  Following the 
recommendations in Shadish, et al. (2002) for reducing regression artifacts this analysis 
will include the using of two-year averages on HMDA data to help control for extreme 
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variability from one year to the next (Chow & Coulton, 1998; Galster, et al., 2005), use a 
multivariate function of several variables, and use a comparison group that is not 
significantly different from the neighborhoods comprising the subject group when 
measured on a set of pretest measures.   
 
4.3  Study Population 
The study population is defined as large municipalities in Ohio (greater than 
100,000 in population according to the 2000 U.S. Census) that use RPTA as an economic 
development policy.  Four of the six large Ohio cities are included in this analysis:  
Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo.  Akron is not included in this analysis 
because it does not use RPTA (D. L. Kleinhenz, personal communication, September 21, 
2006).  Large cities were chosen because they have been using RPTA as a development 
policy for several years and, arguably, the health of a region depends upon the strength of 
its central city (Shroitman-Sarig, 2006), which presumably includes its neighborhoods.  
Further, the population was defined as large Ohio cities because the policy under 
investigation is a state-derived policy, and operates at the local governmental level.  
Originally, Cincinnati was to be the fifth city included in the analysis.  The 
required data could not be secured from Cincinnati’s Police Department at a useful 
geographic level, from the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, nor from the Hamilton 
County Auditor at an affordable price.  Crime data from the police department were not 
available on a geographic level other than precincts, which are too large to provide any 
meaningful inferences at the neighborhood level.  Even after a faxed data request, an in-
person visit and two phone calls, the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office failed to fulfill the 
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request for sheriff’s sales data or assist the researcher in locating the appropriate 
department or staff person for the data request. The appropriate assessment and sales data 
could not be secured without payment of a substantial amount of money.  The Assistant 
County Auditor for Hamilton County stated that certain files needed to be linked to 
census tracts to secure the requested sales and assessment data.  In addition, these data for 
Hamilton County are propriety and owned by a private vendor (P. Drake, personal 
communication, July 8, 2008).  The researcher also contacted two faculty members at the 
University of Cincinnati who did not have the appropriate data available.  In essence, the 
only data acquired in a usable format for the City of Cincinnati were the tax-abated 
residential properties.  The researcher and her dissertation chair agreed that, for these 
reasons, the City of Cincinnati would have to be dropped from the analysis, and that this 
omission does not reduce the efficacy of the study. 
 
4.4  Statistical Model 
Building on the Program Theory Model in Chapter III and modifying Galster, et 
al.’s (2004a) impact study of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) spending, 
the chosen statistical model is intended to uncover statistical relationships between the 
presence of RPTA homes and changing values of six neighborhood indicators.  The 
approach taken in this study was determined to be useful because any analysis of the 
impact of CBDG funding, RPTA, or any large public policy on neighborhoods is very 
often done ex post facto.  Indeed, this is a problem with policy analysis in general; the 
question of program effectiveness occurs well after the policy is already operating, the 
political will is behind its implementation and public dollars are already allocated to the 
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program or, at least, to its administration.   In addition, the proposed model appears to be 
a reasonable attempt at modeling the counterfactual scenario of what the neighborhoods 
in the subject group would have looked like in lieu of RPTA.  Galster, et al. (2004a) used 
cubic regression to uncover any possible threshold effects in CDBG spending.  A similar 
approach is taken here to uncover any threshold effects in terms of a critical number of 
RPTA homes built in a neighborhood at which we see significant changes in the outcome 
variables since “cubic regressions permit the estimation of a wide range of nonlinear 
relationships, some of which may suggest thresholds” (p. 909).   
The statistical model is: 
Y06i = a + b1(RPTAi) + b2 (RPTAi2) + b3(RPTAi3) + b4(Y01i) +MHV i +ΔJGi +  
SSi +CITY +e 
where 
a = intercept 
b = coefficient 
Y06 = 2006 value for outcome indicator Y in neighborhood i 
Y01 = 2001 value for outcome indicator Y in neighborhood i 
RPTA = number of newly constructed single-, two-, and three-family  
residential units through 2003 for neighborhood i 
MHV = 2003 median housing value for neighborhood i 
ΔJG = rate of change in job growth from 2001 to 2006 for neighborhood i 
SS = number of sheriff’s sales in 2006 for neighborhood i 
CITY = dummy variable for city 
e = random error term 
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4.5 Variables 
A “measured change in neighborhood indicators” (Galster, et al., 2004) approach 
was chosen for this study because of the researcher’s interest in examining housing 
policy at the neighborhood level and because policies such as RPTA are designed to be 
administered at the neighborhood level.2 The following sections describe the dependent, 
independent, and control variables for use in this study.  In addition to testing a model of 
neighborhood change, this study also tests the assertion that there are a set of robust, 
parsimonious neighborhood indicators that are  
inexpensive, annually updated, and available for all U.S. communities yet 
robustly capture significant variation in these neighborhood dimensions [e.g., 
crime, housing type and tenure, business and employment]”. (Galster, Hayes & 
Johnson, 2005, p. 265)   
 
Therefore, in using the approach outlined in this dissertation, a researcher should be able 
to get a sense of change happening in urban neighborhoods without having to wait for 
such information from the decennial census, which arguably is outdated by the time the 
data are released.  
 
4.5.1  Dependent Variables 
Determining what constitutes neighborhood change is complex and there is no 
agreed upon set of measurements.  Therefore, a set of indicators of neighborhood change 
was drawn from the literature, namely the work of Galster et al. (2004, 2005), wherein a 
set of robust and parsimonious indicators of neighborhood change was developed and 
tested for such purposes.  As discussed previously, measures for neighborhood crime and 
of property tax equity were drawn from the literature and from local legislation. Given 
                                                 
2 Indeed community development corporations, examination of which is beyond the scope of this study, are 
an example of a legislative invention to implement policies such as RPTA at the neighborhood level.   
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the time needed for completion of housing construction and “the recognition of them by 
market forces in the neighborhood” (Galster, et al., 2004, p. 914), there is a three-year lag 
between the last year of RPTA construction included in the dataset (2003) and the 
measures taken on the outcome indicators (2006).   
 
4.5.1.1  Private Investment & Blight 
There are four variables used to measure private investment:  approval rate of 
home purchase mortgage loan applications (HPMLAAR), number of home purchase 
mortgage loan applications (HPMLA), median dollar amount of home purchase 
mortgage loan originations (DHPLO), and number of businesses (BIZ).  On the surface, 
these indicators appear to be primarily measures of economic changes and, indeed, are 
used to measure the concept of private investment activity drawn from the Conceptual 
Model.  However, there is no unanimous measure for blight; Dardia (1998) used vacancy 
and poverty rates to measure blight while Bier, et al. (2007) used changes in property 
values. Galster, et al. (2005) included a battery of variables in their attempt to find a 
small set of robust indicators of neighborhood change, and concluded from their analyses 
that the above indicators derived from HMDA data also act as strong proxies for housing 
and social dimensions such as vacancy rates, number of female head of households and 
neighborhood racial composition.  Therefore, these dependent variables act as proxies for 
private investment and blight in this study.  Moreover, since this study is concerned with 
a housing policy and its impact on neighborhoods, measures of private mortgage lending 
activity are viewed as particularly salient to this study.   
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The first three variables regarding mortgage lending activity were extracted from 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data and averaged over two years, 2005 
and 2006 (see Table 7).  HMDA data provide the most accurate picture of mortgage 
lending activity at the census-tract level (Galster, et al., 2004).  Following 
recommendations found in previous research (e.g., Chow & Coulton, 1998; Galster, et 
al., 2005) two-year averages were taken from the HMDA data to help control for extreme 
variability between years.  HPMLA is the median number of home purchase loan 
applications by tract, while HPMLAAR is the median approval rate of those applications.  
The third variable, DHPLO, is the median dollar value of home purchase loans 
originated.  The fourth measure of private investment, BIZ, is the mean number of 
businesses by tract.  Number of businesses is relevant to urban neighborhoods because it 
presents one measure of economic growth, which is often viewed as the priority in the 
development of public policy (Bartik, 1991).   Historically, urban neighborhoods did not 
evolve as “bedroom communities” but can often contain business and industry.   
  
4.5.1.2  Crime 
Support for including a measure for crime is found in the Cleveland case study on 
RPTA conducted by Bier, et al. (2007):  
Respondents [Cleveland residents who owned tax-abated property] did not 
indicate a willingness to accept reduced property taxes for assuming higher risks 
related to crime.  There is a clear indication that respondents are as interested in 
safe neighborhoods as they are in getting as much house possible for their money. 
(p. 44)  
 
In addition, the 2005 study by Galster, et al. found that crime remained a significant 
indicator of neighborhood change and is therefore included in this study.   
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Crime data should be a consistent and reliable variable to include in any 
examination of neighborhoods because they are collected annually, fall under general 
uniform categories and can be retrieved at no cost.  However, the experience of this 
researcher found that accurate crime data are difficult to obtain given the underreporting 
of such activity by victims and witnesses, the discretionary nature of such data as they are 
recorded by law enforcement officers, as well as different reasons that can motivate 
police officers to underreport crime (see Maier, 1999).  Indeed, of all the data gathered 
for this dissertation from several different governmental entities, the potential for human 
error in constructing a data set is possibly highest for crime data.  The researcher could 
not obtain 2001 crime data for Columbus because the Columbus Police Department had 
yet to fully computerize such information at that time, and the 2006 crime data for the 
City of Toledo is inaccurate and incomplete.  Therefore, the analysis of crime consists of 
the cities of Cleveland and Dayton, and results will be reported with limitations of such a 
small sample size in mind.  Although, posttest data were available for the city of 
Columbus, there are too few observations to run a posttest only analysis of crime for the 
city.  Crime is divided into two categories, Type I and Type II crimes, as described in 
Chapter III.  In addition to the raw number of crimes variables, additional analyses were 
run using these variables standardized by 2000 population in order to obtain a measure of 
crimes per capita per tract because crime is often measured in terms of rates (per 100,000 
population) or per capita.   
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4.5.1.3  Equity 
The final neighborhood indicator is a ratio of median assessed value to median 
sales price for each neighborhood, called an assessment ratio, and is from the work of 
Birch, Sunderman, & Smith (2004), Allen & Dare (2002), and others (IAAO, 2004).  
Ratio values greater than one imply regressive property tax inequity because the property 
is being assessed at a higher value than the property is worth in the market, resulting in 
the payment of higher property taxes on a property that is of lower value.  Ratio values 
less than one imply the presence of progressive property tax inequity because the value 
used to determine the taxes on the property is less than the value of the property in the 
market.  A ratio equal to one represents equity because the property is being assessed at 
or near its true market value, assuming sales price is an adequate proxy for true market 
value.  If there appears to be a significant relationship between RPTA and assessment 
ratios, depending on the direction of the relationship, then the existence of RPTA units 
may be having an impact on the property tax equity of neighborhoods.   
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TABLE 7 
 
Dependent Variables:   Indicators of Neighborhood Change 
 
 
Indicator 
 
Definition 
 
Source 
 
 
HPMLA 
 
Median number of home purchase mortgage loan applications. 
 
HMDA 
 
HPMLAAR 
 
Median home purchase mortgage loan application approval rate. 
 
HMDA 
 
DHPLO 
 
Median dollar amount of home purchase mortgage loans. 
 
HMDA 
 
BIZ 
 
Mean number of new businesses. 
 
ES202 
 
Type I Crimes 
 
Violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated 
assaults) and property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, auto theft 
and arson). 
 
City Police Depts.; 
NEO CANDO 
 
Type II Crimes 
 
Everything not listed in Type I Crimes such as non-aggravated 
assaults, forgery, fraud, embezzlement, receiving stolen 
property, weapons and drug violations, vandalism, prostitution, 
family offenses, and all others. 
 
City Police Depts.; 
NEO CANDO 
 
Assessment 
Ratio 
 
Median Assessed Value / Median Sales Price. 
 
County Treasurers 
& County Auditors 
 
 
 All of these indicators serve to quantifiably measure outcomes hypothesized to 
have significant statistical relationships with the public policy under examination.  If 
RPTA policy is indeed an effective neighborhood development policy, then we should 
see statistically significant changes in the trajectories of the neighborhood indicators for 
tracts in the subject group that are not seen in the comparison group.    
 
4.5.2  Independent Variable 
Given that the purpose of the proposed study is to uncover the relationship 
between RPTA and a set of neighborhood indicators, RPTA is specified and entered into 
the statistical model as an independent variable.  RPTA represents the number of RPTA 
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single-, two- and three-family newly constructed units in a census tract from the first 
entry in the information provided by the respective public sector department up through 
2003.   Table 8 provides the various sources from which the independent variable was 
collected. 
 
Table 8 
 
Independent Variable 
 
 
Variable 
 
Definition 
 
Source 
 
RPTA 
 
Number of single-, two-, and three 
new construction residential 
properties with tax abatement. 
 
Columbus Dept. of Community Development; 
Cuyahoga County Auditor’s Office; Dayton Dept. of 
Planning & Community Development; Toledo Dept. 
of Development 
 
 
The variable is given the value of zero for each observation in the comparison 
group.  RPTA is also entered into the model in squared and cubic forms to help uncover 
any threshold effects.  In other words, is there a certain number (i.e., threshold) of tax-
abated homes needed in a neighborhood before significant change is seen in any of the 
dependent variables?  Although RPTA can apply to significantly rehabilitated units, only 
new construction is included in this study.  This choice was a pragmatic one and relates 
to the pressure housing developers place on city officials to building more new 
construction with claims of positive neighborhood impact.  Further, cities vary in their 
approaches to rehabilitated properties that differ from new construction in terms of 
durations and rates.       
 
 
 100
4.5.3  Control Variables 
There are four control variables included in the statistical model for this study.  The 
first variable, Y01, provides a pretest measure of the neighborhood context on a given 
indicator.  Although the independent variable (RPTA) includes new construction built 
prior to 2001, the year of the pretest measures, this variable is included in the model to 
give a sense of where the neighborhoods stood in a specific year on each respective 
outcome variable.  In other words, in order to measure change in an outcome variable, 
there needs to be a baseline with which any change in compared.  Following the approach 
taken by Galster, et al., (2004) a five-year lag between pretest and posttest measures was 
chosen.  In addition, Columbus did not begin using RPTA until 2001 and data from any 
city become less reliable the further back in time one goes.  Bivariate analyses revealed 
essentially linear relationships between each posttest measure and its pretest.   
A second variable was included in the statistical model to control for housing 
stock characteristics.  Housing value has been used as a reasonable proxy representing 
housing stock characteristics and some variation in neighborhoods.  Median housing 
values were obtained for year 2003 to correspond to the last year that RPTA data were 
collected.  Median housing values were calculated using 2003 county auditor data.  
Assessed housing values are often defined at 35% of the estimated full market value; the 
median housing value used in this analysis is the estimated full market value.   
The third control variable in the analysis measures the change in job growth 
between 2001 and 2006.  Change in job growth (i.e., number of jobs) is acting as a proxy 
for overall economic health (Galster, et al., 2004a), and corresponds to the five-year lag 
between the pretest and posttest measures.  This variable was constructed using ES202 
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data, a database that includes variables for job growth at the tract level, collected 
annually.   
The fourth control variable is the number of sheriffs’ sales in 2006 by 
neighborhood for each of the four cities.  Similar to studies examining foreclosures (e.g., 
Coulton, Mikelbank, & Schramm, 2008; Brasington & Sarama, 2008), sheriffs’ sales are 
used as a proxy for foreclosures in this study.  Neither the City of Dayton, Montgomery 
County Clerk of Courts, or the County Sheriff’s Office could produce any information on 
sheriff’s sales for year 2001.  The researcher was told that this information is only kept 
for two years and then records are deleted.  The original variable conceived of to control 
for sheriffs’ sales was the change in number of sheriffs’ sales between 2001 and 2006.  
However, since Dayton could not provide any 2001 data, and there were many missing 
values for this variable for 2001 in the other three cities, the researcher decided that the 
best use of this information given the imperfect data collection was to use the number of 
sheriffs’ sales for 2006 as the control variable in the model.  Further, the original scope of 
this project did not include a variable for foreclosures.  However, after discussion during 
the prospectus presentation, the researcher agreed that a control variable for foreclosures 
would be prudent given that rates of foreclosure in Ohio’s cities are at crisis levels. An 
independent samples t-test was conducted to determine whether the number of sheriffs’ 
sales was significantly different between subject and comparison groups.  Results 
indicate that there was a significant difference between subject and comparison groups (t 
= -2.142, p < .05) for the number of sheriff’s sales in 2001.  Therefore, a variable was 
included in the analysis to control for sheriffs’ sales, given the current foreclosure crisis 
affecting Ohio’s urban neighborhoods. The final control variable included in the analysis 
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is a dummy variable to control for any variation seen in outcome indicators that is 
significantly related to a given city.  Table 9 provides a summary of the control variables 
included in this analysis.     
 
 
Table 9 
 
Control Variables 
 
 
Variable 
 
                                      Measure 
 
Sources 
 
 
Y01 
 
2001 value for outcome indicator in neighborhood i 
 
HMDA; ES202; City Police 
Depts.; County Treasurers; 
and Auditors; NEOCANDO 
 
MHV 
 
Median housing value, 2003 
 
MGLCUA Housing Center; 
County Auditors 
 
ΔJG 
 
Percent change in jobs 2001 to 2006 for neighborhood i
 
ES202 
 
SS 
 
Number of sheriffs’ sales in 2006 for neighborhood i 
 
County Auditors; 
Montgomery Co. Sheriff’s 
Office & Clerk of Courts; 
MGLCUA Housing Center 
 
CITY 
 
Dummy variable for Columbus, Cleveland, Dayton 
 
N/A 
 
 
 Performing a similar analysis as the national level would generate the need to 
control for regional changes and indeed Galster, et al. (2004) was pulling from a national 
sample of cities and therefore stratified their sample into four categories based upon 
region.  Such stratification proved to be unwarranted in this study and, given the 
relatively small sample size, there are degrees of freedom to be considered. 
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4.6  Data Collection 
Several public agencies and universities in the four cities were contacted over 
several months in attempts to acquire the various data needed for this project.  In the 
summer of 2008, the researcher visited the cities in the study, met with the public 
administrator(s) in charge of the respective city’s RPTA program, began her data 
collection efforts, and was given guided tours of one or more neighborhoods with RPTA.    
Data on RPTA program dimensions including the date of home construction was given to 
the researcher by these administrators.  For the City of Cleveland, however, the contact 
person was unsure of how long it would take her to complete the request.  Therefore, the 
same request was made to the Tax Incentive Review Council in the Office of the 
Cuyahoga County Auditor, who fulfilled the request. The data were converted from either 
address or parcel number to census tract level.  These data of the location and date of the 
number of newly-constructed single- and two-family residential units that have property 
tax abatement (RPTA) were used to construct the independent variable. 
The first three dependent variables regarding mortgages were taken from Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data provided by the Mandel School of Applied 
Social Sciences Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development at Case Western 
Reserve University.  The fourth dependent variable, number of businesses, and the 
control variable for percent change in jobs were drawn from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (ES202) from the Ohio Department of Jobs & Family Services.  
These data were compiled by the Center for Economic Development at the Maxine 
Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University, and were 
provided at the census tract level for the four cities in the analysis.  For the crime data 
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used in this analysis, data comprising the fifth (Type I Crimes), sixth (Type II Crimes) 
and seventh (Property Crimes) dependent variables were collected through the Columbus 
and Dayton Police Departments for those respective cities.  Crime data for the City of 
Cleveland was retrieved from NEO CANDO, the database website maintained by the 
Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences Center on Urban Poverty and Community 
Development at Case Western Reserve University, which receives the data from the 
Cleveland Police Department.  The researcher confirmed with the Cleveland Police 
Department that the data retrieved from NEO CANDO are the same data one would 
receive from a public records request through the department.  The advantage to 
retrieving data from NEO CANDO is that the data can be retrieved at census tract level. 
The final dependent variable is a ratio of assessed values to sales values for 
residential property.  For the cities of Columbus, Dayton and Toledo, a public records 
request was submitted to the respective county auditors, each of whom fulfilled the data 
request with a monetary charge varying from $1 to $50.  The data were converted from 
parcel level to census tract level using GIS.  For the City of Cleveland, sales and 
assessment data were compiled by The Center for Housing Research and Policy at the 
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University at the 
census tract level.  
Sales data for 2001 and 2006 were collected from the Franklin County Auditor’s 
Office for the City of Columbus, the Lucas County Auditor’s Office for the City of 
Toledo, the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office and Clerk of Courts for the City of 
Dayton, and The Center for Housing Research & Policy at the Maxine Goodman Levin 
College of Urban Affairs at Cleveland State University for the City of Cleveland.  For the 
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City of Dayton, only 2006 data were available.  The researcher was awarded funding that 
covered the costs of data gathering through the Albert A. and Maxine Goodman Levin 
Advisory Fund to assist in her data collection pursuits. 
 
4.7  Data Analysis 
 The SPSS statistical software package was used.  The first step in the analysis 
involved the examination of bivariate scatterplots for each pretest and posttest measure; 
the relationships were essentially linear.  Second, independence of samples tests were run 
on pretest measures to determine comparability between subject and comparison groups 
as described previously.  The third step of analysis is the presentation of some descriptive 
statistics regarding the data.    This stage is to help familiarize the reader with the data by 
presenting summary statistics and distributions of the variables.       
The final stage involves a multiple regression analysis designed to uncover any 
significant statistical relationships between RPTA and the several indicators of 
neighborhood change and the direction of those relationships controlling for city, 
economic growth, housing stock characteristics, and foreclosures by neighborhood.  A 
cubic regression model was run based upon previous research and may help to uncover a 
threshold at which the level of RPTA homes reaches a statistically significant relationship 
with a given neighborhood indicator.  This analysis is exploratory in nature and, as such, 
no strict interpretations of regression coefficients will be made.   
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CHAPTER V 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 This chapter presents results from the analyses performed on each of the seven 
dependent variables as they relate to the presence of newly-constructed residential units 
that received property tax abatements.  Specifically, this chapter will discuss the strength 
and direction of any relationships between the dependent variables and any of the 
independent and control variables in the model as hypothesized in Chapter III.  
Hypotheses were crafted from the perspective of the policy maker and city official in that 
RPTA is a policy effort to revitalize urban neighborhoods and retain and/or attract 
middle- and upper-income homeowners to neighborhoods and cities that have seen these 
groups relocate to suburban areas. 
First there is a brief discussion of the results of the hypothesis testing.  Second, a 
discussion of the independent and dependent variables will be presented.  Third, model 
summaries from testing the usefulness of a chosen statistical model for analyzing 
residential tax abatement policy will be presented and discussed.  Finally, answers to the 
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initial research questions of this study will be presented.  Namely, are there statistically 
significant relationships between residential property tax abatement and a chosen set of 
neighborhood indicators?  Further, is there a certain number of newly-constructed RPTA 
units (a threshold) at which one sees significant relationships between RPTA and 
indicators of neighborhood change? 
 
5.2  Summary Results of Hypothesis Testing 
The researcher found only one discernable relationship between the subject group 
and an indicator of neighborhood change—Type II crimes (H6)—even after controlling 
for the current foreclosure crisis in Ohio’s urban neighborhoods, job growth, housing 
stock characteristics, and the city.  The presence of RPTA homes was significantly 
related to Type II crimes, and the relationship was in the expected direction.  One fails to 
reject the null hypotheses for the remaining six neighborhood indicators.  Table 10 
provides a summary of the hypothesis test results for each specific null hypothesis. 
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Table 10 
Summary of Hypothesis Test Results for Indicators of Neighborhood Change 
  
Hypothesis 
 
p < .05 
 
 
NH1 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to home 
purchase mortgage loan approval rates. 
 
Fail to reject null 
 
NH2 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to the 
number of home purchase mortgage loan 
applications. 
 
Fail to reject null 
 
NH3 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to the 
median dollar amount of home purchase 
mortgage loans originated. 
 
Fail to reject null 
 
NH4 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to the 
number of businesses. 
 
Fail to reject null 
 
NH5 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to Type I 
crimes. 
 
Fail to reject null 
 
NH6 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to Type II 
crimes. 
 
Reject the null 
 
NH7 
 
RPTA is not significantly related to 
assessment ratios. 
 
 
Fail to reject null 
 
5.3  Preliminary Analysis of Independent Variable 
The measure of the independent variable, RPTA, was the number of newly-
constructed single-, two- and three-family tax-abated units in each census tract, from as 
early as 1987 through 2003.  The starting date for implementation of RPTA programs 
varied from city to city, with Toledo reporting the earliest RPTA homes in its dataset 
(1987).  Following the structure laid out in Galster, et al. (2004), a three-year lag between 
the completion of RPTA homes and the measurement of changes in the neighborhood 
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indicators was incorporated into the model.  It is assumed that there is a lag between the 
completion of housing construction and any changes seen in the neighborhood as a result 
of these investments.  In the comparison group observations, RPTA is given a value of 
zero.  Standardizing the independent variable for RPTA was considered but not justified 
by theory, the literature or legislation.  Initially it was considered that number of RPTA 
homes should be standardized by some overall neighborhood characteristic such as 
median number of households or population by tract.  However, there is no standard by 
which areas with RPTA are created.  For example the policy does not have any 
population requirements for a proposed area, but merely requires that investment has 
been discouraged.   
Galster et al. (2004) did not find significant relationships when using median 
CDBG spending for their full sample of census tracts or even when they standardized 
CDBG spending per poor resident, per tract.  “Results changed dramatically when we 
confined our analysis to those tracts evincing above-sample-average CDBG spending” 
(2004, p. 915).  Following this logic, this study focused on a sample of tracts that had 
sixteen or more RPTA units, i.e., those tracts with above-sample-average number of 
RPTA units.  Even with this confined sample (n=59), there were no statistically 
significant relationships between number of RPTA new construction and any indicators 
of neighborhood change (p < 0.05).  Moreover, confining the sample in this way resulted 
in the exclusion of any Columbus neighborhoods and a preponderance of Cleveland 
census tracts comprising the sample (n=45, over 76%).   
The comparison group used in this study is comprised of those census tracts 
contiguous to census tracts with new construction residential tax-abated properties.  
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Tracts contiguous to RPTA tracts were determined to be a reasonable comparison group 
as presented in Chapter IV.  Table 11 lists the number of tracts for each city included in 
the analysis, by group. This information is also represented in Figures A1-A4 of the 
Appendix, which are maps highlighting the subject and comparison groups for each city 
included in the analysis.  There were thirteen contiguous tracts removed from the 
comparison groups for the city of Cleveland for a variety of reasons.  Some of the tracts 
lacked housing and/or mortgage data, while other tracts had zero population and missing 
data.  One subject group tract was removed for the city of Toledo because of scant data.  
No tracts were removed from either group for Columbus or Dayton. 
 
Table 11 
 
Number of Tracts in Subject and Comparison Groups by City 
 
 
City 
 
Subject Group 
Tracts 
 
Comparison Group 
Tracts 
 
 
Total 
 
Cleveland 
 
159 
 
51 
 
210 
 
Columbus 
 
8 
 
37 
 
45 
 
Dayton 
 
10 
 
20 
 
30 
 
Toledo 
 
28 
 
24 
 
52 
 
TOTAL 
 
205 
 
132 
 
337 
 
 
 
5.4  Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
 Table 12 provides information about the distribution of the dependent variables.  
This information is important in understanding why assumptions regarding the 
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interpretation of the regression coefficients, as well as the ability to make causal 
inferences about relationships between RPTA and the given neighborhood indicators are 
not applicable to this analysis because no assumptions are made about the distribution of 
the variables or their corresponding error terms.  Looking at the table of descriptive 
statistics, a majority of the dependent variables are not skewed, but there are high levels 
of kurtosis, especially in the comparison group.  This study was not based on a random 
sample; repeating the study with a large number of samples would yield normally 
distributed sample means.  Included in the Appendix is Table A2, which provides 
descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, and control variables.   
 
Table 12 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables by Group 
 
 
SUBJECT HPMLAAR 
 
HPMLA 
 
DHPLO 
 
BIZ 
 
Type I 
 
Type II 
 
 
AV_SP 
 
 
Valid N 
 
204 
 
203 
 
204 
 
203 
 
177 
 
175 
 
200 
 
Missing 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
 
28 
 
30 
 
5 
 
Mean 
 
.479 
 
77.810 
 
80709.559 
 
30.61 
 
180.67 
 
195.86 
 
1.278 
 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
 
.008 
 
3.868 
 
2107.702 
 
2.006 
 
8.707 
 
8.967 
 
.0284 
 
Median 
 
.470 
 
75.500 
 
77625.000 
 
21.50 
 
161.00 
 
177.00 
 
1.224 
 
SD 
 
.112 
 
55.106 
 
30104.005 
 
28.584 
 
115.842 
 
118.622 
 
.402 
 
Variance 
 
.013 
 
3036.703 
 
9.063E8 
 
817.043
 
13419.462 
 
14071.062 
 
.162 
 
Skewness 
 
-.749 
 
.921 
 
1.931 
 
2.248 
 
2.264 
 
1.339 
 
.337 
 
SE of 
Skewness 
 
.170 
 
.171 
 
.170 
 
.171 
 
.183 
 
.184 
 
.172 
 
Kurtosis 
 
5.464 
 
.955 
 
8.528 
 
6.918 
 
8.331 
 
2.887 
 
1.385 
 
Std. Error 
of Kurtosis 
 
.339 
 
.340 
 
.339 
 
.340 
 
.363 
 
.365 
 
.342 
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Range 
 
.92 
 
273.50 
 
258750.00 
 
168 
 
806 
 
752 
 
2.63 
 
Minimum 
 
.00 
 
.00 
 
.00 
 
1 
 
3 
 
3 
 
.00 
 
 
Maximum .92 273.50 258750.00 170 809 755 
 
 
2.63 
 
 
 
COMP.      
 
 
Valid N 
 
132 
 
132 
 
131 
 
130 
 
105 
 
105 
 
124 
 
Missing 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
27 
 
27 
 
8 
 
Mean 
 
.486 
 
93.489 
 
78938.93 
 
49.07 
 
210.57 
 
259.72 
 
1.29 
 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
 
 
.011 
 
 
6.086 
 
 
4248.56 
 
 
4.905 
 
 
14.304 
 
 
20.266 
 
 
.0346 
 
Median 
 
.482 
 
89.25 
 
71750.00 
 
32.25 
 
189.00 
 
213.00 
 
1.202 
 
SD 
 
.129 
 
69.926 
 
48626.98 
 
55.931 
 
146.573 
 
207.662 
 
.385 
 
Variance 
 
.017 
 
4889.586 
 
2.365E9 
 
3128.22
 
21483.632 
 
43123.394 
 
.148 
 
Skewness 
 
-.920 
 
.794 
 
4.203 
 
3.049 
 
1.684 
 
1.383 
 
.642 
 
SE of 
Skewness 
 
 
.211 
 
 
.211 
 
 
.212 
 
 
.212 
 
 
.236 
 
 
.236 
 
 
.217 
 
Kurtosis 
 
4.248 
 
.316 
 
26.223 
 
11.432 
 
4.756 
 
1.928 
 
1.059 
 
Std. Error 
of Kurtosis 
 
 
.419 
 
 
.419 
 
 
.420 
 
 
.422 
 
 
.467 
 
 
.467 
 
 
.431 
 
Range 
 
.81 
 
298.00 
 
433500.00 
 
356 
 
872 
 
974 
 
2.32 
 
Minimum 
 
.00 
 
1.00 
 
.00 
 
0 
 
12 
 
8 
 
.22 
 
Maximum 
 
.81 
 
299.00 
 
433500.00 
 
356 
 
884 
 
982  
 
5.5  Model Results 
 This section will discuss the outcomes of testing the cubic regression model 
presented in Galster, et al. (2004) as a useful tool for uncovering relationships between 
RPTA and a set of indicators of neighborhood change that were derived from the 
literature and from legislation, and discussed at length in previous chapters.    The results 
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will be presented as they relate to the conceptual model.  The results regarding changes in 
neighborhood private investment and blight are presented first, followed by a discussion 
of RPTA and its relation to crime levels.  Lastly, results regarding the measure of 
property tax equity will be presented and discussed.  The design of this study was chosen 
to present a counter-factual scenario regarding RPTA; namely, the research design 
included a comparison group in order to present what would happen in a neighborhood if 
there were no new tax-abated homes.  Differences between the subject and comparison 
groups will be discussed for each dependent variable. 
It should be made clear at the outset of this discussion that this analysis is probative in 
nature and attempts to uncover the strength and direction of relationships between the 
dependent variables and the independent variable of interest, RPTA.  For reasons 
discussed in the previous section regarding errors with the data, no interpretation of the 
effects on the margin as reflected in the regression coefficients will be included in this 
analysis.  Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix list the coefficients and standard errors for 
those relationships significant at p < .05 for both subject and comparison groups. 
 
5.5.1  Private Investment & Blight 
 The first three variables chosen to represent private investment activity and blight 
were derived to test the usefulness of a tested and published set of such indicators from 
the work of Galster et al. (2004; 2005) and from the legislation regarding the policy.  
These three variables are tested measures of mortgage and mortgage lending activity in 
neighborhoods.  The first dependent variable chosen from this previous study is used in 
this analysis as a way to measure private investment activity: median home purchase 
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mortgage loan approval rates (HPMLAAR) averaged over two years (2005 and 2006).  
Median values averaged over two years were chosen to help control for known variability 
in HMDA data (Galster, 2004).  This variable helps to measure private investment 
activity by gauging the willingness of lenders to invest in local residential markets.  
It was hypothesized (H1) that the presence of RPTA homes in a neighborhood is 
significantly and positively related to home purchase mortgage loan approval rates.  In 
other words, as the number of RPTA homes increased in a neighborhood the HPMLAAR 
also would increase and that there would be no significant change in this indicator for 
neighborhoods in the comparison group.  A one-tailed test was employed because theory 
indicates that the expected direction of the relationship between RPTA and mortgage loan 
approval rates should be positive. The researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis NH1 
that there is no significant relationship between RPTA and home purchase mortgage loan 
approval rates.   
For the subject group, only two control variables were significantly related to the 
dependent variable at p < .05:  the pretest variable controlling for loan approval rates in 
2001 and the constant, which reflects the base category of the dummy variable for city 
which, in all cases, is Cleveland (Table A3, Appendix).  In the comparison group, all 
control variables except change in job growth were significantly related to HPMLAAR at 
p < .05 (Table A4, Appendix).  In essence, there does not appear to be a statistically 
significant discernable relationship between this particular measure of private investment 
and the presence of tax-abated homes. Table 13 presents the cubic regression model 
summary for this neighborhood change indicator.  Both groups appear to have a relatively 
strong linear relationship between the observed values of HPMLAAR and the predicted 
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values of the model.  Approximately thirty-five to forty percent of the variation in 
HPMLAAR is explained by the model.   
 
Table 13 
 
Model Summary of Outcome Variable HPMLAAR 
 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
 
Subject 
 
202 
 
.599 
 
.359 
 
.325 
 
.09226 
 
Comparison 
 
120 
 
.628 
 
.395 
 
.357 
 
.07331 
 
 
The second measure using HMDA data represents blight, and is the median 
number of home purchase mortgage loan applications (HPMLA), averaged for 2005 and 
2006.  This variable is a measure of the demand for new housing purchases in an area and 
is therefore a gauge for blight, assuming that increased home purchase loan applications 
for new construction is an indicator of positive physical change in an area.  The 
hypothesis presented in Chapter III is that RPTA will be significantly related to HPMLA 
and that this relationship will be positive.  In essence, as the number of RPTA homes 
increase in a neighborhood the number of home purchase mortgage loan applications 
would increase as well, and that there would be no significant change in this indicator for 
neighborhoods comprising the comparison group.  The researcher failed to reject the null 
hypothesis NH2.  RPTA is not related to the number of home purchase mortgage loan 
applications (p < .05).   
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However, the cubed variable presented a relationship at a significance level of     
p < .10, and the direction of the relationship was positive (Table A3, Appendix).  This 
result can be interpreted as evidence that there may be a level at which a high number of 
RPTA homes in a neighborhood may be related to HPMLA.  Intuitively and logically this 
relationship makes sense because as a neighborhood reaches a point where there is a very 
large amount of new residential property for sale (i.e., RPTA3), one should expect the 
number of mortgage loan applications to increase, possibly significantly, assuming there 
is demand for the housing.  What is interesting about this finding is that, even though the 
number of mortgage loan applications shows a significant and positive relationship with 
RPTA, the first variable measuring private investment (HPMLAAR) was not 
significantly related, even at a threshold level.  In essence, if a significant number of 
mortgage loan applications to buy these newly-constructed tax abated units are not 
approved, then how well does such an outcome bode for neighborhoods suffering from 
disinvestment?   A relationship may not exist between the supply of home financing 
being made available in these neighborhoods and consumers willing to invest.  While this 
question is not addressed in this study per se, it has policy implications that will be 
discussed in Chapter VI. 
 For both subject and comparison groups it was found that median housing value, 
number of 2006 sheriffs’ sales, and the pretest measure of HPMLA in 2001 was each 
related to the outcome variable at p < .05 (Tables A3 & A4 in Appendix).  A distinction 
between the two groups arises regarding the role of the city in each model.  For the 
comparison group representing the counter-factual scenario, only Columbus had a 
significant association with the number of home purchase loan applications in 2006.  
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However Columbus, Dayton and Toledo were significantly associated with HPMLA for 
the subject group.  This result implies localized effects in the way RPTA is administered 
in these cities; all three cities designate areas to receive RPTA, while Cleveland 
administers the program citywide.  Table 14 presents the model summary on this 
outcome variable of interest.  Both groups appear to have a relatively strong linear 
relationship between the observed values of HPMLA and the predicted values of the 
model, and the model explains between 76 and 88 percent of the variation in HPMLA, 
ceteris paribus.   
 
 
Table 14 
 
Model Summary of Outcome Variable HPMLA 
 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
 
Subject 
 
202 
 
.940 
 
.883 
 
.877 
 
98.2806 
 
Comparison 
 
120 
 
.874 
 
.764 
 
.750 
 
34.4424 
 
 
The third variable measures both private investment and blight in that it gauges 
how much lenders are willing to invest in an area on average, and also with how much 
mortgage debt homeowners are willing to burden themselves.  This variable is the median 
dollar amount of home purchase mortgage loans originated (DHPLO), averaged for 2005 
and 2006.  It was hypothesized that RPTA would be significantly related to DHPLO, and 
that the direction of this relationship would be positive.  In other words, as the number of 
RPTA homes increased in a neighborhood the median dollar amount of home purchase 
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loans originated would increase, but there would be no significant change in DHPLO in 
the neighborhoods comprising the comparison group.  The results of this analysis on the 
outcome variable DHPLO indicate a failure to reject null hypothesis NH3.   RPTA is not 
significantly related to the median dollar amount of home purchase mortgage loans 
originated.  For the subject group, the variables controlling for city, the pretest, and the 
number of sheriffs’ sales were significant at p < .05.  For the comparison group, only the 
constant term (Cleveland) held a significant relationship with the outcome variable.  
Table 15 presents the model summary for the dependent variable DHPLO.  The subject 
group appears to be a better fit to the model than the comparison group, with fifty-three 
percent variation in median dollar amounts of home loans originated explained by the 
model. 
 
Table 15 
 
Model Summary of Outcome Variable DHPLO 
 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
 
Subject 
 
202 
 
.730 
 
.532 
 
.508 
 
21206.374 
 
Comparison 
 
119 
 
.403 
 
.162 
 
.110 
 
39761.813 
 
  
The fourth dependent variable in this analysis is a measure of change in private 
investment in urban neighborhoods and is the mean number of businesses in 2006 (BIZ) 
and used herein as a robust and parsimonious measure of neighborhood change (Galster, 
et al., 2004; 2005).  It was hypothesized that RPTA was significantly related to the 
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number of businesses and that this relationship was positive.  In essence, as the number 
of RPTA homes increase in a neighborhood, the number of businesses would 
significantly increase and that there would be no significant change in number of 
businesses in the neighborhoods comprising the comparison group.  One fails to reject 
null hypothesis NH4; RPTA is not significantly related to the number of businesses.   
Table 16 presents the model summary for this outcome variable.  Both subject and 
comparison group models are a good fit to the data because of the strength of association 
between the pretest variable (mean number of businesses in 2001) and the 2006 measure 
for both the subject and comparison groups (Tables 3A & 4A in Appendix).  This strong 
association between the pretest and posttest variables makes sense in that the number of 
businesses at the neighborhood level may change more slowly over time than the five-
year lag between measurements employed in this study.  The variable controlling for 
median housing values was significantly related to the number of businesses for the 
subject group, and the dummy variable for Toledo was significantly associated with 
number of businesses in both groups.   
 
 
Table 16 
 
Model Summary of Outcome Variable Mean Number of Businesses 
 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
 
Subject 
 
201 
 
.983 
 
.986 
 
.985 
 
5.412 
 
Comparison 
 
119 
 
.993 
 
.966 
 
.964 
 
6.853 
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5.5.2  Crime 
 The variable for crime proposed earlier for this study was adapted from an article 
by Chow and Coulton (1998) and was defined as the total number of homicide, rape, 
robbery, assault, aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft and larceny per capita.  
However, further investigation into the literature on broken windows (e.g., Corman & 
Mocan, 2005) and in the ways in which other sources organize the data (e.g., NEO 
CANDO) reveal that lumping all crimes into one large category may miss a significant 
distinction mentioned in some of the literature that tests the broken windows hypothesis.  
The logic of the argument is that crimes such as homicide and aggravated assault are a 
few more steps removed from (and therefore harder to link directly to) “broken windows” 
than are theft and non-aggravated assaults, ceteris paribus.  So, as discussed and defined 
in Chapter III, the original indicator of neighborhood change representing crime in 
neighborhoods has been divided into two separate indicators:  Type I and Type II crimes, 
measured in 2006.  Results from the separate analyses run on each type will be discussed. 
It should be kept in mind that the sample size was diminished, with only two of the four 
cities included in the analysis.   
 The first variable measuring crime, Type I crimes, includes violent crimes and 
property crimes as delineated by the Mandel School of Social Sciences at Case Western 
Reserve University, and discussed previously.  The hypothesis presented was that RPTA 
was significantly related to Type I crimes and that this was an inverse relationship.  In 
other words, a significant increase in the number of RPTA homes in urban neighborhoods 
is associated with a significant decrease in the number of Type I crimes, and that there 
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would be no significant change in number of Type I crimes in the neighborhoods 
comprising the comparison group for the time period.     
One fails to reject null hypothesis NH5. This finding is contrary to the finding of 
Giacopassi and Forde (2000), who found a link between homicide and traffic fatality 
rates in their empirical analysis of the theory of broken windows.  Table 17 presents the 
model summary for this outcome variable; tables for Type I crimes per capita (total 
number of crimes divided by population, per tract) are presented in Table 5A in the 
Appendix.  Similar to the strong pretest-posttest association found with the number of 
businesses, the pretest measure of Type I crimes in 2001 was significantly related to the 
outcome variable and helps explain the high r-square value for both subject and 
comparison groups.   
 
Table 17 
 
Model Summary of Outcome Variable Number of Type I Crimes 
 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
 
Subject 
 
166 
 
.919 
 
.844 
 
.836 
 
41.368 
 
Comparison 
 
62 
 
.959 
 
.921 
 
.913 
 
43.152 
 
 
 The second variable measuring crime is Type II crimes, and represents lesser 
criminal offenses.  The hypothesis stated in Chapter III is that RPTA is significantly 
related to Type II crimes, and that these variables were inversely related.  One rejects null 
hypothesis NH6 at p < .05; there appears to be a statistically significant relationship 
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between the number of RPTA homes in a neighborhoods and the number of Type II 
crimes, ceteris paribus.  The direction of the relationship was also expected, with the 
number of Type II crimes decreasing as number of RPTA homes increased.  This 
relationship disappears when the analysis is run with Type II crime per capita, the 
summary of which is in Table 6A in the Appendix.  The significant association between 
this indicator of neighborhood change and RPTA should be interpreted with caution 
given the relatively small sample sizes comprised of data for only two cities (Cleveland 
and Dayton).  Both the number of sheriffs’ sales in 2006 and the pretest measure of Type 
II crimes in 2001 were significantly related to Type II crimes in 2006.  In addition, 
variables controlling for city were significant for the subject group.  Model summary 
results comparing subject and comparison groups in this outcome variable are presented 
in Table 18.  Similar to Type I crimes, there is a high goodness-of-fit statistic primarily 
due to the pretest measure being highly correlated with the posttest measure.   
 
Table 18 
 
Model Summary of Outcome Variable Number of Type II Crimes 
 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
 
Subject 
 
165 
 
.822 
 
.851 
 
.843 
 
45.605 
 
Comparison 
 
62 
 
.961 
 
.923 
 
.916 
 
56.569 
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5.5.3  Equity 
The final variable in the analysis is a measure of equity and is the median 
assessed value-to-sales price ratios for each census tract.  Assessed values were pulled 
from the data for each residential property for pretest year 2001 and posttest year 2006.  
In some cities the assessed value is equal to thirty-five percent of the estimated market 
value.  In other cities, the assessed value is presented as the estimated full market value.  
For this study, the estimated full market value was used as the assessed value.  All 
property transfers are included in the data resulting in many cases where transfers took 
place but no money was exchanged; these transfers have a zero as the sales amount and 
were removed from the analysis.  All sales amounts with a value greater than zero were 
used in calculating the denominator of the ratio.  The median assessment ratio was 
calculated for each census tract.   
In examining vertical tax equity issues, one is observing the difference between 
homes in one stratum with homes in another stratum.  In this case, the delineation is 
between assessment ratios for neighborhoods with RPTA and those without tax-abated 
units.  In essence, the question in whether cities practice systematic inequitable 
assessment of properties in neighborhoods without RPTA a way to “make up” the loss of 
property tax revenues from tax abated properties.  Specifically, is there a statistically 
significant relationship between the number of RPTA units in a neighborhood and 
assessment ratios.  City officials do not want RPTA to be associated with any change in 
the assessment ratios because that would imply that the governmental administration of 
the property assessment process is systematically skewed (i.e., unfair). 
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One fails to reject the null hypothesis NH7; RPTA and assessment ratios are not 
statistically significantly related at p < .05.    Only the number of sheriffs’ sales and all 
four cities had significant relationships with the equity measure for the subject group.  
These significant associations differed for the comparison group (pretest, median housing 
value, Cleveland, and Dayton).  However, the cubed RPTA variable presented a 
relationship at a significance level of p < .10, and the direction of the relationship was 
negative.  The researcher cautiously interprets this result as evidence that there may be a 
level at which a high number of RPTA homes in a neighborhood may be related to 
changes in the assessment ratios.  The negative direction of the relationship is interesting; 
either the assessment of new residential properties is more accurate (i.e., closer to the 
sales value) than for older properties, or the process systematically under-assesses new 
residential construction.  An answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study but 
worth further inquiry.  Table 19 provides a summary of the cubic regression model on 
this neighborhood indicator.  The model appears to fit the data for both groups 
adequately, ceteris paribus.   
 
Table 19 
 
Model Summary for Outcome Variable Assessment Ratios, 2006 
 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
 
Subject 
 
193 
 
.636 
 
.405 
 
.372 
 
.307 
 
Comparison 
 
116 
 
.709 
 
.503 
 
.471 
 
.275 
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An additional finding when examining the descriptive statistics for the dependent 
variable is that the assessment ratios vary considerably from 2001 to 2006, with an over-
assessment of 2006 residential property values across both subject and comparison 
neighborhoods.  Indeed, 2001 assessment ratios reveal under-assessment of property 
values, with assessment ratios of less than one for 82.7% of the 323 tracts included in the 
analysis for which data were available.  Conversely, 2006 assessment ratios reach a level 
of over-assessment (where the value is greater than one) at 21.6% of the 324 tracts for 
which data were available.  In other words, less than 20% of homes in the sample tracts 
in 2001 had an increased property tax burden, while in 2006 nearly 80% of the homes 
were being taxed at a higher-than-market rate.  Paired samples t-tests (Tables 19 and 20) 
reveal that the mean difference between 2001 and 2006 assessment ratios for both groups 
is significant.   
 
Table 20 
 
Paired Samples Statistics for Assessment Ratios by Group, 2001 and 2006 
 
 
Group 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
N 
 
SD 
 
SE Mean 
 
 
Subject   
 
 
Assess. ratio_01 
 
Assess. ratio_06 
 
0.870 
 
1.287 
 
195 
 
195 
 
.255 
 
.386 
 
.018 
 
.028 
 
Comparison 
 
Assess. ratio_01 
 
Assess. ratio_06 
 
0.847 
 
1.305 
 
120 
 
120 
 
.144 
 
.380 
 
.013 
 
.035 
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Table 21 
 
Paired Differences for Assessment Ratios by Group, 2001 and 2006 
 
 
Group 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
SE 
Mean 
 
t 
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
 
Subject   
 
 
Assess. ratio_01
Assess. ratio_06
 
-.417 
 
.428 
 
.031 
 
-13.595 
 
.000 
 
Comparison 
 
Assess. ratio_01
Assess. ratio_06
 
 
-.458 
 
.368 
 
.034 
 
-13.647 
 
.000 
 
5.6  Conclusion 
Three aspects of RPTA programs with important policy implications were examined 
in this study regarding the role of residential property tax abatement and its possible 
relationship with changes on a set of neighborhood indicators.  The first question of 
whether there are statistically significant relationships between residential property tax 
abatement policy and any of a set of indicators of change in Ohio’s urban neighborhoods 
is a qualified no, with evidence of only one statistically significant relationship between 
RPTA and the respective dependent variables at p < .05.   The second issue is derived 
from the first, and posited that there may be a certain point at which the number of RPTA 
units is large enough to generate a significant relationship between this threshold and any 
indicators of neighborhood change.  There appears to be no level at which the number of 
RPTA homes is significantly associated with any of the indicators of neighborhood 
change.   The third aspect of this study presented a counterfactual scenario by running the 
same analysis on a comparison group of census tracts in order to uncover any significant 
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differences between it and the subject group.  Comparison of tracts with RPTA and those 
without such homes did not yield significant differences between the two groups.   
 128
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
6.1  Answering the Research Question 
Using a tested statistical model and set of indicators of neighborhood change 
(Galster, et al., 2004; 2005), the purpose of this study was to find evidence of any 
discernable relationships between new construction residential property tax abatement 
(RPTA) and a set of indicators of neighborhood change.   These indicators were drawn 
from the Ohio legislation and the academic literature. The indicators attempting to 
examine changes in private investment and blight were determined to be useful to 
“summarily track[ed] key dimensions of neighborhoods” (Galster, et al., 2004, p. 265).  
The indicators for crime were chosen to test the broken windows hypothesis (e.g., Wilson 
& Kelling, 1982), and changes in assessment ratios were chosen as a measure of vertical 
property tax equity (Cornia & Slade, 2005; IAAO, 2004).  The comparison group 
representing the counter-factual scenario was comprised of contiguous census tracts for 
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which data could be gathered and that did not have RPTA units at the time of the study 
period. 
The research question is whether there are significant statistical relationships 
between residential property tax abatement (RPTA) and changes in urban neighborhoods 
as measured on a set of indicators, and the direction of those relationships.  The answer is 
no, there were no significant statistical relationships between RPTA and six of the seven 
indicators of neighborhood change.  There was one significant association in the expected 
direction between RPTA and Type II crimes, but this relationship was not tight given the 
small sample size drawn from only two cities.  In essence, no neighborhood effects were 
found as defined in this study.  
Another possible result from the analysis would be to discover a threshold at 
which the number of RPTA homes in a neighborhood reaches a point where one sees 
significant changes in the outcome indicators by examining the level of significance of 
the square and the cube of the independent variable.  No such threshold was found at       
p < .05 for any of the indicators of neighborhood change, but the cubed independent 
variable was significantly related to the number of home purchase mortgage loan 
applications at p < .10.  However, this result is not surprising given that a huge increase 
in the supply of newly constructed homes in an area would be significantly associated 
with an increase in the number of loan applications to buy these homes. 
A well-matched comparison group was incorporated into the research design to 
represent a counter-factual scenario: were it not for RPTA, would the neighborhood 
trajectories have remained the same?  Not necessarily.  While subject and comparison 
groups appeared to be similar to each other based upon six of the seven pretest measures, 
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there were significant differences between the subject and comparison groups on posttest 
measures, suggesting that the subject group and the control group may indeed be on 
different trajectories of change.  However, this study provides evidence that these 
different trajectories of change are not related to the number of RPTA homes in these 
urban neighborhoods. 
In addition, no one city stood out as having significantly different relationships 
between its indicators of neighborhood change and the independent or control variables.  
This finding is important given that the cities of Columbus and Dayton target their RPTA 
programs to small geographic areas, Toledo includes a much larger area, and Cleveland’s 
RPTA program is citywide (Figures A1-A4 in the Appendix).  This finding also runs 
counter to conclusions reached in the literature about the effectiveness of targeting tax 
incentive program to smaller geographic areas (e.g., Sands, Reese and Khan, 2006).  
Following a similar approach in Galster, et al. (2004), no discernable relationships 
were found when the sample was stratified by those tracts with number of RPTA homes 
above the mean (greater than 15.56).  Therefore the follow-up question regarding the 
direction of the relationship was rendered moot.  There was a suggestion of a threshold at 
p < .10, where a certain large number of RPTA homes must be constructed before one 
starts to see significant change in two of the neighborhood indicators, the number of 
home purchase mortgage loan applications and lesser criminal offenses (Type II crimes). 
These results mirror the results found in the non-stratified sample.   
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6.2  Results of Analysis and Theoretical Concepts 
The design of this dissertation took the result of a public policy focused on 
neighborhoods — the building of new tax-abated homes—and compared a sample of 
neighborhoods where the policy was in operation with a sample of neighborhoods where 
there was no policy operating during the period under study.  The dependent variables 
were each related to notions of neighborhood change.  These indicators represented both 
constructs in the conceptual model (Figure 1 in Chapter III) and desired policy outcomes 
that were to ultimately change neighborhood context for the better.  In essence, 
residential property tax abatement (RPTA) was to be related to desirable changes in local 
housing markets, local economies, and social and physical conditions of the 
neighborhood.  In addition, there were five theoretical branches outlined in this 
dissertation and represented in its conceptual model that support the exploration of the 
relationship between RPTA and neighborhood change.  As discussed previously, these 
branches were derived from the academic literature, state and local legislation, and the 
political debate surrounding residential property tax abatement.   
It appears that RPTA is having a desirable impact for cities regarding the first 
theoretical branch, inter-jurisdictional competition (IJC).  The positive relationship 
between the number of home purchase mortgage loan applications and the number of 
RPTA homes in a neighborhood implies that there is demand for homes in urban 
neighborhoods with RPTA.  However, this conclusion makes an assumption that the loan 
applicants are not just drawn from a population making intra-city moves.  Bier, et al. 
(2007) argue that even if these moves are within the city, at least urban neighborhoods 
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are retaining emerging middle-class families.  Such an outcome is noteworthy given the 
population loss occurring in older urban areas. 
The second branch involved a discussion of some general theories of 
neighborhood change such as filtering and gentrification.  The idea of filtering as the 
notion that aging housing stock is less desirable than new construction is supported by the 
results of this analysis, if one assumes that the significant positive change in the median 
number of home purchase loan applications in neighborhoods with RPTA is due to the 
demand for these newly constructed homes.  It may be useful to conduct an analysis 
examining the demand for RPTA new construction versus rehabilitation, which also 
receives tax incentives. Making any assertions regarding the process of gentrification is 
beyond the scope of this study, but a similar analysis could be used to examine the 
relationship between RPTA and gentrification.  For example, an examination of changes 
in median household income, poverty levels and changes in racial composition of 
neighborhoods and their possible relationships to the indicators of neighborhood change 
could be conducted.       
It can be argued that the proposed anti-urban—pro-rural dichotomy is operating 
and supported by the study results.  RPTA is an offering of a large financial incentive in 
order to lure people back to urban neighborhoods, but they are not enough to generate 
desirable changes in these neighborhoods.  The fact that such incentives are 
commonplace speaks to the idea that urban areas are undesirable places to live.         
The fourth theory incorporated into this study is the theory of broken windows as 
it relates to changes in crime.  This study lends support to the broken windows hypothesis 
that improving physical conditions of an area through the construction of RPTA homes 
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will have an impact on the number of lesser (Type II) crimes reported to police, ceteris 
paribus.  However, there was not a significant relationship between improving physical 
conditions through RPTA and more serious criminal offenses.  A more comprehensive 
examination of any relationships between crime and RPTA was beyond the scope of this 
study, but warrants further investigation to try and uncover the relationship between 
urban redevelopment efforts and Type I and Type II crimes.  As discussed in Chapter V, 
the support is very weak due to incomplete and missing data.   
The final theoretical branch is concerned with the idea of equitable distribution, 
specifically regarding the property tax burden.  The results of this study do not support 
the assertion of RPTA policy opponents that there is a significant relationship between an 
increase in the number of RPTA homes and an increase in vertical property tax inequity 
(as measured by median assessment ratios) in the subject group.  Instead, there appears to 
be a systematic over-assessment of properties for 2006 across both subject and 
comparison groups (see Tables 20 and 21 in Chapter V).  There were unique historical 
factors operating in the housing market over the last several years that may account for 
the drastic changes in the assessment ratios.   
 
6.3  Policy Implications  
From a policy perspective, a finding of no finding is significant. When cities are 
pressured to encourage the building of dozens of tax-abated homes in a given area with 
purported claims of neighborhood revitalization, the question of the effectiveness of such 
public investments is what initially prompted this researcher to examine the issue at the 
neighborhood level.  Moreover, when public officials from an economically-challenged 
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city are being persuaded to believe that RPTA is the panacea to all the financial woes of 
the city’s neighborhoods (e.g., 8/6/91 Plain Dealer, p. 1F), this study provides evidence to 
the contrary of that assertion.   
Policy analysis is muddy at best but city officials are pushed to do something, and 
RPTA is a popular choice of action because it can be framed as a policy that does not 
incur obvious costs to residents; there is no government outlay of funds in order to build, 
and officials can claim increased government revenues once the abatement expires.  
Further, some studies have shown (namely Bier, et al., 2007) that while there may be 
foregone revenue there is also an immediate increment in higher tax revenues related to 
the enhanced valuation of the land upon which RPTA homes sit.  This outcome permits 
public officials to classify RPTA as having immediate positive revenue effects.  
An original point broached in the first chapter of this dissertation was a discussion 
of the effectiveness of RPTA, with a description of the criteria under which this policy 
would be deemed effective.  The policy would be effective if RPTA had a statistically 
significant relationship in a desirable direction with the chosen set of indicators of 
neighborhood change.  In other words, the number of RPTA homes in a neighborhood 
would be associated with increased private investment, blight removal, decreased number 
of crimes, and no change in the distribution of property tax burden.  
The results of this study suggest that this policy, as it is currently administered, is 
not effective in fulfilling these policy outcomes.  Of course one can make a case against 
this assertion.  Indeed, perhaps the number of tax-abated homes is not robust enough to 
be related to changes in the benchmarks of neighborhood progress that were chosen for 
this study; maybe the dollar amount of the investment in such construction would yield 
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significant associations.  Perhaps neighborhood is too large a unit of analysis to uncover 
any significant change, but significant relationships may be seen at a smaller level such 
as census block group or, as Bates (2006) argues, that defining areas by their housing 
submarkets would be a more effective way to distribute revitalization policies.  Or 
maybe…RPTA is not the panacea some decision makers and developers claim it is in 
turning around whole tracts of depressed areas in older urban neighborhoods.   
Bates (2006) also concludes from her study that, 
Policies that target neighborhoods as though they are homogenous housing areas 
may be problematic and lead to policy failures if the policies are being applied are 
not appropriate for all parts of the neighborhood. (p. 15) 
 
This assertion implies that housing policies need to be more parochial and tailored to the 
unique situations in which Ohio’s urban neighborhoods find themselves.  Building on this 
point, a further consideration is that maybe RPTA policy would work better in the inner-
ring suburbs where there is a greater likelihood of substitution by home seekers among 
similar suburbs than the neighborhoods of a large city.  In other words, if inter-
jurisdictional competition is operating properly, offering RPTA in one suburb could draw 
residents from other similarly-situated area suburbs.  However, offering RPTA may not 
have the same effect in drawing people from one urban neighborhood to another, given 
the high level of racial polarity from neighborhood to neighborhood and that the public 
services are delivered on too large a scale (and therefore perceived as less efficient).  The 
cities included in this study do not have inherent transportation or access advantage 
issues that would significantly impact location decisions in other urban areas. Therefore, 
potential homebuyers can move further out from the central business district without 
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incurring a burdensome commute.  For urban areas without traffic congestion issues, 
RPTA may help make inner-ring suburbs more competitive. 
In essence it can be argued that RPTA perpetuates the view that Ohio’s city 
neighborhoods are undesirable to reside in.  First, RPTA is now expected to accompany 
the purchase of new construction in the city.  Indeed, Bier, et al. (2007) found that a 
majority of recent home purchasers in Cleveland knew about RPTA and of those 
residents, over 43 percent stated they would not have purchased a home in Cleveland but 
for the abatement, and they were also aware of what was available in other cities with 
whom Cleveland competes.  A second consideration is whether RPTA promotes a sense 
of temporary residency, and that moving to “greener pastures” results once the abatement 
expires.  It would be worthwhile to examine whether homeowners of RPTA property 
change their perceptions (or possibly their behavior) about living in urban neighborhoods 
post-RPTA.   
Building on the Cleveland case study on RPTA by Bier, et al. (2007), this 
dissertation sought evidence regarding the effectiveness of RPTA from the perspective of 
the public sector.  However, the Cleveland study was looking at the policy in terms of 
increased tax revenues (or costs) for a particular city; the current study expanded upon 
this inquiry to include other Ohio cities and derived a set of desired policy outcomes from 
state and local legislation.  
 
6.4  Limitations of the Study  
This study takes a tested statistical model used on one public policy and a set of 
indicators of neighborhood change and attempts to apply the same process of analysis to 
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another policy that can be examined at the neighborhood level, namely RPTA.   Although 
this analysis was successful and makes a contribution to the conversation surrounding tax 
abatement, it is not without flaws.  First, it was not easy to gather accurate data for this 
study, contrary to Galster, et al.’s (2005) assertion, even after the researcher had 
favorable communications with the respective city and county departments regarding her 
ability to access the data.  Galster et al.’s (2005) assertion may hold if the person 
requesting the data is a city or county employee and the request is for data regarding only 
one city.  The issue of difficult data gathering can be remedied, but only if public 
agencies prioritize such requests and also have the technical expertise to extract the data.   
A second limitation is with the study sample.  While the recommendation would 
be to draw a random sample of neighborhoods, the policy under investigation is a state-
level policy.  Therefore, geo-political entities within a state comprise the study 
population, and it is those entities within the state from which one would draw a sample.  
In this particular case, one could expand the sample by including suburbs with RPTA.   
A third limitation analyzing this particular policy is that the unit of analysis may 
be too large to capture associations between RPTA and changes occurring, but in a 
smaller geographic area.  However, moving the analysis to a smaller geographic area 
necessarily removes one’s ability to test many of the dependent variables representing the 
mortgage lending activity.  Indeed, there is the potential for a Type II error in this 
analysis, whereby there are statistically significant relationships between the independent 
variable and the dependent variables but these relationships remain hidden due to the 
choice of the unit of analysis.  Again, significant differences between the cities may be 
revealed at a smaller unit of analysis rather than at tract level.   
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A final limitation is the construction of the independent variable.  Another 
measure of RPTA (median investment amount per tract, for example) may have greater 
statistical associations with changes in neighborhoods indicators, and/or may uncover 
threshold effects regarding the value of RPTA homes needed in a neighborhood in order 
to see relationships between the program and change in neighborhoods.  Therefore, a 
recommendation for future research would be to conduct the current analysis again using 
a more robust measure of RPTA. 
In essence, there is a trade-off with changing one’s approach to the research 
questions.  Compiling data from multiple governmental sources will never be without 
some difficulty, especially the further back in time one goes, and in many cases there is 
no alternative data source.  Expanding the sample size is a noble pursuit, but is 
necessarily limited because RPTA is a state-level policy, and the researcher does not have 
control over the application of the treatment.  A smaller unit of analysis removes one’s 
ability to analyze HMDA data since it is only released at the tract level.  Using a different 
measure of RPTA such as investment values may prove to be more robust but there is an 
assumption that such information is accurately recorded and available, especially for 
units constructed prior to 2000.   
The researcher recognizes that this relatively small, non-random sample limits the 
ability to generalize the results beyond large cities in Ohio, which is the defined 
population.  However, this study was testing the generalizability of a particular statistical 
model used in the analysis (Galster, et al., 2004), as well as the usefulness of a set of 
previously-examined indicators of neighborhood change meant to capture complex 
dimensions of neighborhood constructs (Galster, et al, 2005).  A finding of no significant 
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statistical relationships does not disqualify the previous study’s results or the results of 
the current study.  Indeed, Galster et al., (2004) did not uncover significant relationships 
in their analysis until they examined only those census tracts above the mean value of the 
independent variable. Given the lack of studies examining relationships between 
residential tax abatement and change in urban neighborhoods and the practical usefulness 
of this study to local policy makers, the chosen approach is relevant.  As Shadish, et al. 
comment:  “Experiments that demonstrate limited generalizations may be just as valuable 
as those that demonstrate broad generalization” (p. 19).    
 
6.5  Suggestions for Future Research 
In addition to the aforementioned suggestions such as a different measure of the 
independent variable, the researcher has other suggestions for future research in the area 
of RPTA.  First, using a spatial model may result in a more robust analysis of these data.   
As Bates (2006) concluded in her spatial analysis of housing markets, predefined 
neighborhoods (e.g., census tracts) do not define areas for predicting the housing market 
response to policy.  Indeed,  
areas targeted for revitalization planning do not reflect variations in the housing 
market accurately...policy target boundaries could be shifted to more closely align 
with housing-quality variations across space. (p. 6) 
 
A second suggestion for future research is to examine the relationship between 
RPTA and changes in the racial composition of areas or, more interestingly, examining 
the role that RPTA may have in changing people’s perceptions of race, class, and levels 
of crime.  A third area to be explored in future research is an examination of how the 
anti-urban—pro-rural dichotomy continues to impact residential location decisions.  This 
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researcher argues that until there is a greater understanding of how this push factor is 
operating in the collective minds of American homebuyers, urban policies meant to 
influence residential choices will fall short of their true ability to impact such decisions. 
A final suggestion for future inquiry involves the statement made in Chapter V 
regarding a possible disconnect between the supply of funding for housing being made 
available in RPTA neighborhoods, and the potential homebuyers willing to invest in the 
new housing.  This result warrants further examination and could uncover a fundamental 
flaw in the way RPTA programs are currently being administered.  If a city has secured 
the development of RPTA but not secured the confidence of [non-predatory] mortgage 
lenders, then RPTA continually will fail to meet its program objectives, whether they are 
diminishing blight and crime or increasing investment and tax revenues.   
 
6.6  Concluding Remarks 
As Sands, Reese and Khan (2006) noted, incentives have been reported to be 
effective as well as ineffective in the literature because of differing methods, variation in 
the operationalization of "effectiveness", differing units of analysis and of time periods.  
Their general conclusion, and that of Dalehite, Mikesell & Zorn (2005), is that the more 
effective abatement programs seem to be local initiatives that are geographically targeted 
and evaluated periodically.  The conclusion reached in this dissertation does not lend 
support to this assertion.  Localized RPTA programs, even for the Ohio cities with the 
most geographically targeted approaches (Columbus and Dayton), do not appear to be 
related to desirable changes at the neighborhood level.  In essence, RPTA is not effective 
public policy for Ohio’s urban neighborhoods as examined in this study. 
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Table A1 
 
Independent Samples Test for Equality of Means between Subject & Comparison Groups 
 
 
Variable 2001 
 
 
t 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
HPMLA 
 
-1.857 
 
.065 
 
HPMLAAR 
 
-0.866 
 
.387 
 
DHPLO 
 
0.325 
 
.746 
 
BIZ 
 
-2.932 
 
.004* 
 
Type I Crimes 
 
 
-1.401 
 
.165 
Type II Crimes 
 
-0.047 .962 
Assessment Ratio 
 
1.113 .267 
       
   *  Significant at p < .05. 
 
Table A2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables for Census Tracts by Group 
 
 
 
 
Median 
Change in 
Sheriffs’ 
Sales, 
2001 to 
2006 
 
Median 
Housing 
Value, 
2003 
 
Median 
Change in 
Jobs, 2001 
to 2006 
 
Median 
No. of 
RPTA 
Units  
 
Median 
Dollar 
Loan 
Amounts, 
2005/06  
 
Median 
Loan 
Approval 
Rates, 
2005/06 
 
 
Median No. 
of Loan 
Applications, 
2005/06  
 
Mean No. 
Businesses, 
2006 
 
Median  
No. of 
Type I 
Crimes, 
2006 
 
Median 
No. of 
Type II 
Crimes, 
2006 
 
Median 
Assessment 
Ratio 
 
Subject 
 
137% 
 
$45,700 
 
-10.28%
 
7 
 
$76,000
 
47.85% 
 
78 
 
22 
 
161 
 
177 
 
1.22 
 
Comparison 
 
118% 
 
$50,975 
 
-8.62% 
 
NA 
 
$89,250
 
48.62% 
 
94 
 
32 
 
189 
 
213 
 
1.20 
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Table A3  Summary of Regression Coefficients for Subject Group, Significant at p < .05. 
   
 
Neighborhood Indicators 
  
 
Independent Variables  HPMLAAR HPMLA  MDHPMLO BIZ  TypeI  TypeII  AV_SP 
 
RPTA    NS*  4.489E-5^ NS  NS  NS  -1.979  NS 
      (.000)        (.763) 
 
MHV    NS  .000  NS  2.65E-5  NS  NS  NS 
      (.000)    (000) 
 
ΔJG    NS  NS  NS  .012  NS  NS  NS 
          (.007) 
 
Dummy_day   NS  -26.27  NS  NS  -74.51  57.654  .399 
      (6.664)      (16.991)  (17.848)  (.114) 
 
Dummy_tol   NS  18.16  -14746.47 -2.063  NA  NA  .512 
      (4.08)  (4914.125) (1.145)      (.072) 
   
Dummy_col   NS  24.35  25969.38  NS  NA  NA  -.391 
      (9.281)  (9936.22)       (.149) 
 
SS06    NS  .943  -550.09  NS  1.055  1.009  .010 
      (.147)  (113.160)   (.289)  (.362)  (.002) 
 
Y01 (pretest)   .502  .801  .747  .944  .853  .662  NS 
    (.056)  (.052)  (.085)  (.014)  (.043)  (.037) 
 
Constant*   .226  NS  21.33  NS  NS  35.96  1.168 
    (.033)    (5.97)      (10.962)  (.110) 
 
N    202  202  202  201  166  165  193 
^  RPTA**3 significant at p < .10.  
*  NS = Not Significant 
** Reflected in the constant term is the City of Cleveland, which is the base category for the dummy variables for CITY.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A4  Summary of Regression Coefficients for Comparison Group, Significant at p < .05. 
 
 
Neighborhood Indicators 
  
 
Independent Variables  HPMLAAR HPMLA  MDHPMLO BIZ  TypeI  TypeII  AV_SP 
 
MHV    1.52-E6 .000 NS*  NS  NS  NS  NS  -5.607E-6 
    (.000)  (.000)          (.000) 
 
ΔJG    NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS  NS 
 
Dummy_day   .079  NS  NS  NS  -79.755  NS  .466 
    (.023)        (18.896)    (.088) 
 
Dummy_tol   .044  NS  NS  -3.932  NA  NA  NS 
    (.019)      (1.799)      
   
Dummy_col   .049  18.96  NS  NS  NA  NA  NS 
    (.020)  (9.304)     
 
SS06    -.001  1.27  NS  NS  1.509  2.489  NS 
    (.000)  (.301)      (.427)  (.510) 
 
Y01 (pretest)   .199  .675  NS  1.001  .850  .631  .914 
    (.061)  (.107)    (.012)  (.058)  (.047)  (.196) 
 
Constant*   .299  NS  67661.03  NS  NS  NS  .731 
    (.031)    (15232.47)       (.164) 
 
N    120  120  119  119  62  62  116 
 
** Reflected in the constant term is the City of Cleveland, which is the base category for the dummy variables for CITY.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A5  
 
Model Summary for Outcome Variable Type I Crimes per Capita, 2006 
 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
 
Subject 
 
166 
 
.806 
 
.650 
 
.633 
 
.0289 
 
 
Comparison 
 
62 
 
.868 
 
.753 
 
.731 
 
.0217 
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Table A6 
 
Model Summary for Outcome Variable Type II Crime per Capita, 2006 
 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
R 
 
R Square 
 
Adjusted R 
Square 
 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
 
Subject 
 
165 
 
.832 
 
.693 
 
.677 
 
2643.048 
 
Comparison 
 
62 
 
.899 
 
.809 
 
.792 
 
2752.280 
 
 
 
